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Abstract 
The purpose of the current study was to develop a measurement of 
information security culture in developing countries such as Saudi 
Arabia. In order to achieve this goal, the study commenced with a 
comprehensive review of the literature, the outcome being the 
development of a conceptual model as a reference base. The literature 
review revealed a lack of academic and professional research into 
information security culture in developing countries and more 
specifically in Saudi Arabia. Given the increasing importance and 
significant investment developing countries are making in information 
technology, there is a clear need to investigate information security 
culture from developing countries perspective such as Saudi Arabia. 
Furthermore, our analysis indicated a lack of clear conceptualization 
and distinction between factors that constitute information security 
culture and factors that influence information security culture. Our 
research aims to fill this gap by developing and validating a 
measurement model of information security culture, as well as 
developing initial understanding of factors that influence security 
culture. 
A sequential mixed method consisting of a qualitative phase to explore 
the conceptualisation of information security culture, and a quantitative 
phase to validate the model is adopted for this research. In the 
qualitative phase, eight interviews with information security experts in 
eight different Saudi organisations were conducted, revealing that 
security culture can be constituted as reflection of security awareness, 
security compliance and security ownership. Additionally, the 
qualitative interviews have revealed that factors that influence security 
culture are top management involvement, policy enforcement, policy 
maintenance, training and ethical conduct policies. These factors were 
vi 
confirmed by the literature review as being critical and important for 
the creation of security culture and formed the basis for our initial 
information security culture model, which was operationalised and 
tested in different Saudi Arabian organisations. 
Using data from two hundred and fifty-four valid responses, we 
demonstrated the validity and reliability of the information security 
culture model through Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), followed by 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA.) In addition, using Structural 
Equation Modelling (SEM) we were further able to demonstrate the 
validity of the model in a nomological net, as well as provide some 
preliminary findings on the factors that influence information security 
culture. 
The current study contributes to the existing body of knowledge in two 
major ways: firstly, it develops an information security culture 
measurement model; secondly, it presents empirical evidence for the 
nomological validity for the security culture measurement model and 
discovery of factors that influence information security culture. The 
current study also indicates possible future related research needs.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Introduction  
One of the major benefits of information security culture creation is the 
protection of the organisation assets in which ultimately will have a 
“direct interaction with information assets and thereby minimize the 
threats that user behaviour poses to the protection of information 
assets” (Da Veiga, 2008) (p.1). The importance of creating a security 
culture within organisation settings arises from the fact that the human 
dimension in information security is always considered to be the 
weakest link (Chia, Maynard, & Ruighaver, 2002; Da Veiga & Eloff 
2009; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). Therefore, the creation of an 
information security culture is necessary for effective information 
security management (Eloff & Eloff, 2005; Eloff & von Solms, 2000).  
Although previous literature has provided a good understanding of how 
information security culture can be created there certainly remains a 
lack of empirically validated research in the information security culture 
area. Currently, there are only three information security culture 
empirical research instruments available (Da Veiga & Eloff, (2009); 
Martins & Eloff, (2002); Schlienger & Teufel, (2003). All of the following 
studies have provided valuable input to the information security culture 
research, specifically to the quantitative area. Schlienger and Teufel 
(2003) designed a questionnaire to obtain an understanding of official 
rules intended to influence security behaviour of employees. Martins 
and Eloff (2002) developed a theoretical information security culture 
framework in order to assess information security culture. However, the 
information security culture questionnaire designed by Martins and 
Eloff (2002) was not validated in a real world environment. Finally, Da 
Veiga, and Eloff, (2009) designed an information security culture 
assessment instrument. The Da Veiga, and Eloff, (2009) work is 
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considered the most comprehensive approach to assessing information 
security culture. The existing literature has emphasized the importance 
of information security culture and provided suggestions and guidelines 
on how to assess information security culture. However, these literature 
analyses have not provided a clear understanding of how security 
culture must be conceptualized in order for researchers to develop an 
instrument for the understanding and measurement of an information 
security culture model. Therefore, there is still a lack of systemic 
treatment, understanding and measurement of information security 
culture. As a result, the current study was decided on to add to the 
existing body of knowledge. It uses a mixed method approach and 
focuses on developing a reliable and valid information security culture 
measurement model that conceptualizes elements or factors pertaining 
to security culture.  
1.2 Overview of Research Problem  
The increasing uses of Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICT) also see increased incidents of computer abuse (Dhillon & 
Backhouse, 2000). A Computer Security Institute survey suggested that 
the lack of sufficient information security has resulted in losses of $124 
million and in England the Audit Commission estimated losses to the 
order if nearly $2 billion (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000). Unfortunately, 
information security has been widely considered as technical issues 
rather than managerial issues (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000, von Solms, 
2000). As a result, many organizations are not adequately investing in 
information security (Gordon & Loeb 2002). It has been noted that 
aspects can reduce information security breaches (Straub, 1990; Straub 
& Welke, 1998). One of the most important behaviour aspects is the 
creation of information security culture. Despite the importance of 
creating a security culture environment towards maintaining and 
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managing information security, the literature review in Chapter 2 
identifies the need to investigate information security culture in 
developing countries such as Saudi Arabia. Also, it demonstrates the 
importance of understanding the critical factors that conceptualised 
information security culture in developing countries such as Saudi 
Arabia. Additionally, the literature analyses have indicated a lack of 
understanding and measurement of information security culture in 
developed and developing countries alike (Chia, Maynard, & Ruighaver, 
2002b; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007, Schlienger & Teufel, 2002). Therefore, 
there are substantial needs to develop a reliable and valid information 
security measurement model as a primary goal. To address these 
issues, the core research problem for the current study was: 
What are the characteristics that conceptualize an information security 
culture measurement model for Saudi Arabian organisations? 
1.3 Research Goal 
The goal of this research was: 
To provide and develop a useful understanding of an information 
security culture measurement model that is reliable and valid and that 
will assist researchers and practitioners to understand the complexity 
and challenges that surround the nature of information security 
culture, particularly in the Saudi Arabian context. 
This research goal was achieved by addressing the following research 
objectives and questions.    
1.4 Research Objectives 
The objectives of the research were to: 
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• Identify, present and discuss: firstly, factors that constitute or 
reflect security culture; and secondly, factors that have direct 
influence on information security culture and which might 
influence the effectiveness of information security management 
practices in developing countries such as Saudi Arabia. 
• Understand the relevance of these identified factors and their 
interactions with each other, in order to produce an information 
security culture measurement model for Saudi Arabian 
organisations. 
• Assess and validate a security culture measurement model using 
a nomological validity net by gathering data from a real-world 
situation and developing an initial understanding of the factors 
influencing security culture components in the Saudi context.  
1.5 Research Questions 
In order to achieve the research objectives, the following research 
questions were constructed: 
1. What are the factors that constitute or reflect security culture in 
the Saudi context? 
2. What are the factors that have direct influence on information 
security culture in the Saudi context? 
3. How can a reliable and valid information security culture 
measurement model be developed?  
The collection of data was made and the analysis applied using a 
positivistic research approach to address the research questions above. 
This sought to achieve the research objectives and the research goal.   
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1.6 Research Design 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the high level of the research process for the 
current study. A mixed methodological design using sequential 
qualitative and quantitative approaches was used to understand and 
interpret the research findings.   
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Figure1.1: Outline of Research Process 
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1.7 Benefits of the Research 
The current study has practical and academic benefits. Section 1.7.1 
describes the practical benefits while section 1.7.2 describes the 
academic benefits.   
1.7.1 Applied Benefits 
The applied benefits of the research include the following: 
• An information security culture validated measurement model 
which can be used to investigate security culture will be 
developed with a view to promoting an environment that will lead 
to the understanding or the creation of a security culture within 
Saudi Arabian organisations.  
• A significant increase in the body of knowledge will result to 
assist managers in Saudi Arabia to understand the importance of 
information security culture in the Saudi context.  
1.7.2 Academic Benefits 
The academic benefits of the current study include the following: 
• A validated information security measurement model in the 
domain of security culture that can be applied and tested in other 
contexts will result.  
• An extension of knowledge about information security culture to 
help address the paucity of information security research that 
exists with respect to developing countries emerges.   
• A foundation for comparative studies in information security 
culture between developed and developing countries results.  
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1.8 Research Focus 
The focus of the current study is on factors relevant to information 
security, and security culture in Saudi Arabian organisations. Issues 
integral to the current study are factors associated with information 
security culture in the Saudi environment. Additionally, these factors 
might influence information security culture practices in the Saudi 
context. Reference might be made to peripheral issues for the sake of 
completeness, for example: 
• Technical issues related to information security in Saudi Arabian 
organisations. 
• National and organisational culture that might influence 
information security practices or activities in the Saudi 
environment.  
1.9 Potential Limitations  
Some limitations affecting the study include: 
• Lack of support for and understanding of the importance of 
academic research in developing countries such as Saudi, 
including lack of relevant theory that suits the research problem 
investigated.  
• The information security culture area is relatively immature in 
terms of academic research. The current study is one of the first 
to empirically validate an information security culture 
measurement model.  
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1.10 Thesis Overview 
Chapter 1 of the current thesis introduces the research problem and 
addresses the research goals, objectives, questions, design benefits, 
focus, potential limitations and thesis overview.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the literature review. This chapter aims to present 
an introduction to information security culture and gives a brief 
information security management background. Afterwards, background 
information about Saudi Arabia’s development plans including those for 
the educational, economic, social and cultural, and Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) facets is discussed. This section 
illustrates the Saudi government’s massive plans and investment 
promises to develop Saudi Arabian infrastructure. Then the 
development of the conceptual model will be examined. This includes an 
extensive review of an information security culture framework in order 
to develop a conceptual model. This includes identifying a set of 
candidate factors that conceptualize security culture as an important 
factor for the research conceptual model. The outcome of Chapter 2 is 
the conceptual model.    
Chapter 3 presents the research methodology. This chapter begins with 
the research questions and is followed by the research design and 
justification. This chapter describes the qualitative data analysis, 
including data collection procedures, sampling and analysis techniques. 
This chapter then describes the quantitative data analysis, including 
survey rationale, analysis approach, survey content, questionnaire 
development, data collection method, measurement scale, sampling, 
pre-testing, analysis technique and data validation. The last section of 
Chapter 3 is the summary. This chapter illustrates the integrated 
approach of qualitative and quantitative methods under a single 
research design.   
Chapter 1: Introduction 
10 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the development of the information security 
culture model. It presents the interview findings and discusses them. 
Additionally, the refinement of the conceptual model will be also 
discussed in this chapter. Afterwards, by hypothesis, development 
associated with relationships between the model constructs will be 
examined. Then, the construct operationalisations will be discussed 
extensively. The operationalisation of the information security culture 
model constructs is discussed, in order to produce viable measurement 
variables that capture the underlying meaning of each construct. This 
includes the adoption and the construction of scale for the research 
model construct. Finally, this chapter concludes with a summary of the 
chapter.  
Chapter 5A presents the detailed results of the descriptive statistics 
analysis based on the questionnaire survey of Saudi Arabian 
organisations. The chapter begins by presenting the profiles of the 
survey respondents, followed by the screening of the survey data to 
ensure that it is suitable for the subsequent multivariate statistical 
analysis such as Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). The 
preliminary findings interpreted from the survey are then presented.  
Chapter 5B presents the results of the measurement scale analysis, 
including the analysis results of scale reliability, which helped to assess 
the internal consistency of the measurement scales utilized in the 
survey questionnaire. Next, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) techniques are presented. EFA 
helped to uncover the appropriate number of factors (i.e. factor 
structures) for each model construct. CFA confirmed the identified 
factor structures, which further strengthened the validity of each 
construct. 
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Chapter 6 illustrates the process for the information security culture 
measurement model testing. The model assessment was sequentially 
undertaken based on the results of the above measurement scale 
analysis. This chapter begins with SEM overviews using Covariance-
based method such as Analysis of Moment Structures (AMOS). 
Measurement model assessment is then discussed, followed by the 
measurement model results. Afterwards, the testing of nomological 
validity for the information security culture model is examined.  
Chapter 7 is the conclusion. It begins with an overview of the research 
project, followed by the research problem and subsequent research 
questions. Next, contributions to the existing body of knowledge are 
presented, followed by implications for academic and practitioners. 
Afterwards, limitations of the research are discussed, followed by future 
research opportunities.   
Figure 1.2 shows the thesis structure.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of 
information security culture. This includes an introduction to 
information security culture and a brief background to information 
security management. Then an introduction to the Saudi context is 
provided that includes explanations of factors influencing the 
implementation of new technology in Saudi Arabia such as educational, 
economical, social and cultural and technological considerations. 
Afterwards, the conceptual model development will be investigated. The 
development and production of the conceptual model was based on a 
comprehensive review of academic and professional literature on 
information security cultural areas. Additionally, in this chapter 
cultural factors such as national and organisational culture will be 
examined. The chapter will be finalized by identifying the conceptual 
model factors that present a set of candidate factors that conceptualize 
security culture models in developing countries such as Saudi Arabia.  
2.2 Introduction to Information Security Culture 
Before discussing information security culture, this study reviewed 
some security culture definitions. Some of the definitions found for 
security culture are: 
• Da Veiga, ( 2008; p.26) provided a more extensive definition for  
information security culture as:  
An information security culture is defined as the attitudes, 
assumptions, beliefs, values, and knowledge that 
employees/stakeholders use to interact with the organisation’s 
systems and procedures at any point in time. The interaction 
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results in acceptable procedures at any point in time. The 
interaction results in acceptable or unacceptable behaviour (i.e. 
incidents) evident in artefacts and creations that become part of 
the way things are done in an organisation to protect its 
information assets. This information security culture changes 
over time.  
• Schlienger and Teufel (2003; p.405) state that information 
security culture is a subculture in regards to content. They 
declare: Security culture encompasses all socio-cultural 
measures that support technical security measures, so that 
information security becomes a natural aspect in the daily 
activities of every employee. 
• Dhillon; (1995; p.90) defines security culture as: The totality of 
patterns of behaviours in an organisation that contribute to the 
protection of information of all kinds. 
• Von Solms (2000; p.618) calls for security culture creation within 
organisation: By instilling the aspects of information security to 
every employee as a natural way of performing his or her daily 
job. 
Von Solms (2000; p.616) added that: 
corporate information security culture that supports the 
information security policies, procedures, methods and 
responsibilities of the company, in such a way that information 
security becomes a natural aspect of the day to day activities of 
all employees of the company.  
• Martin and Eloff’s (2002; p.204-205) discussed information 
security culture as: 
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• A set of information security characteristics that the 
organisation values,  
• The assumption about what is acceptable and what is not 
in relation to information security,  
• The assumption about what information security behaviour 
is encouraged and what is not,  
• The way people behave towards information security in the 
organization. 
Many studies have shown that the establishment of an information 
security culture is necessary for effective information security (M. Eloff 
& von Solms, 2000; S. von Solms, 2000). What makes information 
security culture challenging is the complexity of defining and 
understanding both of the elements ‘security’ and ‘culture’. Quantifying 
information security is challenging (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). Security 
culture reflects the values and beliefs of information security shared by 
all members at all levels of an organisation (D’Arcy & Greene, 2009). 
Security culture covers social, cultural and ethical measures to improve 
the relevant security behaviour of organisational members (Schlienger & 
Teufel, 2003). It concentrates on a small aspect of human values and 
behaviours, and does not cover all the basic human values, norms and 
beliefs that influence organisational culture (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). 
In addition, ‘culture’ itself is a complex concept in which difficult to 
measure. It has been argued that measuring security and culture is a 
complex process that will take significant time to investigate and is 
extremely hard to generalise to a large population (Schlienger & Teufel, 
2003). As a result, the challenge faced is to quantify and investigate 
critical elements that conceptualize and measure security culture.  
Despite the importance of the previous definitions in recognising the 
need to create security culture in order to manage security effectively, 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
16 
these definitions only focuses on the manifestation of information 
security culture within organizations. They define what security culture 
is-it reflects values, behaviour, beliefs, altitude and action of the 
organizations members. These definitions did not specifically discussed 
what factors or constructs that constitute or conceptualized information 
security culture.  
Most of the current information security culture researches had applied 
theories from different perspective: from organization culture (Chang & 
Lin, 2007); organization behaviour (van Niekerk & von Solms, 2003); 
total quality management (Chia et al., 2003); and as part of national 
culture (Chaula 2006). Some of the existing literature has adopted 
Schein organizational culture model to study information security 
culture (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003;  Zakaria, 2004; von Solms, 2005; 
Thomson & von Solms, 2005). These studies indicated that all of the 
information security elements and issues can be represented in the 
three levels of the organizations culture model (artefacts, values and 
assumptions). These studies indicated information security culture is a 
product of different factors in which influence the behaviour of 
individual within the organization settings. However, these studies also 
did not define or specify what factors can represent or conceptualize 
information security culture. These studies have broadly describe 
information security culture can be created without specifying factors 
that constitute or conceptualize information security culture. As a 
result, there is a clear gap on the existing literature of what constitutes 
a security culture in terms of identifying factors or elements that are 
necessary for the creation of a security culture. More details in terms of 
the lack of agreement will be presented in the development of the 
information security culture conceptual model (Section 2.7).  
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Based on this discussion, this study attempts to fill this gap by 
developing an information security culture measurement model that will 
conceptualise security culture. Because it is nearly impossible to 
investigate every aspect of security culture in every organisation, this 
study focuses on factors for security culture creation in the Saudi 
context. However, to do this, it is also necessary to provide background 
information about factors that could influence the implementation of 
new technology in Saudi Arabia such as economical, education, social 
and cultural and technological in order to understand the complexity 
that surrounds security culture in developing countries. These factors 
could strongly influence information security management and 
behaviour and ultimately will influence the information security culture 
of the organization. These factors will be examined in details in section 
2.5. First, however, a brief introduction to information security 
management is provided.  
2.3 Information Security Management Background 
Information 
Information security may be defined as “the prevention of, and recovery 
from, unauthorized or undesirable destruction, modification, disclosure, 
or use of information and information resources, whether accidental or 
intentional” (Longley, Shain, & Caelli, 1992)(p.244). According to 
Pfleeger (1997), information security is the preservation of the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of information and 
information resources, where basic services are described as: 
1. Confidentiality of sensitive information, which is concerned with 
preventing the disclosure of information to unauthorized users, 
either because of its sensitivity or the technical nature of its 
information. 
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2. Integrity, which is concerned with ensuring that data is created 
and maintained with appropriate controls to ensure that the 
information is correct, auditable and reproducible. It is also 
concerned with ensuring that data cannot be modified without 
authorization. 
3. Availability, which is concerned with ensuring that information is 
available to authorized users when required (Pfleeger, 1997) (P.5). 
The goal of information security management, however, is also to 
prevent or at least minimize the damage to organisational assets 
through developing and maintaining quality information 
infrastructures, and using processes and procedures (J. Eloff & Eloff, 
2003; Gerber & von Solms, 2005). Information security management 
has several benefits. For example, the establishment of information 
security management has improved organisations’ performance and by 
becoming the normal way of doing business it can ensure business 
continuity (Information Security Standards ISO/IEC 27002, 2005). It 
also enhances the confidence and effectiveness of information services 
within an organisation, or between an organisation and its external 
business partners (R. von Solms, 1996). As a result, developed 
countries such as the USA, the UK, European Union and Australia have 
invested in the construction of information security management 
guidelines, standards and procedural practices in order to successfully 
protect their IT infrastructures from compromise and damage 
(Rathmell, 2001).  
Information security management practices in developed countries 
occur because of the recognition of the importance of information 
security management and its impact on their economies. According to 
an Ernst and Young survey, security incidents such as denial of service, 
virus and worms can cost companies between $17 and $28 million for 
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each occurrence (Garg, Curtis, & Halper, 2004). Breaches and attacks 
on security in developed countries influence organisations’ prosperity, 
including reputation, money loss and business confidence. Additionally, 
globalization and international competition increases the importance of 
information security management (R. von Solms, 1998, 1999). 
Therefore, organisations in developed countries ensure a secure 
environment in their ICT infrastructures in order to enhance 
performance and productivity. Many countries in the developed 
countries have realized the impact of ICT and the important role it plays 
in developing societies, boosting economies, and increasing income for 
states and individuals ("World Information Technology and Service 
Alliance," 2005). For example, ICT worldwide raised its contribution to 
the international Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 5.5% in 1993 to 
6.75% in 2004 ("World Information Technology and Service Alliance," 
2005). The size of the ICT in developed countries sector in 2004 reached 
2.6 trillion dollars worldwide. For example, ICT increases in which the 
US economy grew annually from 1.5% (for the period 1974-1995) to 
2.5% (for the period 1995-2000) ("World Information Technology and 
Service Alliance," 2005). ICT in Ireland contributes to more than 16% of 
the country’s GDP and helped to reduce unemployment in 1988 from 
17% to only 4% ("World Information Technology and Service Alliance," 
2005).  In Korea however, ICT contributed more than 12% in the year 
2000 ("World Information Technology and Service Alliance," 2005).  All 
of these figures indicated the importance of ICT, and the high priority 
accorded to it in some countries has led to fundamental changes in 
their economies. As a result, the maturity of ICT infrastructures has 
contributed to the economy of the developed countries.  
Developing countries such as Saudi Arabia have invested in creating 
and building ICT infrastructures that assist the establishment of 
effective information security management practices, as will be 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
20 
discussed in the subsequent sections. It is important to understand the 
factors influencing the implementation of new technology that 
surrounds ICT infrastructures in order to gain knowledge of the Saudi 
context. The very same factors that positively impact ICT practice 
developed countries could negatively affect the implementation of ICT 
infrastructures in the Saudi environment (Al-Gahtani; 2004, AL-Shehry, 
Rogerson, Fairweather & Prior 2006; CITC, 2006). It is also important to 
realize that effective information security management can be achieved 
by the creation of an information security culture as will be discussed 
later in the literature. This background information will be discussed in 
the section following that on the Saudi background information. 
2.4 Saudi Arabia Background Information 
Before discussing the factors influencing the implementation of new 
technology in Saudi Arabia, it is appropriate to describe background 
information about the Saudi Arabia context first. Saudi Arabia is 
considered to be a developing country ("World Bank," 2009). The World 
Bank (2009) defined developing countries as low- or middle- income 
countries where living standards are thought to be low relative to high-
income countries. Developing countries have low standards of living and 
a low industrial capacity ("World Bank," 2009). Despite this status, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in the Middle East, 
comprising 25% of the Arab World's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(USSABC, 2008). This document refers to Saudi Arabia as a kingdom. It 
is the world's leading oil exporter, possessing 19.5% of the world’s 
proven oil reserves (Central Intelligent Agency, 2011). Saudi Arabia is 
the leading country in the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). Saudi Arabia has commenced several mega internal 
infrastructures projects since the early 1970s. The total cost of these 
ongoing projects is estimated to be $283 billion, with up to $700 billion 
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in on-going investment on Saudi infrastructures planned over the next 
20 years (SABB, 2007; SAMBA, 2008; USSABC, 2008). The budget for 
the fiscal year 2011 in Saudi Arabia was the largest in Saudi’s economic 
history, around 155 Billon US Dollars and the GDP was 585 Billon US 
Dollars (Central Intelligent Agency, 2011).These facts show tremendous 
growth and opportunities for business to be established in Saudi Arabia 
as a developing country. However, business leaders and investors 
require an environment that provides opportunities to succeed. These 
opportunities include the development of human resources through 
education, economic incentives to operate, and social, cultural and 
technological infrastructures. These concerns have been addressed in 
Saudi government economic development plans, the latest of which is 
the 9th plan, approved in August 2010 (Ministry of Planning, 2011). The 
next section of this chapter and its subsections examine background 
information about factors influencing the implementation of new 
technology in the Saudi environment.  
2.5 Factor Influencing the Implementation of New Technology 
in Saudi Arabia 
Factors such as technical, cultural, educational, economic and social 
issues influence the implementation of new technology particularly in 
the Saudi context (AL-Sedairy, 1994; Chadhar & Rahmati, 2004; Yavas, 
Luqmani, & Quraeshi, 1992; Zakaria., Stanton, & Sarker-Barney, 
2003). The next sections will provide background information about 
these factors.  
2.5.1 Economic Perspective  
The Saudi government launched a development plan between 1990 and 
2000 which emphasized the improvement of educational, financial, legal 
and technical services, to create private sector employment 
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opportunities for Saudi citizens ("Country Profile: Saudi Arabia," 2009). 
The purpose was to reduce the dependency of the country’s economy on 
the oil sector by diversifying economic activity. The current plan which 
is the 9th (2010-2015) continues to focus on economic diversification, 
increasing expenditure on education ("Background Note: Saudi Arabia," 
2011). 
Saudi Arabia has enormous economic leadership in the Middle East. 
Saudi Arabia has the biggest export and import market in the Arab 
world ("Why Invest in Saudi Arabia," 2010). It has an oil-based economy 
with strong government controls over its major economic activities. In 
the last two decades, Saudi Arabia has spent about US $1.2 trillion on 
infrastructure projects Jasimuddin (2001) which have attracted people 
from all over the world who are seeking employment. The improving 
business environment, boosted by privatization and liberalization, is 
giving the Saudi economy an increasing edge in attracting foreign 
investors in the country ("Why Invest in Saudi Arabia," 2010). Mega 
projects in various industries and Saudi’s economic liberalization 
ensure that there are no economic factors that can prevent Saudi 
Arabia’s dynamic growth ("Saudi Economy Goes from Strength to 
Strength," 2009). The Saudi government succeeded in making the 
country one of the top ten world destinations, in terms of investment 
competitiveness in 2010. This has been achieved because Saudi is 
ranked 7th for the most rewarding tax system in the world and 4th in 
the world for “fiscal freedom”. Other factors contributing to this high 
ranking included: 
• Ranked the 7th freest labour market in the world, according to 
the World Economic Forum; 
• The largest economy in the Middle East and North Africa;  
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
23 
• One of the fastest growing countries, per capita income is forecast 
to rise from $20,700 in 2007 to $33,500 by 2020;  
• The fastest reform business climate;  
• The largest free market in the Middle East and North Africa, 
representing 25% of total Arab GDP;  
• Has 19.5% of the world’s oil reserves; 
• 13th overall ease of doing business globally;  
• 1st for ease of registering property;  
• The largest recipient of Foreign Direct Investment in the Arab 
world ("Why Invest in Saudi Arabia," 2011).  
The growth in the Saudi economy is dependent upon the growth of 
technologies in Saudi Arabia and this growth of technologies requires 
effective ICT infrastructure. However, ICT and information security in 
particular and their implementation face several barriers such as lack 
of ICT expert’s (CITC, 2006). Information security is part of large ICT 
infrastructure scale projects that the Saudi government is developing as 
part of the country’s growth. However, information security issues could 
prevent the development process of Saudi Arabia economy. Information 
security issues could cause significant damages to the Saudi 
organizations and the national economy. Therefore, the Saudi 
government has established organizations (such as Elem Company) for 
protecting and providing guidelines for secure environment in the 
public and private sectors (CITC, 2006). The investment of the Saudi 
government in the ICT and information security in particular has 
encouraged private and public organizations to increase the 
productivity and performance of organizations. As a result, this will 
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increase the expansion of the technology industry in Saudi Arabia and 
ultimately the growth in the Saudi national economy.  
2.5.2 Educational Perspective 
Education is a key to economic growth and to people’s ability to earn a 
living. It is also important for society, as it responds to increasing 
cultural and ethnic diversity ("Organizations for Economic Cooperation 
and Development," 2009). Education is important for the Saudi 
government and its people. There has been substantial growth in 
education in the Kingdom over the last 40 years and it is still growing 
("Why Invest in Saudi Arabia," 2010). The high percentage of young 
children in the Saudi Arabian population has caused the government to 
increase its spending on the education and training sector. The total 
population is expected to reach nearly 40 million by 2025 (Mouwad, 
2008). Currently in Saudi almost 60% of the population of 26 million is 
under the age of 25, and 40 % of those are under 15. The big challenge 
then is to build educational facilities and create jobs  ("Why Invest in 
Saudi Arabia," 2010). For this reason the Saudi government has a keen 
interest in the provision of education and training, as reflected in the 
establishment of large-scale projects such as schools, vocational 
training centres, universities and technical colleges. Such projects are 
spread over various regions of the Kingdom and will be worth an 
expected total value of up to US$100 billion over the next 20 years 
(USSABC, 2008). As the world’s 7th highest education spender, Saudi 
Arabia is investing heavily in education and training programs to 
provide a workforce capable of world leadership in a knowledge-based 
economy ("Why Invest in Saudi Arabia," 2010).  
Several educational and training bodies have prepared the ICT 
manpower in order to prepare the necessary human resources that 
satisfy the market demand in Saudi Arabia (CITC, 2006). These 
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includes universities, colleges, the General Organization for Technical 
Education and Vocational Training that offers certification programs by 
international ICT companies, plus special training courses. Some 
interesting statistics reveals that more than 12000 university students 
in ICT specializations and more than 13000 students in specialized ICT 
diplomas (CITC, 2006). Graduation statistics for the same year showed 
that around 1000 university ICT students and around 2500 diploma 
ICT students have graduated. Despite these increasing efforts, it has 
been observed that there are still big deficiencies in high and specialized 
diplomas in sub-specializations such as information security (CITC, 
2006). 
The Saudi government‘s willingness to raise educational levels 
encourages private industries to establish businesses in the country 
and employ highly-skilled Saudi residents. Raising education in Saudi 
Arabia would encourage and make the process of the adoption of new 
technology such as information security much easier (CITC, 2006). As a 
result, the Saudi government‘s investment in educational facilities helps 
the establishment of ICT infrastructures in the Kingdom and 
information security as an essential part in ensuring the success of 
Saudi economic plans.  
2.5.3 Social and Cultural Perspective 
The attitude of Saudi nationals towards technology has changed 
tremendously during the past decade (AL-Gahtani, 2004). Business 
technology in Saudi Arabia accounts for 40 percent of all computer and 
IT application sales in the Gulf region, with a US$5 billion information 
technology market. The increased of IT application sales has resulted in 
an increase in Internet connections, e-banking services and growing 
usage of e-commerce. Growth in information technology is also being 
fuelled by an expansion in the country’s young population (see Section 
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2.5.2) which is increasingly interested in technology. Al-Gahtani (2004) 
however reported there are several factors that have encouraged IT 
acceptance in Saudi Arabia, of which the main factors are the positive 
attitudes of the government and the improvement in organisational 
performance. Al-Gahtani (2004) also found IT acceptance in Saudi 
Arabia is slower than in other countries due to conservative beliefs 
within Saudi society, as it is believed that IT originated in developed 
countries to suit their cultural values. A study by AL-Shehry, Rogerson, 
Fairweather and Prior (2006) found the IT industry in Saudi Arabia is 
influenced by many factors, such as organisational, human, social and 
cultural issues. Ahmed, Zairi and Alwabel (2006) found that Saudi 
citizens favour face-to-face contact and the development of the IT 
industry changes their interactions. Saudi citizens do not favour 
changes in their working environments (Ahmed, Zairi, & Alwabel, 2006). 
AL-Turki and Tang (1998) and Yavas, et al (1992) found that diffusion of 
technology in Saudi Arabia has a number of problems, such as 
technical problems including lack of IT planning and expertise, and low 
levels of management support as well as cultural and social barriers. A 
recent study by Idris (2007) also showed that Saudi national culture 
remains the main challenge to organizations attempting to transform 
their local employees into a competitive advantage. As a result, national 
cultures could influence the widespread use of technology among Arab 
countries because cultural beliefs, including those in Saudi Arabia, 
have a strong influence on Information Technology diffusion (Straub., 
Loch, & Hill, 2003). Saudi culture and society influence the people’s 
interactions with existing or new activities or practices, especially when 
they are adopting Western knowledge systems (AL-Sedairy, 1994; AL-
Shehry et al., 2006; AL-Turki & Tang, 1998). The Saudis face the 
dilemma of preserving their cultural and religious heritage, while 
benefitting from the advantages of wealth (Siblini, 2004). Saudi society 
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is known to have a complex cultural and social system especially in 
terms of the adoption of new technologies (Bjerke & Al-Meer, 1993). 
Despite the economic prosperity in Saudi Arabia, it is still suffering 
from various factors similar to those of other developing countries, such 
as cultural, social and educational factors that delay the recognition 
and approval of Information Technology. However, despite the social 
and cultural obstacles in Saudi Arabia, the government is always 
planning and encouraging modernization, and has provided the 
equipment needed to accelerate the technological transformation 
process to a knowledge-based economy.  
2.5.4. Information and Communication Technologies  
Many countries have realized the importance of ICT in improving the 
lives of individuals and society, and its role in boosting the economy 
and income for the individual and the state (CITC, 2006). The 
continually increasing use of ICT worldwide over the last decade has led 
to huge profits for countries and companies that invested in ICT 
production and utilization. ICT represented 6.75% of international GDP 
in 2004, and is still growing ("World Information Technology and Service 
Alliance," 2005). The size of this sector in the Middle East is less than 
2% (approximately 50 billion dollars) ("World Information Technology 
and Service Alliance," 2005). To achieve a high level of technological 
adoption, Saudi Arabia has developed a National Communications and 
IT Plan (NCITP) as part of the economic development plan. The ICT 
infrastructures are to be established to increase the productivity and 
performance of both organisations and individuals in Saudi Arabia. The 
National Communications and IT Plan (NCITP) comprises these two 
components: 
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• The first five-year plan for Communications and IT in the 
Kingdom. 
• A long-term perspective for Communications and IT in the 
Kingdom. 
The first five-year plan is a progression towards the long-term 
perspective. The long-term vision for ICT in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia is: 
The transformation into an information society and digital 
economy so as to increase productivity and provide 
communication and IT services for the sectors of the society in all 
parts of the country and build a solid a information industry that 
becomes a major source of income (CITC, 2006)(P.4). 
The Kingdom has paid special attention to information technology, as 
emphasized in the five-year development plan, as well as the long term 
national comprehensive development plan (CITC, 2006). The plan’s 
objective is to promote public services, achieve prosperity for society, 
raise the productivity of all sectors and consequently raise the GDP. The 
objectives are focused on supporting ICT industries; innovation; 
creativity; invention and development in order to diversify income 
sources and achieve sustainable economic growth; create high paying 
job opportunities; and raise the efficiency of education and training 
systems through the employment of ICT (CITC, 2006). Another objective 
is to bridge the digital divide by enabling all societal sectors to reach 
and access ICT services easily within reasonable costs (CITC, 2006). The 
ministry of communications and technology promoted the need for 
establishing government regulations, laws, and the provision of a 
conducive investment environment to attract domestic and foreign 
capital (CITC, 2006). 
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The Kingdom’s ICT plan that was launched in 2006 has already 
succeeded in establishing the basic indicators of an information society 
such as the number of fixed phone lines; the number of mobile phone 
lines; the number of personal computers; and the number of Internet 
users per 100 inhabitants. According to CITC (2011) the mobile service 
growth in Saudi Arabia was extraordinary in the last decade, moving 
from 12% penetration up to 191% penetration. Other indicators that 
Saudi Arabia is moving to an information society include its household 
teledensity of around 66.9%; the fact that broadband subscriptions 
have grown to over 4.8 million with an average annual growth in the 
last five years of 123%; and the number of Internet users that has 
grown to an estimated 11.8 million from around 1 million in 2001. 
These key indicators of ICT in the Kingdom show that Saudi 
experienced significant growth in areas essential to the economic 
development plans.  
The Saudi government‘s willingness to invest in the ICT infrastructures 
assist the local enterprises to invest in the country.  The government 
urged the local organizations to utilize the Saudi ICT infrastructures. 
One of the major invest of the Saudi government in the ICT is through 
the usage of E-government. The Saudi government is expected to spend 
800 US millions dollars to develop an E-government system (CITC, 
2006). This will encourage private industries to establish businesses in 
the country. Therefore, the Saudi government‘s investment in the ICT 
infrastructures in the Kingdom is an essential part in ensuring the 
success of Saudi economic plans. 
2.6 Information Security in the Future Perspective for Saudi 
Development 
Saudi’s booming economy has enabled the government and private 
sector to focus their vision on various projects to enrich the national 
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economy: education, infrastructure, transportation and other 
industries. The government has also supported the establishment of 
future ICT projects in which information security is seen as part of the 
future of the country (CITC, 2006). These projects encourage the private 
and public sectors to plan more projects and to hire ICT and 
information technology experts from all over the world, to guarantee 
their successful implementation (AL-Shehry et al., 2006). 
One of the main Saudi strategic plans is to provide the necessary 
machinery to guarantee the security and protection of information. The 
Saudi government has emphasized the importance of adopting scientific 
and technological courses of action that satisfy the needs of security 
and development (CITC, 2006). In particular, the Saudi government has 
launched multiple information security projects to raise the security 
level of ICT networks and protect the privacy for both organisations and 
individuals. The projects involve: 
• Setting up regulation of information, computers and the internet, 
expected to protect the rights of owners as well as improve the 
security of ICT systems;  
• Setting up a special unit for monitoring and investigating crimes 
in ICT networks;  
• Setting up a national advisory centre for ICT network security in 
the Kingdom, to provide consultation with regard to security 
issues and to increase awareness of security problems and 
threats;  
• Launching further projects to increase the number of experts in 
information security in the country, by providing scholarships 
abroad for students to specialize in information security because 
of lack of expertise in the field in Saudi Arabia (CITC, 2006).  
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The launching of these projects by the Saudi government has shown the 
urgency felt by Saudi officials to develop a more secure environment in 
the ICT infrastructures in order to minimize damages and losses from 
intruders or attackers. For these security projects to succeed, the 
creation of a security culture within Saudi Arabian organisations is 
requisite.  
 
2.7 Development of Conceptual Model 
This study discusses in Section 2.3 the definition of information 
security and its basic service which is confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. The creation of information security culture was necessary 
since human behaviour posts significant risks to the protection of 
information assets of the organization. Two to three percent of 
organization annual profits are lost due to information security 
incidents mainly caused by human behaviour (McIlwarth, 2006).  
Since the focus of this study is to develop a reliable and valid 
information security culture measurement model, an understanding of 
current information security culture existing models and frameworks is 
essential. As a result, a comprehensive review of information security 
culture models and frameworks in the developing countries and 
specifically in the Saudi Arabian environment was conducted. Early 
findings indicated a lack of academic and professional literature in the 
Saudi Arabia environment about information security management, and 
particularly information security culture. Therefore, a comprehensive 
review of information security culture in developed countries such as 
the USA, the UK, the European Union, Australia and South Africa was 
conducted, and used as a foundation for developing the conceptual 
model. The first purpose of the comprehensive review is to identify and 
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examine the conceptualizations of information security culture, as an 
essential step in developing the conceptual model that assists 
effectiveness of information security management in Saudi Arabian 
organisations. The second purpose of this comprehensive review is to 
provide a detailed list and analysis of constructs that were proposed by 
each study in the information security culture area in order to develop 
the research conceptual model.  
This review has also focused on studies that included a questionnaire 
instrument that assesses information security culture to assist in 
developing an information security culture measurement model. The 
main reason for focusing on studies that include a questionnaires 
instrument because it will assist this study in developing a reliable a 
valid an information security culture measurement model instruments. 
Important criteria in the literature review evaluation process include: 
development of the assessment instrument, content validity, construct 
validity and reliability. These criteria will assist in identifying: firstly, 
the existing gap in the information security culture literature; and 
secondly, a valid and reliable information security measurement.  
The findings of this review indicated there are only two out of the 
thirteen information security culture research models that have 
provided a validated information security culture assessment 
instrument (Da Veiga. & Eloff, 2009; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). In the 
first of these, Schlienger and Teufel (2005) designed a questionnaire to 
obtain an understanding of official rules intended to influence the 
security behaviour of employees. In the second, an instrument was 
developed by Da Veiga, and Eloff (2009) designed to cultivate 
information security culture. Da Viega, and Eloff’s, (2009) work is 
considered the most comprehensive approach to assessing information 
security culture. While Martins and Eloff (2002) have developed a 
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theoretical information security culture framework to assess 
information security culture, they did not validate their questionnaires. 
Other information security culture research provide proposed 
constructs to develop a security culture framework but did not develop 
an assessment instrument to measure information security culture.  
Schlienger and Teufel (2003) stated that information security culture 
has three major information security culture layers: corporate policies 
layer that include security policy and organization and structure and 
resources; management layer that include the implementation of 
security policy and responsibilities, training, awards, auditing; and 
individual layer that includes attitude, communication and compliance. 
Da Veiga, and Eloff (2009) work included five major component to 
develop an information security assessment. The first component is 
leadership and governance; security management and organizations; 
security policies, security program management and user security 
management. Both of these studies have developed a comprehensive 
information security culture model. They provide an insight into how 
organizations can develop and maintain an acceptable level of 
information security culture. These research, however, have two 
limitations. Firstly, they did not clearly distinguish between factors that 
constitute or conceptualise information security culture and factors that 
drive information security culture within the organization settings. 
Secondly, they have not been validated rigorously. For example, they 
did not provide the relationship between their measurements constructs 
using EFA to determine whether statements can be grouped in other 
dimensions and did not test their model to identify the relationship 
between components. 
This comprehensive review of the information security culture research 
area illustrates the lack of empirical measurement in the information 
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security culture area.  As a result, there is a clear scarcity in terms of 
instruments for information security culture measurement models. 
Additionally, the current information security culture frameworks did 
not clearly made any distinction on what factors constitute or 
conceptualise information security culture and what factors drive the 
creation of information security culture. Therefore, this study will ease 
the existing limitations of the current literature by providing an 
information security culture measurement model that is reliable and 
valid using EFA, and CFA and testing the nomological validity of the 
measurement model using SEM. The current literature analyses have 
not yet shown how to ensure the nomological validity of the information 
security culture measurement model. The current information security 
culture frameworks did not clearly made any distinction on what factors 
constitute or conceptualise information security culture and what 
factors drive the creation of information security culture.   
Table 2.1 summarizes the list of information security culture research 
constructs for each study. The first column of the table 2.1 represents 
various information security culture research frameworks. The second 
columns represents constructs and findings for each relative 
information security culture frameworks. The third columns indicate 
whether researchers have conducted survey methods to assess 
information security culture. The fourth and fifth columns discuss 
whether a valid information security culture assessment is provided. 
The sixth columns discuss whether frameworks constructs are reliable. 
The last constructs whether statistical analysis were provided.   
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Table 2.1: Summary of Current Proposed Constructs in Information Security Culture Research  
Research Constructs/ Findings Assessment 
Instrument 
(Questionnaires) 
Content 
Validity  
Construct 
Validity  
Reliability  Statistical  
Analysis 
(Schlienger & 
Teufel, 2002, 
2003, 2005) 
Schein organisational 
culture model: 
Security culture has three 
layers: 
Corporate Politics that 
include: 
Security policy;  Organization 
structure; Resources 
Management that includes: 
Implementation of security 
policy; Responsibilities; 
Qualification and training;  
Awards and prosecutions; 
Audits;  Benchmarks; 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Individual that includes: 
Attitude; Communication, 
compliance  
 
 
Research Constructs/ Findings Assessment 
Instrument 
(Questionnaires) 
Content 
Validity  
Construct 
Validity  
Reliability  Statistical  
Analysis 
(Martins & Eloff, 
2002) 
Security policy; Change 
management;  Risk analysis; 
Benchmarking; Budget; Trust; 
Awareness; Ethical Conduct 
Yes Yes No No No 
(Helokunnas & 
Kuusisto, 2003; 
Kuusisto & 
Ilvonen, 2003) 
Security culture Framework: 
Standardization; Certification; 
Measurement of information 
security 
Content components: 
People’s attitude; Motivation; 
No No No No No 
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Knowledge; Communication, 
compliance  
Research Constructs/ Findings Assessment 
Instrument 
(Questionnaires) 
Content 
Validity  
Construct 
Validity  
Reliability  Statistical  
Analysis 
(OECD, 2003) Awareness; Responsibility; 
Response; Ethics; Democracy; 
Risk assessment; Security 
design and implementation; 
Security management; 
Reassessment 
No No No No No 
(Tessam & 
Skaraas, 2005) 
 
Long Term Plan; Change 
Management; Top 
Management; Participation; 
Branding; Organization 
Culture 
 
No No No No No 
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Research Constructs/ Findings Assessment 
Instrument 
(Questionnaires) 
Content 
Validity  
Construct 
Validity  
Reliability  Statistical  
Analysis 
(Dojkovski., 
Lichtenstein, 
Sharman, & 
Warren, 2006) 
Managerial aspect 
Policies and procedures; 
Benchmarking; Risk analysis; 
Budget; Management 
response; Training and 
Education; Awareness; Change 
management 
Behaviour Issues 
Responsibility; Integrity; Trust; 
Ethnicity; Values; Motivation; 
Orientation 
Individual and Organization 
e-learning 
No No No No No 
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Training and Education 
Ethical; National culture;  
Organization culture 
Research Constructs/ Findings Assessment 
Instrument 
(Questionnaires) 
Content 
Validity  
Construct 
Validity  
Reliability  Statistical  
Analysis 
(Kraemer & 
Carayon, 2005) 
Employee Participation; 
Training; Hiring Practices; 
Reward System; Management 
Commitment; Communication 
and Feedback 
No No No No No 
Da Veiga, Eloff, 
(2009) 
 
Leadership and governance 
Sponsorship; Strategy; IT 
Governance; Risk Assessment;  
ROI / Metrics /Measurement 
Security management and 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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organisation 
Program Organization; Legal & 
Regulatory 
Security policies 
Policies; Procedures; 
Standards; Guidelines;  
Certifications; Best practice 
Security program 
management 
Monitoring and Audit; 
Compliance 
User security management 
User Awareness; Education 
and Training; Ethical Conduct; 
Trust;  Privacy 
Technology protection and 
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operations 
Asset Management; System 
Development;  Incident 
Management; Technical 
operations; Physical and 
environmental;  Business 
Continuity 
Change: Change Management 
Research Constructs/ Findings Assessment 
Instrument 
(Questionnaires) 
Content 
Validity  
Construct 
Validity  
Reliability  Statistical  
Analysis 
(Chia et al., 
2002) 
Security budget; Security 
expenditure; Employee 
security awareness; Security 
risk of staff; Implementing the 
security policy; Making 
security suggestions; Security 
Ownership; Security Audits 
No No No No No 
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Research Constructs/ Findings Assessment 
Instrument 
(Questionnaires) 
Content 
Validity  
Construct 
Validity  
Reliability  Statistical  
Analysis 
(Ramachandran 
et al., 2004) 
Security Awareness; security 
ownership; Security Risk; 
Compliance with security rules 
and regulations 
No No No No No 
(Tarimo., 
Bakari., 
Yngström., & 
Kowalski, 2006) 
Management: 
Policies; Personnel; Training; 
Education; 
Principles and values: 
Responsibility; Honesty; 
Integrity;  Ethics; 
Commitment; Compliance; 
Leadership; Motivations 
Shared underlying 
No No No No No 
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assumptions: 
Knowledge; Trust 
relationships; Beliefs 
Research Constructs/ Findings Assessment 
Instrument 
(Questionnaires) 
Content 
Validity  
Construct 
Validity  
Reliability  Statistical  
Analysis 
(Koh, Ruighaver, 
Maynard, & 
Ahmad, 2005) 
 
Security Governance 
Framework: Structural 
Mechanisms; Functional 
Mechanisms; Social 
Participation; 
Influences on 
Security Culture Framework 
Dimension particularly: 
Control; Coordination;  
Ownership 
No No No No No 
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Research Constructs/ Findings Assessment 
Instrument 
(Questionnaires) 
Content 
Validity  
Construct 
Validity  
Reliability  Statistical  
Analysis 
(van Niekerk. & 
von Solms, 
2005, 2006) 
Top management; Policy 
change; Effective Information 
Security; Education program 
No No No No No 
Total Refer to Table 2.2 3 3 2 2 2 
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Table 2.1 provided substantial knowledge for the current study in terms 
of identifying factors that assist in the creation of security culture. 
Literature in the area of security culture showed that research on 
information security culture is still in the early stages of development. 
Issues are still being identified and conceptualizations explored 
(Ramachandran et al., 2004). Thirteen studies were retrieved in Table 
2.1. The process used to develop the conceptual model was to extract 
research in existing information security culture frameworks and 
models in order to develop an understanding of current information 
security culture phenomena. The purpose for examining these 
frameworks is to develop the research conceptual model. For each 
study, all the proposed constructs were extracted and counted in Table 
2.2. The purpose for counting constructs for each study is to identify 
top constructs as potential candidates because it is simply impossible 
to examine every factor that could help conceptualize a security culture. 
Most of the literature examined the creation of security culture broadly, 
and might not necessarily apply to the creation of security culture in 
the Saudi environment. There is simply no mutual agreement on what 
factors constitute a security culture. In other words, there is a clear gap 
in terms of identifying factors that help conceptualize a security culture. 
As a result, the conceptualizations of security culture will be an 
important part of this study.  
Table 2.2 provides candidate constructs for conceptualizing a security 
culture. As illustrated in Table 2.2, there are many factors found to be 
important elements of security culture. However because of the scope 
limitation, the current study will only consider the top constructs where 
there is strong agreement between academic researchers as to their 
importance for security culture creation. The current study extracted 
the top eight constructs as candidate constructs and constructs of 
interest for the conceptual model. These factors are: top management 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
46 
commitment, security policy and policy enforcement, continuous 
security awareness, security training programs and education, security 
risk assessment and analysis, security compliance, ethical conduct. 
These factors appear to be the most influential factors and are 
considered as part of security culture conceptualization. However, 
constructs in Table 2.1 were measured mostly using qualitative 
approaches. Therefore, there is a clear lack of measurement in terms of 
information security culture constructs. This will be discussed 
extensively in section 4.8.3. 
It is essential to examine external cultural factors surrounds the 
adoption or creation of security culture. These factors are mainly 
organizational and national culture. Organization culture has emerged 
in this literature review as essential elements that influence security 
culture. Security culture was itself considered as part of the 
organization culture (Chia et al., 2003; Dojkovski et al., 2006; 
Schlienger and Teufel, 2005). Moreover, as discussed earlier in section 
2.5.3, Saudi national culture is known to have cultural beliefs in which 
has a strong influence on Information Technology diffusion (Straub., 
Loch, & Hill, 2003). Therefore, the Saudi national culture might be able 
to influence security culture in Saudi Arabian organisations. 
Additionally, Chaula, (2006) studies has considered security culture as 
part of national culture in the developing countries context. As a result, 
national culture will be a candidate among the external factors that 
influence security culture.  
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Table 2.2: Constructs of Interest Appear in the Information Security Culture Research 
Constructs  Number of Times 
Cited out of 13 
studies  
Construct 
Rankings 
Management commitment to 
Information Security 
8/13 1 
Security policy and policy enforcement 6/13 2 
Security Awareness 6/13 2 
Security training and education 6/13 2 
Security Risk assessment 6/13 2 
Security Compliance 5/13 6 
Organization Culture 5/13 6 
Ethical Conduct 5/13 6 
Change management 4/13 9 
Trust 4/13 9 
Responsibilities  4/13 9 
Ownership 3/13 12 
Communication 3/13 12 
Audits 3/13 12 
Benchmarks 3/13 12 
Motivation 3/13 12 
Standardization and best practices 2/13 17 
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Leadership and governance 2/13 17 
Attitude 2/13 17 
Knowledge 2/13 17 
Integrity 2/13 17 
Participation 2/13 17 
Response 2/13 17 
Feedback 1/13 24 
Monitoring 1/13 24 
Organization structure 1/13 24 
Awards and prosecutions 1/13 24 
Branding 1/13 24 
Democracy 1/13 24 
Reassessment 1/13 24 
e-learning 1/13 24 
Ethnicity 1/13 24 
Orientation 1/13 24 
  Hiring Practices 1/13 24 
Reward System 1/13 24 
Control 1/13 24 
Coordination 1/13 24 
Technology protection and operations 1/13 24 
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Privacy 1/13 24 
Honest 1/13 24 
Legal & Regulatory 1/13 24 
 
2.8 Factors that Conceptualize Security Culture 
Based on the literature review conducted in the current study (refer to 
Table 2.2), the top candidate constructs for conceptualizations of 
security culture were: top management commitment; security policy 
and policy enforcement; continuous security awareness; security 
training programs and education; security risk assessment and 
analysis; security compliance; and ethical conduct. Since the security 
culture area is considered in the early stages of development, the 
literature analyses were undertaken in related area to information 
security culture such as information security management. This is 
because the existence of security culture is well considered as part of 
effective security management practices. The next sections provide 
literature analyses for identifying top factors as important for 
conceptualizing security culture. 
2.8.1 Top Management Support for Information Security  
Executive support can be helpful in promoting an effective information 
security program. Fourie (2003) asserted that top management support 
is the most significant factor affecting information security management 
activities in organisations. A study by Knapp, Marshall, Rainer and 
Morrow (2004, 2007) showed that top management support was ranked 
number one in a list of 25 security issues that can affect information 
security in most organisations. The visible commitment from 
management and a good understanding of security requirements are 
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the most important factors affecting the success of information security 
management (British Standards Institute, 1999). Top management 
support refers to the degree to which senior leadership understands the 
importance of the information security function and the extent to which 
it is involved in information security activities (Armstrong & 
Sambamurthy, 1999; Ragu-Nathan, Apigian, Ragu-Nathan, & Tu, 
2004). However, lack of commitment from senior management is a 
major issue that organisations face in daily operations (R. von Solms, 
1996). This is the case in most organisations which face difficulties in 
managing information security. Fourie (2003) indicated that top 
management can be involved by defining and communicating a security 
policy, allocating specific responsibilities to appointed people, making 
resources available for the continual upkeep of information security and 
control, and constantly monitoring and reviewing information security 
effectiveness. However, the importance of management support goes 
beyond the existence of information security management, to also 
supporting the establishment of a security culture. Many researchers 
have asserted that top management is an essential part of the 
establishment of a security culture (Chia et al., 2002b; D’Arcy & 
Greene, 2009; Dojkovski et al., 2007; Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009; 
Maynard & Ruighaver, 2002; OECD, 2003). Gaunt (2000) argued that 
when creating an information security culture, commitment from the 
management and strong leadership is necessary at an initial stage to 
succeed in the long term. In addition, Knapp, et al (2006) found that top 
management support is the most important significant predictor of 
security culture and level of policy enforcement. They also found that 
low levels of executive support will produce an organisational culture 
less tolerant of good security practices. Knapp, et al (2006) stated that 
top management also can support user training, promote a security-
aware culture, and insist that security policies are relevant, current and 
enforced (Knapp, Marshall, Rainer, & Morrow, 2004). A security culture 
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would not be easily established without strong and consistent support 
from the top management of the organisation. As a result, top 
management support would have strong influence on security culture 
creation and will be included as a candidate factor for the research 
conceptual model. 
2.8.2 Establishing an Effective Information Security Policy through 
Policy Enforcement 
Security policy is the foundation of any security regime and specifies 
the strategies behind an organisation’s information security approach 
by a written document, directly linked to the overall policies of the 
organisation (Fulford & Doherty, 2003; Höne & Eloff, 2002). The 
primary objective of an information security policy is to define the user’s 
(i.e., employee’s) rights and responsibilities in an organisation 
(Blacharski, 1998; Ward & Smith, 2002). Gaunt (1998) argues that a 
successful organisational security policy should incorporate clear 
definitions of user responsibilities. The information security policies of 
the organisation deal with “the processes and procedures that the 
employee should adhere to in order to protect the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information and other valuable assets” 
(British Standards Institute, 1999) (p.1) in conformity with the approved 
corporate security objectives and strategy. The policy provides 
management direction and support for information security (British 
Standards Institute, 1993). The purpose of the security policy is "to 
create a shared vision and an understanding of how various controls 
will be used such that the data and information is protected in an 
organisation" (Dhillon, 2006) (p.6). Effective security policy will 
influence users to understand what acceptable and responsible 
behaviour is, to ensure a safe environment (Höne & Eloff, 2002). Public 
standards and guidelines have emphasized the importance of the 
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security policy (Fulford & Doherty, 2003; Höne & Eloff, 2002). The 
formulation and utilization of a security policy can enhance the 
effectiveness of an information security management system (Fulford & 
Doherty, 2003). Hong, Chi, Chao, and Tang (2003) assert that 
organisations cannot achieve effective information security management 
systems without the establishment, implementation and maintenance 
of an information security policy. Such a security policy must be 
structured and organized effectively (R. von Solms & S. von Solms, 
2004).  
A number of empirical studies have investigated the establishment of an 
information security policy (Andersen, 2001; DTI, 2002; Gupa & 
Hammond, 2005; Hinde, 2002; Hong, Chi, Chao, & Tang, 2006). Most of 
these studies indicate organisations in developed countries such as the 
USA and UK had established information security policies, especially for 
the larger sized organisations. However, some organisations still do not 
appear to understand the importance of the establishment of such a 
policy. A security policy is an essential part of security practices within 
organisations and could substantially impact on their organisational 
security. As Higgins (1999) (p.1) notes, “Without a policy, security 
practices will be developed without clear demarcation of objectives and 
responsibilities”. Nevertheless, even though some organisations have an 
established security policy, this does not ensure that employees will 
necessarily obey these policies (R. von Solms & S. von Solms, 2004). 
A security policy is not only important for the effectiveness of 
information security management but it is also important for the 
creation of a security culture. OECD (2003) reports that for security 
awareness to succeed, it needs a foundation of security policies. 
Security policies are extremely important and should be included in an 
organisation’s information security program. It is important to cultivate 
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an information security culture in an organisation and understand how 
the culture can be integrated with the security policy (Kluge, 1998). 
This is important because the superficial goal of security culture is to 
influence the behaviour of the employees to comply with the official 
security policy (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). This shows the importance 
of having an effective security policy for the creation of a security 
culture and the improvement of an organisation’s security. Information 
security culture should be integrated into daily work routines in order 
to create an atmosphere of security that becomes a concern amongst 
the staff. For that to happen, an effective information security policy 
must be established. This can be achieved if organisations are able to 
have consistent enforcement of the security policy. Based on this 
discussion, the current study concluded that establishing an effective 
information security policy through security policy enforcement has a 
strong influence on the creation of a security culture and so it will be 
included as a candidate factor for the research conceptual model. 
2.8.3 Information Security Awareness  
Information Security Forum (ISF) defines security awareness as: 
The extent to which organisational members understand the 
importance of information security, the level of security required 
by the organisation and their individual security responsibilities, 
and act accordingly. (Information Security Forum, 2005) 
Siponen (2000) (p.31) defined security awareness as “A state where 
users in an organisation are aware, ideally committed to, of their 
security mission”. One critical aspect of information security 
management is information security awareness (Deloitte, Touche, & 
Tohmatsu, 2005; Furnell, Gennaton, & Dowland, 2002; Nosworthy, 
2000; Schultz, 2004; Siponen, 2000; Thomson. & von Sloms, 1998; S. 
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von Solms., 2001). Security awareness fundamentally exists in all 
dimensions of information security management. Dhillion, (2006); von 
Somls, (2006) indicating strong influence across all aspects. 
Information security awareness is of crucial importance, as information 
security techniques or procedures can be misused, misinterpreted or 
not used by employees (Ceraolo, 1996; D. Straub, 1990; D. Straub & 
Welke, 1998). A lack of either manager or user awareness will result in 
great risks (D. Straub & Welke, 1998). Thus, it is widely asserted that a 
significant portion of information security breaches in an organisation 
are carried out by its own organisational members (Magklaras & 
Furnell, 2005; Neumann, 1999; Schultz, 2004).   
In some cases, security awareness is only concentrated around the IT 
department and does not include employees in the organisation 
(Mitchell, Marcella, & Baxter, 1999). This is a major problem if 
organisations do not realize the importance of having security 
awareness amongst employees (S. von Solms & R. von Solms, 2004). 
Information security awareness levels are still found to be low among 
the employees of organisations and organisations are nevertheless still 
not making any effort to implement awareness programs to improve the 
situation (R. von Solms & S. von Solms, 2004). Employees have been 
identified as an important factor enabling information security, since 
security incidents are often the result of employees’ lack of awareness of 
information security policies and procedures (Hansche, 2001).  
Various statistics show lack of information security awareness across 
organisations. According to the Computing Technology Industry 
Association, human errors accounted for approximately 60% of security 
breaches in 2005, increasing from 47% in 2004 (Wagner, 2006). A 
Global Information Security Survey (Ernest and Young, (2001) showed 
that less than 50 percent of information security officers and 
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Information Technology directors worldwide had received information 
security awareness training. The security awareness index survey in 
2002 found that two-thirds of security managers thought information 
security awareness was inadequate or dangerously inadequate; 50% of 
employees had never received formal information security training; 10% 
of employees had never read their company security policy; and 25% of 
employees had not read their security policy in the last two years. 
According to the Information Security Breaches Survey 2002 
(ISBS2002) released by Price Waterhouse Coopers, “UK businesses are 
spending considerable time, effort and money on implementing 
sophisticated technology, without developing a security awareness 
culture within their organisation to support it” (Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, 2002). Ernst & Young’s 2004 Global Information Security 
Survey revealed that employee awareness is the top obstacle to 
information security (Johnson, 2006).  
Organisations often do not realize the importance of security awareness 
(Computer Security Institute, 2008). To ensure that an adequate level of 
security awareness exists within an organisation, it is important to 
establish an information security awareness program as a vital control 
in securing the information technology environment (International 
Standards Organization ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 2004). The importance of 
awareness programs is illustrated by their inclusion in current 
international information security standards such as BS7799 and 
ISO/IEC TR 13335 (International Standards Organization ISO/IEC TR 
13335-1, 2004). According to ISO/IEC TR 13335, a security awareness 
program should be implemented at all levels of the organisation, from 
top management down to every employee. The report also suggests that 
employees require different awareness training according to their role 
within organisations (International Standards Organization ISO/IEC TR 
13335-1, 2004). However, it is the responsibility of management to 
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ensure that information security awareness policies and procedures are 
in place (Kritzinger & Smith, 2008).  
The previous discussions have highlighted the importance of security 
awareness as a vital part of protecting information security and creating 
an effective approach to manage information security. Security 
awareness however has been well acknowledged in the literature to be 
an essential component for creating security culture. Von Solms (2000) 
refers to the third wave of information security, called the 
institutionalization wave, often discussed under the title “information 
security awareness” and more recently under the title “information 
security culture”. Earlier researchers referred to security culture as 
advanced stages of security awareness of organisations. Instilling a 
security culture is achieved through security awareness, knowledge and 
skills (Tarimo, 2006). The importance of security awareness for the 
establishment of a security culture has been acknowledged by other 
researchers in the literature. For example, van Niekerk and von Solms, 
(2005) state that as security culture is closely related to security 
behaviour, analysing security awareness levels will directly contribute 
to the establishment and maintenance of a security culture. The 
ISO/IEC standard states that security awareness of all employees is an 
essential element of effective security and contributes positively to an 
improved security culture (International Standards Organization 
ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 2004). It has been also argued that security 
awareness should be established in very young organisations, where 
managers can strengthen compliance (Eloff. & Eloff., 2005). As staff 
realize the importance of adopting a security culture, it becomes a 
natural behaviour and individual responsibility is developed concerning 
what is and what is not acceptable with respect to information security 
(Martins & Eloff, 2002).  
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What makes information security a crucial issue for organisations is the 
fact that information security breaches are often caused by internal 
users of an organisation (Price Waterhouse Cooper, 2008). Employees, 
whether intentionally or through lack of knowledge, are the greatest 
threat to information security (Thomson. & von Sloms, 1998). 
Operational controls rely on human behaviour, hence employee 
behaviour can be seen as the weakest link in information security (van 
Niekerk & von Solms, 2005). By increasing the awareness of users, the 
understanding and improving of a security culture can be 
accomplished. Therefore, security awareness must be an organisational 
priority and must be taken seriously by top management to ensure not 
only an effective information security management but also an 
improvement in the security culture. Based on this discussion, security 
awareness has strong influence on the creation of a security culture 
and will be included as a candidate factor for the research conceptual 
model. 
2.8.4 Information Security Training and Education 
There is a strong belief that security training is the key to improvement 
in security awareness. According to the Gartner Group, nothing in the 
security arena yields as much return on investment (ROI) as security 
training (Schultz, 2004). Security training is an ongoing process as 
security policies evolve (D. Straub & Welke, 1998). In order to recognize 
security problems, security training should be provided to improve 
awareness (D. Straub & Welke, 1998). Johnson (2006) asserts proper 
training and education help change people’s mindsets and behaviours 
toward security. Bresz (2004) believes that without security awareness 
and training programs, people will always be the weakest link and the 
organisation will still be at risk. Kelly (2006) suggests that security 
training be required for all employees in order to improve awareness.  
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Information security training is important for the creation of a security 
culture. Organisations need to ensure that “an information security 
culture is inculcated through training, education and awareness 
raising, in order to minimize risks to information assets” (Da Veiga & 
Eloff, 2007)(P.149). This implication conforms to the assertion that an 
effective security culture represents one of the necessary foundations 
for information security management and cannot be achieved without 
appropriate attention to security awareness, training and education for 
all ICT users (Tarimo, 2006). Companies can be assisted to establish a 
security culture through various approaches that are based on policy, 
awareness, training and education (Furnell, Gennatou, & Dowland, 
2001; Lichtenstein & Swatman, 2001; Lim, Ahmad, Chang, & Maynard, 
2010; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). Education of employees in terms of 
their security roles and responsibilities is a crucial aspect of security 
culture (R. von Solms & S. von Solms, 2004). Security awareness and 
training can improve employees’ behaviour and decrease the chances of 
having any problems with regard to their security actions. Dhillion 
(1999) notes that user education and training programmes are singled 
out because increasing awareness of security issues is the most cost-
effective control that an organisation can implement. As a result, it is 
clear that user training and awareness programmes play a major and 
readily achievable role in the establishment of a security culture (van 
Niekerk & von Solms, 2005). However, user education and awareness 
alone are not sufficient, and the emphasis should also be on the 
creation of an organisational culture of information security (van 
Niekerk & von Solms, 2005). Therefore, there is a need to integrate 
awareness, education and organisational leadership simultaneously to 
ensure an effective security culture (Thomson. & von Sloms, 1998; 
Zakaria, 2004). Based on this discussion, the current study concluded 
security training has strong influence on creation of a security culture 
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and so it will be included as a candidate factor for the research 
conceptual model. 
2.8.5 Information Security Risk Analysis and Assessment 
Risk is “the likelihood that a threat materializes” (Turban, Mclean, & 
Wetherbe, 1996, p. 70). To some degree risk is unavoidable and 
organisations must accept a degree of risk.  
Risk is the sum of threats (those events which cause harm), 
vulnerabilities (the openness of an enterprise to the threats) and 
asset value (the worth of the asset in danger). Increase any of 
these factors, and the risk increases; decrease any, and the risk 
decreases. (Smith, 1993, p. 19)  
Risk analysis: In risk management, the minimizing of risk by 
effectively applying security measures commensurate with the 
relative threats, vulnerabilities and value of the resources to be 
protected. The value of the resources includes the impact on the 
organisation, the automated system supports, and the impact of 
the loss or unauthorized modification of data. (Caelli, Longley, & 
Shain, 1989) (p.417). 
Caelli et al., (1989, p.417) define risk assessment as “Risk assessment 
determines if countermeasures are adequate to reduce the probability of 
loss or the impact of loss to an acceptable level”. 
Risk analysis can be thought as a trade off with the corresponding costs 
for protection organisation assets. In countries like the USA, the UK 
and Australia, organisations are under constant pressure from both 
governments and industries to implement risk management methods 
(Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, 1999; King 
Committee on Corporate Governance. King II Report, 2002; Sarbanes 
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Oxley Act, 2002). In addition, the high pressure to implement risk 
management comes from an increase in information security breaches 
and the security requirements of business partners. However, it is 
almost impossible to determine how much security organisations need 
to keep their security systems safe from intrusions. In some cases, risk 
analysis studies raise more questions than they answer (Kowk & 
Longley, 1999). Nevertheless, the benefits of risk analysis play a very 
important role in an organisation’s success. Risk analysis provides 
organisations with increased knowledge and understanding regarding 
their expected loss due to security failure (Gerber., von Solms, & 
Overbeek, 2001). Information security risk management methods such 
as Central Computer and Telecommunication Agency Risk Analysis and 
Management Method (CRAMM), Methodology for Model-Based Risk 
Assessment (CORAS), and Operational, Critical, Threat, Asset, 
Vulnerability and Evaluation (OCTAVE) help organisations to manage 
their security exposure. Each method has a different approach to 
identifying, measuring, controlling and monitoring the information 
security risks (Bornman & Labuschagne, 2006). Organisations must 
ensure that the information security risk methodology employed 
corresponds to international best practice, appropriately adapted to 
their own particular environment, and government regulations 
regarding privacy (King Committee on Corporate Governance. King II 
Report, 2002).  
Risk assessment is a fundamental first step in gauging the level of 
information security risk in an organisation (International Standards 
Organization ISO/IEC 27002, 2005). By applying security risk analysis 
and assessment, organisations and staff members are able to realize 
their security damages and will create a security aware culture for their 
security practices. Ramachandran, et al., (2004), however, found the 
existence of security risk has strong influence on the understanding or 
the acceptance of security beliefs which will ultimately influence 
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security culture. As a result, the current study believes that security 
risk analysis and assessment would assist organisations in being more 
aware of their losses and damages due to lack of security knowledge 
and misbehaviour of employees in relation to information security 
practices. Therefore, security risk analysis and assessment will have a 
strong influence on the security culture of organisations and will be 
included as a candidate factor for the research conceptual model. 
2.8.6 Information Security Compliance 
It is widely recognised that many security incidents are caused by 
human behaviour, rather than by technical failures (Beautement, 
Sasse, & Wonham, 2008; Schneier, 2000). According to the 2001 
Information Security Industry Survey, 48% of security breaches 
perpetrated by employees were accidental. This demonstrates a 
negligence or ignorance of the security policies of the organisation. 
Employees often are not aware of the security consequences of their 
actions and do not understand enough about the impact of their 
security decisions (Zurko, Kaufman, Spanbauer, & Bassett, 2002). This 
can be resolved if a clear vision from senior management is presented to 
influence employees’ behaviour to protect the organisation’s information 
assets through compliance with the security policy (S. von Solms & R. 
von Solms, 2004). Since effective information security management and 
security culture relies on employees complying with security policies, 
many organisations have tried to influence employees’ security 
behaviour to comply with security policy but found it a major challenge 
(Beautement et al., 2008). In some cases, the anticipated cost and 
benefits of such action outweighed perceived cost and benefits to the 
organisation (Beautement et al., 2008). In other cases, compliance with 
information security is not well established within the information 
security operations (S von Solms., 2005). As a result, there is a need to 
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find a method to ensure the compliant behaviour of employees and to 
monitor and measure the effectiveness of a compliance program (Vroom 
& von Solms, 2004). Researchers have argued that security compliance 
can be improved through more security awareness programs Smith, 
Jamieson and Winchester, (2007); senior management involvement with 
a high awareness and education, and comprehensive understanding of 
security issues (Lane and May,  (2006); security awareness and training 
programs which increase understanding of the possible risks (Denning, 
(1999); and assessment of compliance with the applicable laws and 
regulations (Luthy & Forcht, 2006). Others have argued that constant 
monitoring and enforcement of individual employees’ behaviours will 
influence compliance with policy (Adams & Sasse, 1999; Weirich & 
Sasse, 2001). 
Researchers have suggested that organisations can influence user 
behaviour by cultivating a security culture that promotes security-
conscious decision making by complying with the security policy (R. von 
Solms & S. von Solms, 2004; Vroom & von Solms, 2004). Eloff and Eloff 
(2005) stated that compliance with the security policy will improve the 
security culture of an organisation. D’Arcy and Greene (2009) found a 
strong relationship between security culture, security compliance and 
security extra-role behaviours of employees. This shows the importance 
of complying with the security policy for the establishment of security 
culture and improvement of the security in organisations. This is 
important because the one goal of a security culture is to influence the 
behaviour of employees with respect to complying with the official 
security policy (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). Based on the previous 
discussion, it can be asserted that security compliance is an essential 
part of the establishment of security culture and it is considered as a 
candidate factor for the research conceptual model. 
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2.8.7 Ethical Conduct Policies 
Hellriegal, Slocum and Woodman (1998) (P.19) define ethics as, “The 
values and rules that distinguish right from wrong”. Ethical conduct 
policies can be used to control the behaviour of employees and establish 
‘moral’ codes for the company (Hinde, 2003). The security of any 
organisation is only “as strong as its weakest link, and this link, which 
is generally the employees, could put the corporation and its customers 
at risk, and therefore needs to be well managed and monitored” (Mears 
& von Solms, 2004) (p.5). Codes of ethics and conduct “facilitate 
responsible security awareness, as users are held personally 
responsible for ensuring sound security practices are implemented, 
reducing the security risks” (Mears & von Solms, 2004) (p.5). Codes of 
ethics and conduct also help ensure employees are adhering to the 
security policy, since the objective of an information security culture is 
to instil information security behaviour that is conducive to the 
protection of information assets based on the organisation’s information 
security policies and code of ethics (Hinde, 2003). Therefore, 
information security ethics play a major role in addressing security 
problems.  
Information security ethical codes must clearly state which actions are 
ethical and which are not (Mears & von Solms, 2004). Employees need 
to integrate ethical behaviour relating to information security into their 
everyday life in the organisation (Trompeter & Eloff, 2001). Despite the 
importance of ethical conduct, it has not been investigated in most 
information security frameworks, and approaches by academic and 
professional researchers (Flowerday & von Solms, 2006; Trompeter & 
Eloff, 2001). The development and distribution of ethical conduct 
policies is the responsibility of management and the board (Baggett, 
2003). Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) gave examples of unethical conduct 
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such as installing organisational software at home or using the Internet 
for private purposes during working hours. Such instances need to be 
enforced as unacceptable conduct in the work environment. They also 
added that ethical conduct must be addressed by the organisation to 
minimize the risk of invasion of privacy, selling of customer information 
and unauthorized altering of data.  
One of the principles in creating a security culture is ethical conduct 
where both management and the board develop and communicate 
corporate codes of conduct (Baggett, 2003; OECD, 2005). However, 
ethical standards and policies can differ between countries (Dojkovski 
et al., 2007). Previous empirical research on information security 
culture for organisations has ignored the ethical conduct with one 
exception which pointed out that those different nations and companies 
that have their own values and cultures of companies sharing relevant 
knowledge, can strengthen information security culture (Helokunnas & 
Kuusisto, 2003). This shows a gap which is the investigation of the 
importance of ethical conduct policies for security culture creation that 
needs to be addressed by academic researchers in the information 
security field. Therefore, ethical conduct polices will be a candidate 
factor for the research conceptual model.   
2.9 Factors Influencing Information Security Culture 
Security culture can be influenced by external cultural factors such as 
national and organisation culture. The next sections will discuss the 
possible potential influence of these cultural factors on security culture 
in the Saudi context.     
2.9.1 National Culture 
According to Hofstede (1980) (p.25), national culture (NC) is defined as 
“the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the 
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members of one human group from another”. National culture affects 
an organisation’s performance and it is important to consider it when 
implementing a new practice or system. National culture remains a 
significant factor in the acceptance of new products (Sengun & Janell, 
2003). Ignoring cultural difference is a serious issue that might cause 
misunderstandings in which conflict might occur between individuals 
(Finestone & Snyman, 2005). Many business leaders consider 
organisational culture to be independent of national culture. However, 
Hofstede’s (1984) study has broken the ground analysis and argued 
that organisational cultures are nested within a national culture, in 
which national culture influences human resource practices and 
organisational behaviour. In addition, cross-cultural research has 
indicated that management processes are not universal and every 
culture may not adapt to them (Ang & Massingham, 2007). While many 
scholars have proposed different frameworks, Hofstede’s culture 
dimensions were found to be the most comprehensive. Hofstede’s study 
was conducted with 116,000 individuals from 72 countries, most of 
whom were employees in a single worldwide corporation. The 
respondents had similar jobs in their company (Hofstede, 1980, 1984). 
Hence, Hofstede’s findings identified that any differences in attitudes 
and values were caused by culture differences (Ali, (2006), and this 
theory was the most replicated and cited in cross-cultural research 
(Robertson, Al-Khatib, and Al-Habib, (2002), involving detailed research 
in a major multinational corporation, over several years, in various 
countries (Bjerke & Al-Meer, 1993). In addition, Hofstede’s dimensions 
exist at the individual level and at the national level (Robertson et al., 
2002). (Robertson et al., 2002) state that what has been applied at the 
cultural level may or may not apply at the individual level.  
Hofstede (2001) classifies national culture in five dimensions: 1) power 
distance index (PDI), which means the power is distributed unequally; 
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2) individualism index (IDV), which means that tasks prevail over 
relationships; 3) the Masculinity Index (MAS), which means that social 
gender roles are separated; Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI), which 
means that cultural members are threatened by uncertain risks; 5) 
long-term orientation (LTO), which means the degree of traditions in a 
specific culture and to what extent these traditions are connected to 
their past and future (Hofstede, 2001; G Hofstede., Hofstede, & Minkov, 
2010; G.  Hofstede., Minkov., & Vinken, 2008). Hofstede added two new 
cultural dimensions in 2008 (the sixth and seventh dimensions): the 
Indulgence vs. Restraint Index (IVR), and the Monumentalism  Index 
(MON) (G Hofstede. et al., 2010; G.  Hofstede. et al., 2008). Indulgence 
versus Restraint Index (IVR) stands for a society that allows relatively 
free gratification of some individuals desires and feelings. 
Monumentalism Index (MON) stands for a society that rewards people 
who are, metaphorically speaking, like monuments: proud and 
unchangeable. After identifying these dimensions, Hofstede rated each 
country within his sample accordingly. Japan and the United States 
were identified as being culturally very different, while Canada and the 
United States were identified as being very similar. It should be noted, 
however, that these scores may no longer reflect the dimension scores 
for those countries today (Ford and Chan, (2003) despite the ongoing 
research in this field, and the changes that have occurred within 
countries (e.g. countries’ scores on Individualism have increased over 
the years (Hofstede, 2001). Therefore, it is important to reapply 
Hofstede’s measures to update existing data (Ford & Chan, 2003). Table 
2.3 demonstrates how mapping the culture traits and their associated 
scores on Hofstede‘s scale differs between Saudi Arabia and Australia, 
according to Hofstede‘s official website (G Hofstede. et al., 2010). 
Australia was chosen as an example of national culture dimensions of 
western countries. It is obvious Saudi Arabia and Australia is culturally 
different in terms of national culture dimension. This study will 
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examine the influence of national culture dimension on Saudi context 
on section 2.9.1. This study will also examine the influence of these 
dimensions on comparative studies between the Saudi and the western 
societies.  
 
Figure 2-1 Mapping Saudi Arabia and Australia on Hofstede’s Dimensions  
Table 2.3: Saudi Arabia and Australia on Hofstede’s Dimensions  
Dimension Saudi Arabia Australia 
PDI 80 36 
IDV 38 90 
80 
38 
53 
68 
36 
52 36 
90 
61 51 
21 
71 
PDI
IDV
MAS
UAI
LTO
IVR
Saudia Arabia Australia
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MAS 53 61 
UAI 68 51 
LTO 36 21 
IVR 52 71 
MON N/A N/A 
 
2.9.1.1Research on Saudi National Culture 
The existence of the national culture impact has been investigated in 
the Saudi environment. For example, a study conducted by Bjerke and 
Al-Meer (1993) explores the extent to which American managerial 
theories can be applied in Saudi Arabia, based on the cultural 
dimensions of (Hofstede, 1984). The same study revealed that Saudi 
managers have a high power distance, high uncertainty avoidance, high 
collectivism, and femininity, which means that there are major cultural 
differences between Americans and Saudis. The study concluded that 
the Saudi culture has low individualism, high power distance, and high 
uncertainty avoidance (High-risk tolerance). Hofstede (1980 and 1984) 
indicated that a society with high individualism, low power distance, 
and high-risk tolerance has a better opportunity to adopt innovations. 
National culture plays an important role in either encouraging or 
discouraging the implementation and adoption of new practices and 
technology, especially when cultures have dissimilarities. The Chadhar 
and Rahmati (2004) study compared the effect of the national culture of 
Australia and Saudi Arabia on the adoption rate of the ERP system by 
dividing user satisfaction into three categories (technological, 
organisational, and personal) to measure ERP success. The study found 
that both countries are opposite to each other in each cultural 
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dimension, and did not reveal or discuss the differences between their 
cultural dimensions. The adoption of a technology such as ERP is 
influenced by national culture (van Everdingen & Waarts, 2003). The 
same authors found that higher levels of high-risk tolerance 
(Uncertainty Avoidance), masculinity, and power distance negatively 
influence the ERP. Van Everdingen and Waarts (2003) conclude that 
national culture is one of the important factors positively or negatively 
influencing the implementation of new technology practices, and ERP 
systems in particular. A recent study by Idris (2007) showed that 
national culture in Saudi Arabia remains the main challenge for 
organisations in transforming their local employees into a competitive 
advantage. On the other hand, Hill, Loch, Straub and El-shesahi (1998) 
found that Arab countries are capable of adopting a new technology 
within their culture despite the challenges and differences in national 
cultures. Loch, Straub, and Kamel (2003) also studied culture-specific 
inducements and impediments to using the Internet in the Arab world. 
Loch, et al (2003) identified how culture can both inhibit and encourage 
technological innovation and how Arab cultures can move their 
economies faster into the digital age.  
While most research has concentrated on international organisations in 
developed countries such as the US (Helokunnas & Kuusisto, 2003; 
Kuusisto & Ilvonen, 2003; Ramachandran et al., 2004), Australia 
(Dojkovski., et al., , 2006; Chia et al., 2002) and Europe (Schlienger & 
Teufel, 2003), there is little to know about the particularities of 
information security culture in the developing countries’ regions. This is 
important because the Saudi government is attracting new companies 
from different international countries to establish their business and to 
invest in the country. As a result, the international organisations must 
ensure that Saudi citizens and residents are adapted to any new 
technology, especially sensitive ones such as those dealing with 
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information security. However, national culture factors in developing 
countries such as Saudi Arabia are believed to have an impact on the 
implementation and the adoption of any new technology. As a result, 
national culture is an important factor that might influence security 
culture in Saudi Arabian organisations. Therefore, it will be included as 
a candidate factor for the research conceptual model.  
2.9.2 Organization Culture 
Culture is the “collective programming of the mind that distinguished 
people of different countries, according to social anthropology theories” 
(Hofstede, 2001), (p. 25). Organisational culture defines how an 
employee sees the organisation (Schein, 1999). “It is a collective 
phenomenon that grows and changes over time and, to some extent, it 
can be influenced or even designed by management” (Schein, 1999) 
(p.6). Schein (1999) (p.6) defines organisational culture as:  
The pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has 
invented, discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, and that 
have worked well enough to be considered valid, and therefore to 
be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, 
and feel in relation to those problems.  
For some, culture is the single most important factor accounting for 
success or failure in an organisation (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). However, 
it has been found that only 5% of organisations have a defined culture, 
where senior management have taken an active role in the shaping of 
the corporate culture (Atkinson, 1997). If management does not 
understand the culture of the organisation, it could prove to be fatal 
("Hagberg Consulting Group," 2009). Nevertheless, each organisation’s 
corporate culture determines the behaviour of its employees (Schein, 
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(1999); Thomson and von Solms, (1998), and influences what employees 
determine acceptable behaviour to be within their organisations (Beach, 
1993). Schein (1999, p. 15) cautions that oversimplifying the concept of 
culture is the biggest danger to understanding it and proposes that a 
better way to think about culture is to examine the different “levels” at 
which culture exists. All organisations’ corporate cultures include three 
levels: artefacts espoused values and shared tactic assumptions Schein 
(1999). Schein describes them below:  
Level One: Artefacts. Schein (1999, p. 15) defines artefacts as “what 
can be observed, seen, heard, and felt, in an organisation”. He added 
that artefacts include visible organisational structures and processes. 
Culture is considered to be very clearly at this level and has an 
immediate emotional impact, which could be positive or negative, on the 
observer (Schein, 1999). Schein adds that observing artefacts alone 
does not explain why the members of the organisation behave as they 
do. As a result, Schein concludes that to understand the reasons for the 
behaviour patterns of an organisation’s members, it is necessary to 
examine deeper levels of culture such as the organisation’s espoused 
values. Examples of artefacts could range from the architecture and 
décor of the organisation to how people behave towards each other and 
customers. Other examples of artefacts are the office layout, building 
access with physical security and visible behaviour patterns with 
personnel security. 
Level Two: Espoused Values. Schein (1999) points out that an 
organisation’s espoused values are the reasons an organisational 
insider would give for the observed artefacts. Espoused values are 
values the organisation wants to live up to. They generally consist of the 
organisation’s official viewpoints, such as mission or vision statements, 
strategy documents, and any other documents that describe the 
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organisation‘s values, principles, policies, ethics and visions. Schein 
(1999) believes that it is possible for two organisations to have very 
different observable artefacts and yet share similar espoused values. 
The interpretation and application of these espoused values in the day-
to-day running of the organisation depends on the shared tacit 
assumptions between the employees of that organisation. Schlienger 
and Teufel (2002) believe that espoused values are partially visible in 
the organisation and reflect the values of a particular group of 
individuals. Examples of espoused values are teamwork and good 
communication. An example of espoused values in information security 
is an organisational strategy for information security, an information 
security management style, and the development of skills in information 
security awareness, training and education (Schlienger & Teufel, 2002). 
Level Three: Shared Tacit Assumptions. Schein (1999) states that 
organisations must develop shared tacit assumptions to ensure their 
success. Shared tactic assumptions are formed in the early years of an 
organisation. Schein adds that strategies based on specific beliefs and 
values continue to be successful if these beliefs and values gradually 
come to be shared and taken for granted in an organisation and form 
the essence of that organisation’s culture. As a result, the beliefs and 
values become tacit assumptions about the nature of the world and how 
to succeed in it. Basic tacit assumptions are the heart of corporate 
culture as they represent the commonly learned values and 
assumptions of employees. Basic tacit assumptions are also hidden and 
largely unconscious, and occur very much at the individual level 
(Schein, 1999). Shared tacit assumptions are unique to a particular 
organisation, but are generally decisions and actions that are second 
nature to employees. The deeper level may or may not be consistent 
with the values and principles that are espoused by the organisation. To 
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truly understand the culture of an organisation, one must understand 
what is happening at the deeper level (Schein, 1999). 
Figure 2.2 presents Schein’s corporate culture model. Any 
organisation’s corporate culture includes all three of the above levels. 
The level most difficult to quantify is the shared beliefs and values. 
However, these shared tacit assumptions act as a kind of “filter” which 
affects how individuals carry out their normal day-to-day activities and 
it also influences how they interpret the organisation’s policies and how 
they implement its procedures (Thomson & von Solms, 2005).  
Artifacts and creations 
Collective values, 
norms and knowledge 
Basic Assumptions 
and beliefs
 
Figure 2.2: Schein’s Corporate Culture Model 
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2.9.2.1 Organisational Culture Influence on Security Culture   
Information security culture, which forms part of organisational 
culture, has to do with employees’ behaviour (Schlienger & Teufel, 
2003). The way things are done is based on collective values, norms and 
knowledge and has a crucial impact on corporate success (Schlienger & 
Teufel, 2003). As mentioned in the security culture section 2.2, none of 
the research about security culture has provided a clear definition of 
security culture, nor are there any clear views on how to create 
organisational culture to support security (Chia et al., 2002). However, 
Chia, et al, (2002) argue that it is important to understand 
organisational culture, which will lead to the appropriate management 
of information security culture. Organisational culture has a 
substantial impact on the security of information, and this could be 
negative or positive (Chang & Lin, 2007). It is imperative that 
organisational culture reflects a positive attitude to information security 
throughout the entire organisation Schlienger and Teufel, (2003); 
Zakaria, Jarupunphol, and Gani,  (2003), and it is important to perform 
organisational activities consistent with good information security 
culture practice (van Niekerk & von Solms, 2005). Security culture is 
“based on the interaction of employees with information assets and the 
security behaviour they exhibit within the context of the organisational 
culture of the organisation” (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010) (p.198).  
In order to understand the influence of an organisation’s culture on 
security culture, Chia et al., (2002) propose an organisational culture 
model drawn from a Deter, Schroder, and Mauriel (2000) organisational 
culture model, which used literature on security culture to apply each 
dimension to security in an organisation. Chia et al., (2002) then 
developed a research model for evaluating an organisation’s security 
culture. However, Helokunnas and Kuusisto (2003) found that 
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considering only organisational culture is not enough for understanding 
the factors influencing information security culture. Each individual in 
every organisation is influenced by several ethical, national and 
organisational cultures which will affect the way the individual 
interprets the meaning and importance of information security. As a 
result, it is important to understand the complexity of organisational 
culture which will have influences on security culture. Therefore, 
organisational culture will be included as a candidate factor for the 
research conceptual model.  
2.10 Conceptual Model Development Summary 
Based on the comprehensive review of the literature, Figure 2.3 
presents the conceptual model development. The set of candidate 
factors that conceptualized security culture based on the literature 
review analysis are: 
• Top Management Support for Information Security, 
• Establishing an Effective Information Security Policy through 
Policy Enforcement, 
• Security Awareness, 
• Information Security Training, 
• Information Security Risk Analysis and Assessment, 
• Security Compliance, 
• Ethical Conduct Policies. 
In the Saudi environment, additional cultural factors might influence 
the effectiveness of security management practices and more 
particularly security culture such as national culture and 
organisational culture. 
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The relationships between constructs of security culture however have 
not been investigated from an empirical standpoint. There is little 
clarification as to what exact factors constitute security culture and as 
to what factors influence or drive the creation of security culture. The 
distinction clearly has not been made by academic literature on the 
information security culture. In other words, there is a clear gap in 
knowledge in terms of identifying what factors constitute or reflect the 
security culture and what factors influence the security culture. 
Therefore, the current study will take this initiative and develop an 
information security culture measurement model that clearly 
distinguishes between what factors constitute security culture and what 
factors influence or drive the security culture. In order to achieve this 
goal, an open ended interview will be implemented to develop the 
information security culture measurement model in Saudi Arabian 
organisations. Additionally, the qualitative interviews will also assist in 
minimizing subjectivity in identifying factors for the research conceptual 
model. However, other factors could emerge after conducting and 
analysing the qualitative interviews. Furthermore, as discussed earlier 
in section 2.7, security culture is a very complex phenomenon and the 
current study cannot investigate every element or factor that influences, 
helps conceptualize or constitute security culture. As a result, the 
current study will focus only on factors that influence security culture 
and factors that constitute security culture based on the qualitative 
interviews and the literature review analysis in order to develop the 
information security culture measurement model. More details about 
the qualitative interviews will be discussed later in the methodology 
chapter. Outcomes of the qualitative analysis of interviews will be 
presented in Chapter 4. 
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Ethical Conduct Polices
 
Figure 2.3: Conceptual Model Development 
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2.11 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented a comprehensive review of the security culture 
literature in order to develop the conceptual model. Earlier in this 
chapter, background information about the Saudi context was provided 
that included an examination of factors influencing the implementation 
of new technology such as educational, economic, social and cultural 
and technological factors. Afterwards, the examination of security 
culture was provided in which a conceptualization of security culture 
was developed based on the literature review analysis. Later, 
examinations of cultural factors such as national and organisational 
culture that could influence security culture was examined in order to 
gain an understanding of the important factors that could substantially 
affect security culture. This chapter finished by developing the 
conceptual model and summary of this chapter. It is important to 
remember that an open-ended qualitative interview will be conducted to 
ensure the identification of factors that constitute or reflect security 
culture and factors that influence security culture in the Saudi context. 
The outcome of the qualitative analysis will be incorporated into the 
literature review to develop the information security culture 
measurement model. The current study aimed to test and validate this 
model in subsequent stages of the research process with a survey 
questionnaire
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology  
3.1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 presented a critical review of the available literature in order 
to understand the constructs and assess the current background of the 
information security culture in Saudi Arabian organisations. It also 
reviewed the current information security cultural factors which assist 
in the establishment of effective information security management 
practices. The information generated from the literature review is used 
to develop the qualitative interview. The outcomes of the qualitative 
interviews are incorporated into the literature review to develop the 
information security culture measurement model. Based on the 
information security culture model, survey questionnaires will be 
developed to test the reliability and validity of the model. The objective 
of this chapter is to explain approach, design, plan and methods. This 
chapter will present the research design; data collection methods and 
data analysis for both methods employed in this study and will justify 
the use of a qualitative and quantitative method. In addition, the 
reliability and validity of the quantitative approach will be examined.  
3.2 Research Design/Process  
Research design is important as it serves as a blueprint for meeting the 
established research objectives. Research design helps researchers to 
arrive at the answers to their research questions while effectively 
controlling the logic by providing links to the data to be used in 
answering the research questions (Cavana, Delahaye, & Sekaran, 
2001). Research design involves a series of rational decision-making 
choices with reference to the study, the study setting, the extent of 
researcher interference, the time horizon and the unit of analysis 
(Cavana et al., 2001). Furthermore, decisions have to be made regarding 
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the type of sample to be used, the data collection methods, how 
variables will be measured, and how the concepts and variables will be 
analysed (Cavana et al., 2001). An exploratory process is illustrated 
using mixed methods in Figure 3.1. The research activities are 
summarized in the following points: 
• A synthesized literature review to capture information security 
factors was conducted in order to develop a conceptual model. 
• An integrated mixed method qualitative and quantitative 
approach was used in which the qualitative aspect was designed 
to develop an information security culture measurement model 
and the quantitative approach was designed to test and validate 
the model. 
The research methodology chapter now elaborates on each research 
activity.  
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Input    Research Activities  Output 
Personal and 
Research Interest Preliminary Investigation
Literature Review Analysis
Qualitative Data Collection 
Questionnaire Development
Questionnaire Survey
Descriptive Data Analysis
Measurement Scale 
Analysis
Model Assessment and 
Refinements
Interpretations and 
Contributions
Eight Interviews Represent 
Different Saudi Arabian 
Organizations
Academic Experts
Saudi Arabian 
Organizations
Conceptual Model 
Development 
Qualitative Data 
from Interviews 
A priori  Model
Survey 
Questionnaires
Data from the 
Survey
Descriptive Results
Validate 
Measurement Scale
Refine Model
Implications and 
Recommendations
Initial Research 
Questions/ Objectives
Refined Research 
Questions
 
Figure3.1: Outline of Research Process 
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3.3 Justification of Research Method Design 
For the current study, a mixed method model described by Creswell 
(2008) was used. A mixed method research design is a procedure for 
collecting, analysing and mixing both qualitative and quantitative 
methods in a single study to understand a single research problem 
(Creswell, 2008). Semi-structured interviews using qualitative data will 
be used to identify factors constituting information security culture and 
factors influencing information security culture in the Saudi context. 
However, quantitative data using survey questionnaires will be used 
primarily to test the model validity through testing the nomological net 
validity for the information security culture measurement model. 
Additionally, quantitative data using survey questionnaires will be used 
to develop an initial understanding of the relationship between factors 
that influence security culture and factors that constitute security 
culture. The advantages of using a mixed method approach in 
information systems have been discussed in the literature (Gable, 1994; 
Kaplan & Duchon, 1988). 
Collecting different kinds of data by different methods from 
different sources provides a wider range of coverage that may 
result in a fuller picture of the research problem. It provides a 
richer contextual basis for interpreting and validating results 
(Kaplan & Duchon, 1988, p. 575). 
There are a lot of studies supporting the combined use of qualitative 
and quantitative research methods in information systems filed (Gable, 
1994; Kaplan & Duchon, 1988; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). 
Qualitative research is a widely used method in information systems 
research (Benbasat, Goldstein, and Mead, (1987); Walsham, (1995, 
2006), including its combination with surveys (Ives, Olson, & Baroudi, 
1983). In qualitative analysis, data are collected from a small number of 
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organisations and participants through methods such as participant-
observation and in-depth interviews (Yin, 2003). Case studies, which 
mainly use interviews, provide the opportunity to ask penetrating 
questions and to capture the richness of organisational behaviour, 
however the conclusions drawn may be specific to the particular 
organisations studied and may not be generalisable (Gable, 1994).  
The survey approach refers to a group of methods which emphasize 
quantitative analysis, where data from a large number of organisations 
are collected through methods such as mail questionnaires, telephone 
interviews, or from published statistics, and these data are analysed 
using statistical techniques (Gable, 1994; Jick, 1979). By studying a 
representative sample of organisations, the survey approach seeks to 
discover relationships that are common across organisations and hence 
to provide generalisable statements about the object of study (Jick, 
1979). Surveys need a larger population to observe directly (Newsted, 
Huff, & Munro, 1998). While surveys can accurately document the 
norm, identify extreme outcomes and delineate associations between 
variables in a sample, Vidich and Shapiro (1955), p.31) highlight the 
relatively superior 'deductibility' of the survey method over field 
methods. They observe that "without the survey data, the observer 
could only make reasonable guesses about his area of ignorance in the 
effort to reduce bias"(1955), p.31). Jick (1979) suggested survey 
research may also contribute to greater confidence in the 
generalizability of the results. Yet, “for a survey to succeed in 
elucidating causal relationships or even in providing descriptive 
statistics, it must contain all the right questions asked in the right way” 
(Gable, 1994) (P.114). Often the survey approach provides only a 
"snapshot" of the situation at a certain point in time, yielding little 
information on the underlying meaning of the data. As a result, some 
variables of interest to a researcher may not be measurable by this 
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method (e.g. cross-sectional studies offer weak evidence of cause and 
effect) (Gable, 1994). Therefore, surveys in general are strong in some 
areas but weak in others (Attewell & Rule, 1991).  
3.4 Conceptual Model Development  
3.4.1 Preliminary Investigation 
The objective of this stage was to gather fundamental knowledge 
pertaining to an information security culture model in Saudi Arabian 
organisations. This research activity was undertaken through a critical 
and comprehensive review of the relevant literature. The outcome of this 
stage has revealed a lack of academic and professional literature in 
terms of information security management in general and more 
specifically information security culture in the Saudi context.  
3.4.2 Literature Review Analysis 
This stage was described in Chapter 2. It provided a comprehensive 
understanding of information security cultural factors such that a 
conceptual model was subsequently established. A gap in the 
knowledge was identified which led to the development of a conceptual 
model to address the deficiencies. 
3.4.3 Conceptual Model Development  
The comprehensive review of the information security culture area 
conducted in Chapter 2 revealed a lack of academic and professional 
research in the Saudi environment. To address this significant gap in 
knowledge, a comprehensive review of research in other environments, 
such as developed countries, was conducted to examine critical 
information security culture factors that assist in the effectiveness of 
managing information security. The comprehensive review revealed a 
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lack of studies that measure information security culture. The outcome 
of this comprehensive review led to the development of a conceptual 
model. However, the conceptual model developed that was based on the 
literature review analyses, has no clearly distinct factors that either 
constitute security culture or that influence security culture. In other 
words, the literature analyses did not provide an understanding as to 
what factors could constitute or influence information security culture. 
Additionally, the current study cannot presume that the current 
information security cultural factors found in the developed countries 
are applicable to the Saudi Arabian context. As a result, further 
investigation was needed to determine firstly, what factors constitute 
security culture and what factors influence security culture; and 
secondly, whether the information security cultural factors in developed 
countries are similar to those in the Saudi context. Therefore, an 
exploratory qualitative interview was conducted to identify factors that 
constitute information security culture and factors that influence 
information security culture in the Saudi context.  
3.5 Interviews  
Semi-structured interviews are one of the most important data 
gathering tools in qualitative research (Yin, 2003). They are used in 
action research, in grounded theory studies and in ethnographies, but 
most notably in case study research (Yin, 2003). Interviews provide 
opportunities for the researcher to know how each respondent feels 
about a particular issue. Interviews have several advantages. Interviews 
give information which leads to conceptualization of the issues in ways 
different from what might be anticipated before (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 
2009). Additionally, interviews offer better control than observations 
over the types of information received through specific questions to 
elicit this information (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Furthermore, 
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interviews provide opportunities to ask for clarification if an answer is 
vague and provide clarification if a question is unclear (Creswell, 2008). 
In the information systems discipline, semi-structured interviews are 
considered appropriate where research and theory are in the early 
formative stages (Benbasat & Zmud, 1999). This applies to information 
security culture research which still needs to build good theories for 
explaining and predicting real-life practices. Semi-structured interviews 
are an acknowledged way of uncovering notions and concepts relevant 
to actual practitioners (Recker, 2008). Therefore, semi-structured 
interviews are an appropriate means of carrying out research into 
information security culture. Semi-structured interviews in particular 
were used to maximize the flexibility of the interview and to provide the 
opportunity to tailor the interview to suit the individual participant 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Semi-structured interviews can be 
exploratory, explanatory and descriptive (Gable, 1994; Recker, 2008; 
Yin, 2003).  
• Exploratory interviews are generally used to answer “What” 
questions where the goal is to develop pertinent hypothesis and 
propositions for further inquiry. This assists in the formation of 
research questions and hypothesis.  
• Explanatory interviews are designed to answer “How” and “Why” 
questions. The goal is to determine whether there are causal 
relationships between variables or events. 
• Descriptive interviews provide the researcher with a rich 
description of the phenomenon being studied. Descriptive 
interviews are used to answer “what” questions in the form of 
“How many” or “How much” (Yin, 2003). 
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In this present study, semi-structured interviews are used in an 
exploratory manner. They are used to enrich theoretical propositions 
about information security culture in the Saudi context, and mainly to 
develop the information security culture measurement model. This 
process includes identifying factors that constitute or reflect 
information security culture and factors that influence information 
security culture in the Saudi context. The outcome of the interviews in 
conjunction with the literature review will assist in deriving the 
theoretical model—see Chapter 2 for details. The outcome of the 
interviews will also be used to determine a foundation for more detailed 
investigations, to be implemented using a quantitative (survey 
instrument) technique conducted in the subsequent stages. Therefore, 
the main goal of the interview phase was: 
1. To develop the information security culture measurement model 
by satisfying the following: 
o Are all of the eight factors that were found in the 
conceptual model important factors in the Saudi Arabia 
Environment? 
o Determining what factors constitute or reflect security 
culture 
o Determining what factors influence or drive security culture 
o Are there any factors that must be included in the emergent 
theoretical model? 
2. To aid in the design of the subsequent survey by making sure to: 
o Get input from which to derive the construct that is to be 
tested in the survey. 
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o Gather evidence to justify the survey constructs of both 
independent and dependent variables. 
3.5.1 About the Interviewer 
Bandara (2007) and Smyth (2001) identified guidelines that the 
interviewer must follow: 
1. Frame interview questions clearly and unambiguously; 
2. put the interviewee at ease; 
3. be alert and sensitive to any ‘new insights’ that may arise during 
the interview; and 
4. probe further when required, or take a different angle, which can 
influence the quality of data gathered from the interview 
significantly.  
As the researcher did not have training or experience in interviewing 
skills prior to this study, the interviewer increased his skills by utilizing:  
• a comprehensive review of relevant literature; 
• a very detailed interview protocol design; and 
• interview practice conducted with colleagues, his principal 
supervisor and his supervisory team. 
3.5.2 Interview Sampling and Sampling Methods 
The primary research goal is to conceptualize an information security 
cultural model that helps manage information security effectively in 
Saudi Arabian organisations. The sampling selection of firms to be 
included in the interviews was based on the following criteria: Firms 
must 
1. have an established information security infrastructure; 
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2. use information security management practices frequently, such 
as policy, awareness; and 
3. be interested in participating in the study. 
The following criteria were included in the selection process of the 
organisations participating in this study:  
1. Organisations to come from different sectors and work 
environments (Private, Government and semi Government); 
2. Organisations to come from different industries (IT, Healthcare, 
Financial, Consulting); 
3. Organisations to be of different sizes, small (less than 500 
employees), medium (500-3000 employees) and large (more than 
3000 employees); and 
4. Organisations to be willing to participate in this research and to 
give space and time for interviews, the survey, and participation 
in this research. 
The selection process for organisations from different sectors and 
industries would assist in understanding of information security culture 
phenomenon from different perspectives and backgrounds in the Saudi 
environment. This would assist in generalising the results and findings 
to many sectors and industries in the Saudi environment. Ultimately, 
the findings from the qualitative phase gave rise to the information 
security culture model variables which were used to test the validity of 
the model in the subsequent quantitative survey. 
3.5.3 Development of the Interview Guide 
This research aimed to explore significant factors that may assist in 
measuring information security culture in the Saudi context. Specific 
data collection questions from each of these perspectives are set out in 
the interview guide (please refer to Appendix A). The guidelines used 
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during each of these interviews were based on Yin’s, (2003) suggestion 
to maintain a sequence of questions and a level of consistency during 
each interview. Open ended interviews questions allow the respondents 
to provide details necessary to understand the richness of the 
phenomenon in which little is yet known such as information security 
culture. The interviews started out with six structured questions to 
elicit specific information from the participants in relation to their Saudi 
organisation. The purpose of these questions was to establish the roles 
of both the organisation and the interviewee with respect to information 
security measures. They concerned: organisation type; size of 
IT/Information security department and organisation; type of industry; 
accountability; extent of ICT centralization or decentralization; and core 
business of the organisation. Afterwards, there were seven flexible 
questions arising from the following imperatives: 
1. Discuss information security culture in the Saudi context. 
2. Investigate and examine how information security culture can be 
created in the Saudi context. 
3. Identify main contributory factors to create an effective 
information security culture in the Saudi context. 
4. Identify factors that influence information security culture in the 
Saudi context. 
5. Identify main barriers to address the lack of information security 
awareness in the Saudi context. 
6. Identify factors for improving security compliance in Saudi 
Arabian organisations. 
7. Identify the effect of the cultural factors at national, 
organisational and individual levels on information security 
culture in the Saudi context. 
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The questions were designed to minimize the potential bias through the 
application of common instruments, including the interview guide. 
Additional questions would also be asked when appropriate, based on 
the responses of the interviewees. This approach allowed the 
participants to discuss pertinent themes in a suitable manner and the 
interviewer to gain in-depth responses. Table 3.1 presents the open-
ended interview questions and their linkage to the research questions. 
The answers to the research questions taken collectively, should answer 
the first research objective. Afterwards, a pilot study was conducted to 
determine the appropriate unit of analysis, to refine the data collection 
instruments and to develop familiarity with the research phenomenon 
(Yin, 2003). The interview instrument was pretested with four 
information security managers from different organisations in Saudi 
Arabia. Based on the comments received from the pre-test, minor 
modifications were made to the interview questions for improving their 
clarity before using the actual interview. The outcome of the qualitative 
interview was integrated with the literature analysis to develop the 
information security culture measurement model. The outcome of the 
interviews will assist in identifying factors that constitute information 
security culture, and factors influencing information security culture in 
the Saudi context. The development of the information security culture 
model will be introduced in the next chapter. The respondents’ opinions 
on the relevance and importance of elements found in the literature 
were examined. As a result, the researchers obtained new ideas to 
enhance the model while simultaneously validating the existing a priori 
factors. 
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Table 3.1: The Interview Questions and Their Linkage to the Research Questions 
2 Research Question 7 Interview 
Questions 
1. What are the factors that 
constitute or reflect security 
culture in the Saudi context? 
1. Could you please talk about security 
culture in your organisation? 
2. Please indicate, and give examples of, 
how information security culture can be 
created in your organisation? 
2. What are the factors that have 
direct influence on information 
security culture in the Saudi 
context? 
1. What do you consider to be the main 
contributory factors to create an effective 
information security culture in your 
organisation? 
2. What are the factors that influence 
security culture in your organisation? 
3. What are the main barriers to address the 
lack of information security awareness? 
Please explain. 
4. How can you improve security compliance 
in your organisation? Please explain. 
5. Please indicate, and give examples of, 
how information security culture in your 
organisation is affected by: cultural factors 
at three levels: 
National, Organizational, and 
Individual. Please explain. 
 
3.5.4 Conduct of the Interviews 
Prior to conducting the interviews, issues with respect to basic ethical 
issues of research were considered (Patton, 1990). One of these issues 
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is the confidentiality of the interviewee and the data they provide. It is 
required that the informed consent of the interviewees be obtained that 
their responses can be used as data input for a research project. It is 
also important to assess and disclose the potential risks involved with 
the interviewees. Finally, it is important to discuss the promised 
benefits to the interviewees in return for sharing their time and 
insights. After addressing these issues in a clear plan, ethical clearance 
from QUT was granted prior to conducting the interviews. Afterwards, 
the researcher established a key contact person in each chosen 
organisation. A contact list was established between the researcher and 
the key contact person in each chosen organisation. Interviewees were 
selected on the basis of the role they played within the organisation in 
terms of information security management. After respondents were 
nominated by the key contact person in their organisation, they were 
contacted by the researcher. The researcher emailed them, introducing 
the purpose of the interview and sought the cooperation of the 
respondents. Table 3.2 represents the interview process.  
Table 3.2: Interview Process 
1 Initial contact with respondent 
2 E-mail the respondent to schedule the interview 
3 
Establish dates/times with respondent for further 
communication regarding interviewing the respondents 
4 
Subsequent contact/s may involve: 
interviewing respondent (on-site, Skype, telephone, ...) 
email communication 
5 Each respondent will be given access to the study's findings 
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An interview guide was developed to maintain the direction of the 
interview within the area of interest and ensure the consistency of the 
data collected. Face-to-face interviews were used to provide the 
opportunity for clarifying ambiguous questions, to observe the actual 
environment of the firm being studied, and to explore and understand 
complex issues (Sedera, Gable, & Chan, 2003). The researcher had a 
list of predetermined questions to be posed to the interviewees. 
Unfortunately, because of the sensitive nature of information security 
studies, many participants declined to have the interview recorded. As a 
result, the researcher took notes in all of the interviews to ensure an 
accurate description of the interviewee’s responses. In addition, the 
participants agreed to document their responses in writing. The total 
time requested for the interviews was 45-60 minutes. The researcher 
ensured the time limit was not exceeded and the arrangements for each 
interview were at the convenience of the interviewee, to maximize 
cooperation. The actual interview was based on the interview guide 
(refer to Appendix A). The interviews were conducted at the experts’ 
workplaces in Saudi Arabia during December 2008 and January 2009. 
The interviews were conducted in English, with some Arabic terms used 
when necessary. The study information background and interview 
questionnaire sheets were provided to all participants. Each respondent 
was given the opportunity to review the data obtained. All the 
comments, changes and modifications required by the participants were 
considered in the final interview report. 
3.6 Qualitative Data Analysis  
Data analysis is one of the least developed and most difficult aspects of 
doing qualitative studies, consisting of examining, categorizing, 
tabulating, testing or otherwise recombining evidence to develop a 
research hypothesis (Yin, 2003). For the purpose of this study, the data 
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analysis used a within-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1978). A within-case 
analysis generally involves detailed interviews and write-ups for each 
interview. The information gained from each interview provided insight 
into how the model factors and constructs were perceived within a real-
life context. The outcome of the qualitative interviews generated 
information security culture factors from the given data through a 
narrative discussion then an interpretation. Creswell (2008) points out 
that interpretation in qualitative research means that the researcher 
gains a broader understanding of the phenomenon based on personal 
views, comparisons with past studies or both. This broad 
understanding was gained through reviewing the major findings and 
comparing personal views with the literature. Yin, (2003) suggested 
qualitative data analytical procedures consist of three steps: 
• Step 1: choosing a general strategy to help in deciding what to 
analyse and why it should be analysed; 
• Step 2: coding the evidence; and 
• Step 3: using an analytical technique to develop or test the 
theories.  
3.6.1 General Analytic Strategy 
According to Yin (2003), there are two analytical strategies for 
qualitative research. While the first strategy relies on theoretical 
propositions to organize the qualitative data, the second one develops a 
descriptive framework to organize the qualitative data. This study 
adopted the second strategy, categorizing and identifying themes from 
the data according to the following steps: 
1. The first step began with coding themes and patterns. These 
codes were used later in the analysis of individual transcripts. 
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2. Each individual transcript was summarized. The process for 
analysis was reduction. Afterwards, all the individual 
responses to each question were combined in a single 
document.  
3. Transcript and response summaries were used for ‘within-
case’ analyses. 
4. The final step involved drawing conclusions and writing the 
interview report. 
For each interview, the following questions were addressed: 
• What factors constitute or reflect security culture? 
• What factors influence or drive security culture? 
• Are any of the identified factors redundant? 
• What type of relationships exists among constructs? 
Figure 3.2 represents the qualitative data analysis process. 
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1. Conduct Interviews
2. Instrument pretest
3. A priori Coding
4. Interview Transcript
Within Case Analysis
Summary of Responses
Summary of Transcript
Interview Report (A Priori 
Model Development) 
 
 
Figure3.2: Qualitative Data Analysis Process 
3.6.2 Analytic and Coding Techniques 
Qualitative research mainly uses two general approaches: inductive and 
deductive (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). In the inductive approach, 
research starts with a loose question rather than a strict hypothesis 
(Creswell, 2008). In the deductive approach, the researcher collects data 
to test a predefined hypothesis. Deductive reasoning leads researchers 
to measure the relative attainment of predetermined, clear and specific 
goals (Creswell, 2008). Inductive reasoning however leads researchers to 
focus more on a scheme or on product impacts and effects (Creswell, 
2008). This study uses both deductive and inductive approach. The 
deductive approach investigated factors that constitute information 
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security culture and factors that influence information security culture 
in order to develop the information security culture measurement model 
in the Saudi Arabia environment. The inductive techniques were applied 
to derive constructs and items of the survey instruments. 
Pattern codes represent the sets of emergent codes the researcher 
develops during data analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994). As described 
by Miles and Huberman (1994) (P.68-69), pattern coding is “A way of 
grouping the summaries into a smaller number of overarching themes 
or constructs”. Pattern coding helps to reduce the large amount of data 
into a small number of analytic units (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Pattern matching is used to verify the concepts and relationships 
among concepts identified in the conceptual framework (Yin, 2003).. As 
a result, pattern matching is a useful technique to link data to 
propositions (Campbell, 1975) and to verify the concepts and link the 
relationships among concepts identified in the conceptual model. 
Therefore, pattern matching will be used in this study.   
3.7 Development of the Information Security Culture Model 
The development of the information security culture model will be 
examined in detail in Chapter 4. Basically, the development of the 
information security culture model is based on qualitative interview 
findings, incorporated with the literature analysis. Qualitative interview 
findings will be discussed in Chapter 4. Survey questionnaires will 
validate the information security culture model constructs which will be 
the focus of Chapters 5A, 5B and Chapter 6.  
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3.8 Survey Questionnaires and Data Analysis 
3.8.1 Survey Rationale 
A number of reasons exist as to why survey research has been deemed 
a suitable research method for the current study. Pinsonneault, and 
Kraemer, (1993, p.78) suggested four aspects of research design for 
which survey research is most appropriate, all of which apply to the 
present investigation as follows:  
1. The central questions of interest about the phenomena are 
"what is happening?" and "how and why is it happening?” In the 
current study, the research interest is to understand what factors 
constitute security culture and what factors influence security 
culture as essential steps to developing the information security 
measurement model.  
2. Control of the independent and dependent variables is not 
possible or not desirable. The current study used security culture 
perceptions as the primary unit of observation.  
 3. The phenomena of interest must be studied in their natural 
setting. In the current study, the adoption of security culture by 
individuals in their organisations’ work setting is studied.   
4. The phenomena of interest occur in current time or the recent 
past. Security culture is an example of behaviour that has an 
interesting aspect and unique pattern of organisation adoption. 
This is interesting since the creation of a security culture within 
the organisation’s setting could improve the effectiveness of 
managing information security.    
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Pinsonneault, and Kraemer (1993), provided a general classification for 
survey research by stating that “Survey research can be used for 
exploration, description, or explanation” (p.79). They further classify 
survey research into cross-sectional survey and longitudinal surveys.  
The purpose of the exploratory survey is to become more familiar with a 
phenomenon or topic of interest (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993; 
Recker, 2008). It basically focuses on eliciting the important constructs 
and the best way to measure them (Recker, 2008).   
“The purpose of survey research in exploration is to become more 
familiar with a topic and to try out preliminary concepts about it. 
A survey in this context is used to discover the range of responses 
likely to occur in some population of and to refine the 
measurement of concepts….Usage of survey research for 
exploration as an end in itself is almost never warranted. 
Exploratory surveys should be used as the basis for developing 
concepts and methods for more detailed, systematic descriptive or 
explanatory surveys” (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993) (p.79).    
One example of exploratory survey is to define various types of end-user 
computing involved in systems development (Rockart & Flannery, 
1983). Descriptive surveys however are used when the goal is to 
examine “what situations, events, attitudes, or opinions are occurring 
in a population” (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993) (P.80). As a result, 
descriptive surveys ascertain facts and do not occur in a population and 
the hypothesis is not causal. An example of descriptive statistics is 
describing the types of people that use computers in organisations 
(Danziger & Kraemer, 1985). “The purpose of survey research in 
explanation is to test theory and causal relations” (Pinsonneault & 
Kraemer, 1993) (P.80). Survey research aimed at explanation asks 
about the relationships between variables (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 
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1993). The central research question in explanatory research is: “Does 
the hypothesized causal relationship exist, and does it exist for the 
reasons posited?”  (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993)(P.80). An example of 
explanatory survey research studies is whether and why user 
participation in systems development projects influences system usage 
and information satisfaction (Baroudi, Olson, & Ives, 1986). 
Cross sectional surveys examine the sample population during a single 
interval, with only one point in time for data collection. Longitudinal 
surveys specifically examine the variables within the study over time 
(Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993).   
The survey designed for the current study was predominantly 
exploratory the purpose for which was to develop familiarity with a topic 
and to try out preliminary concepts about it. The exploratory surveys 
were used since there was clearly a lack of reliable and valid 
information security culture measurement instruments as shown by the 
literature which examined the security culture but did not provide 
empirical evidence for it.  Exploratory surveys will assist in testing the 
validity and reliability of the information security culture measurement 
model that was designed as the primary goal. Additionally, the 
explanatory survey will be used in a secondary capacity the goal of 
which is to test the causal relationship between the factors influencing 
a security culture and the factors constituting a security culture. 
Furthermore, cross-sectional surveys in which data was collected only 
once were used in this study. One of the main reasons for the selection 
of cross-sectional surveys is because of feasibility and practicality 
issues. Cross-sectional surveys are simple to design and establish 
research validity in addition to taking minimal time in the research 
project in comparison to longitudinal surveys. 
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3.8.2 Survey Content 
The questionnaire was designed in three major sections: 
• Section 1 gathered demographic information about the 
respondents and their organisations. 
• Section 2 elicited respondents’ opinions on factors within the 
influence of security culture in Saudi Arabian organisations (19 
statements).  
• Section 3 obtained respondents’ opinions about security culture, 
represented by three constructs: awareness of the security policy, 
compliance with security policy and security ownership (9 
statements). 
3.8.3 Questionnaire Development and Administration 
A questionnaire contains a pre-formulated written set of questions, 
designed to elicit the information relevant to the research interest, to 
which the respondents record their answers by following the given 
protocols (Schwab, 1999; Sekaran, 2003). As a questionnaire should be 
well designed to provide accurate and useable data, certain procedures, 
suggested by Dillman (2000), were followed to maximize the response 
rates, whilst minimizing error: 
• Using appropriate language; 
• Making the questionnaire appear short and easy; 
• Making the questionnaire interesting and easy to complete by 
carefully designing the layout and structuring the order of the 
questions; 
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• Using an introductory letter to establish the significance of the 
study, the objectives of the research and the importance of the 
survey, and to show positive regard to and thank the respondents 
in advance; 
• Notifying respondents in advance to gain their co-operation 
through networking, emails or telephone calls; 
• Making it convenient for the respondents to return the completed 
questionnaire by providing a pre-paid reply envelope, and 
creating a web-based version of the questionnaire as an 
alternative means of completing the questionnaire;  and  
• Following up the survey by email or telephone, to the late/slow 
respondents in particular.  
During the survey process, the organisations were first contacted via 
email, telephone and networking to confirm contact details and to 
introduce the survey. The self-administered questionnaires were then 
mailed to the managerial and professional staff member(s) within the 
chosen organisations. A cover letter was attached to the questionnaire 
to introduce the researcher, the objectives of the study and the 
importance of the survey. A self-addressed, stamped return envelope 
was included in the package. A total of 500 questionnaire packages 
were delivered. Telephone and email follow-up were undertaken during 
the week following the delivery of the questionnaire packages.  
These questionnaires were conducted after obtaining ethical approval 
according to QUT ethical guidelines. To ensure the integrity of the 
ethical process, this study provided: 
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• Consent: The participants in this research were voluntary. There 
was no requirement for organisations to participate in this 
research.  
• Confidential: This research ensured that data that was collected 
was confidential. Any disclosure of information to a particular 
organisation must be given written approval.  
• Privacy: The research ensured the privacy of participants’ and 
organisations’ names.  
The study was conducted within the environment of Saudi Arabian 
organisations, the data being gathered over a period of two months.  
3.8.4 Instrument Translation 
The scales used in this study had been developed originally in English 
and were translated into Arabic for use in Saudi organizations. A 
forward-backward translation process with subjective, objective, and 
pilot evaluations was used since the quality of translation is the key to 
ensuring the functional equivalence between the English and Arabic 
versions of the measures. This process drew on the cross-cultural 
instrument development work of Brislin (1970), and Lin, Chen, and 
Chiu, (2005). The goal of the translation and process was to produce an 
Arabic version of the items that were equivalent in meaning to the 
original English versions. Therefore, the research objective was an 
equivalent translation not an identical word-by-word translation of 
items. Equivalent translations emphasize functional equivalence or the 
equivalence of meaning of the survey items between the original and 
translated instruments (Brislin; 1970 and Lin, Chen, and Chiu, 2005). 
Functional equivalence helps to ensure that the translated measures 
work in the new target culture as well as they did in the original 
culture. This would ensure that the items do not lose their core 
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meaning in the translation process and that the language used in the 
translated items has appropriate form and readability (Brislin; 1970 
and Lin, Chen, and Chiu, 2005). The translation process is discussed 
below based on cross-cultural instrument development work of Brislin 
(1970), and Lin, Chen, and Chiu, (2005). 
3.8.4.1 Forward and Backward Translation 
Two translators bilingual in English and Arabic separately translated 
the English version of the items into Arabic (forward translation). These 
translators were instructed to retain the meaning of the items as close 
to the original as possible. Then the resulting items were compared to 
assess the item-by-item similarity across the two translations. In the 
case of disagreements or discrepancies, the translators discussed and 
revised the items until consensus was reached. When the Arabic 
translation was finalized, the items were then back-translated (from 
Arabic to English) by two other people bilingual in English and Arabic 
following the same comparison and revision process. 
3.8.4.2 Subjective Evaluation 
The researchers evaluated the back-translated items to ensure that 
item meanings were equivalent in both the original English versions and 
the back-translated version. If differences in meaning were found 
between items, those items were put through the forward and back-
translation process again until the researchers were satisfied there was 
substantial meaning equivalence. 
3.8.4.3 Objective Evaluation 
Following the subjective evaluation, a rating process was implemented 
in which a group of 10 native English speakers (Queensland University 
of Technology graduate students and other professionals) compared the 
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back-translated items with the original items and rated the functional 
equivalence of each pair using a seven-point Likert-type rating scale 
with anchors ranging from 1 (Not at all similar in meaning) to 7 (Very 
similar in meaning). Items with mean ratings below four would have 
been put through the forward, back translation and subjective 
evaluation process again. However, no mean ratings fell below this 
threshold. 
3.8.4.4 Pilot Test 
The Arabic version of the survey was pilot tested with a group of 20 
employees in Saudi Arabia to collect feedback about instrument content 
and usage. This feedback did not lead to any substantive changes. 
3.8.5 Data Collection Method 
Postal mail was chosen as the primary means of distributing the survey 
instrument. Mailing the survey was chosen because it was easier to 
reach a large number of respondents (Fong, 2005). To improve the 
response rate, a web-based version of the questionnaire was also 
developed as an alternative method for respondents to use. The web-
based survey details are provided in Appendix B.  
3.8.6 Measurement Scale 
Five-point scales were used to measure the operationally-defined 
elements of the constructs within the proposed theoretical model. Five-
point Likert scales were applied to measure the perception of factors 
influencing security culture, and factors constituting security culture. 
For detail, see the questionnaire in Appendix C. In this study the 
numbers 1 to 5 were assigned to the categories of concepts (strongly 
disagree = 1, disagree = 2, undecided = 3, agree = 4 and strongly agree = 
5), knowing that this surely does not represent the true distances 
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between them but believing that it is close enough to derive meaningful 
results (McClendon, 1994). For more details about the measurement 
development instrument, please refer to Chapter 4 Construct 
Operationalisations, section 4.8.  
3.8.7 Survey Sampling and Sampling Methods 
According to Neuman (2006), sampling is a process of systematically 
selecting cases for inclusion in a research project. A researcher uses a 
set of cases (elements) or samples, which are more manageable and cost 
effective to work with than a pool of all the cases (Neuman, (2006); 
sampling cuts costs, reduces labour requirements and quickly gathers 
vital information. The research objectives’ statements highlight that the 
unit of analysis was information security culture at the individual level. 
In order to select the sample candidates, this study chose from many 
organisations in the Saudi Arabian context (private, public and semi-
public). This study also contacted public institutions to increase 
exposure in the government sector. Many small and medium 
enterprises were contacted in order to cover the largest group possible 
that represented Saudi Arabian organisations. The candidate sample 
frame chose 200 organisations ranging from small, medium and large, 
private, public and semi-public organisations. The participants chosen 
had an information security baseline experience and were aware of 
information security practices in their organisations. The participants’ 
roles ranged from general and technical staff, department and IT 
managers, IT staff, security staff, to information security managers and 
officers. The study offered an option of “not applicable” for participants 
who did not feel it appropriate to disclose particular information about 
their information security practices. If too many statements from an 
individual turned out to be “not applicable”, the study excluded such 
participants to avoid too many missing values in the questionnaires. 
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The time needed to answer the survey for each participant was 10-15 
minutes.  
3.8.8 Questionnaire Pre-test 
A draft questionnaire was pre-tested to ensure the questions were 
understood by the respondents and there were no problems with the 
wording of the instrument (Sekaran, 2003). Generally, there are two 
common types of pre-tests: panel judgment and pilot study. This study 
used both methods for testing the questionnaires. A panel judgment 
ensures the content validity of the questionnaire, whilst a pilot study 
identifies any ambiguities in the questionnaire, as well as enabling the 
researchers to see if the collected data behave as expected (Sekaran, 
2003). In this research, the panel judgment method was used in the 
pre-testing the draft questionnaire, through an ‘expert-review’ 
technique. This involved sending the draft questionnaire to a group of 
experts to judge whether each item measured the theoretical construct 
nominated. This step will be discussed in detail in the Construct 
Operationalisations section in Chapter 4. In total, four experts 
participated in the review process (all academic staff from Queensland 
University of Technology). The experts were provided with a briefing 
sheet explaining the background and purpose of the study, as well as a 
guideline for reviewing the draft questionnaire (see Appendix C). The 
draft questionnaire was revised as per the experts’ comments, resulting 
in the final survey questionnaire. After revising the questionnaires, pilot 
testing was conducted with twenty participants from Saudi Arabian 
organisations to evaluate the questionnaire for clarity, bias, ambiguous 
questions and relevance to the Saudi Arabian business environment. 
Fifteen respondents offered valid feedback that was considered 
sufficient for serving the purpose (Burns & Bush, 1998). The data 
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collection process began after the questionnaire had been finalized, 
based on the panel judgment and pre-test feedback. 
3.8.9 Data Analysis Techniques/Tool/Process 
Multivariate statistics were employed to quantitatively analyse the data 
collected from the questionnaire survey. This technique is suitable since 
it provides an analysis of a complicated data set that has independent 
and dependent variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). There are many 
objectives for data analysis: to get a feeling for the data through 
descriptive statistical analysis, to test the goodness of the measurement 
scale by measuring reliability and validity, to uncover factors underlying 
model constructs, and to assess and refine the model (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). A descriptive data analysis was conducted, primarily 
using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) (version 
18.00) program, to obtain a feel for the data and to determine if the data 
met the basic assumption required prior to conducting multivariate 
data analyses. (Please refer to Chapter 5A for more detail on these 
assumptions). The analysis included an examination of the respondent 
profiles and data screening (through assessing normality, mean, 
standard deviation and standard error of the mean). It also included a 
preliminary analysis of the mean values to gain a broad picture of the 
respondents’ perceptions regarding each construct, based on the entire 
survey population.  
Afterwards, a measurement scale, used in the questionnaire to capture 
the meaning of each model construct, was assessed for reliability and 
validity. Reliability can be measured using ‘Cronbach’s alpha’, which 
provided an indication of how consistent the responses were across 
items within the scale. ‘Item-total correlations’ were used to assess the 
degree to which a particular item belonged to its scale. On the other 
hand, the validity of the information security culture model was 
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assessed using factor analysis sequentially: Exploratory Factor Analysis 
(EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). EFA enables the 
identification of appropriate variables, as well as the analyses of the 
interrelationships between large numbers of variables, in terms of their 
common underlying dimensions (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & 
Tatham, 2006). The expected results from the EFA provided essential 
information on the valid factor structure of each model construct. 
Following EFA, CFA was sequentially conducted to strengthen the 
validity of the measurement scale by confirming the factor structures 
uncovered from the EFA process (Hair et al., 2006). CFA was used as it 
is considered the best-known technique for testing how well a pre-
determined (hypothesized) factor structure matches the actual data 
(Hair et al., 2006). EFA was carried out using SPSS, and CFA was 
carried out using AMOS. (Please refer to the quantitative findings in 
Chapter 5B for more detail).  
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was employed to test the proposed 
hypotheses concerning mainly the nomological validity of the research 
measurement model constructs and secondarily examining the initial 
understanding of the relationship between factors influencing security 
culture, and factors constituting security culture. SEM techniques were 
also employed to examine a series of dependence relationships, and 
provide a transition from exploratory to confirmatory analysis. SEM is 
an extension of several multivariate techniques, such as multiple 
regression and factor analysis (Hair et al., 2006). By using SEM, the 
confidence placed in the causal relationships was tested, that is, the 
internal validity of the model was established. SEM has many 
advantages, such as it analyses the data for inferential purposes by 
demanding the pattern of inter-variable relations are specified a priori 
(Byrne, 2001). In addition, SEM provides explicit estimates of 
measurement error variance parameters, thereby avoiding possible 
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serious inaccuracies caused by potentially sizable measurement errors 
ignored during exploratory analyses (Byrne, 2001). SEM also 
incorporates and integrates path analysis and factor analysis. It is a 
hybrid model with both multiple indicators (measurement variables of 
the model constructs) for each latent variable (model constructs) and 
specified paths connecting the latent variables. SEM used two steps: 
validating the measurement model and fitting the structural model. The 
first step is achieved through CFA. The second step is achieved through 
path analysis with latent variables (Garson, 2010). SEM can be 
performed with the assistance of specialized computer programs, such 
as LISREL, AMOS, and EQS. In this study, AMOS (version 18.0) was 
employed for testing the hypotheses, as an extension to the use of 
SPSS. (Further detail and results of EFA, CFA, and the SEM analysis 
are in the quantitative findings Chapter 5B and Chapter 6). 
3.8.10 Data Validations 
According to Creswell (2008), the ideal situation in a study exists when 
scores are both reliable and valid. Nevertheless, Creswell believes scores 
need to be stable and consistent (reliable) before they can be meaningful 
(valid). Also, Creswell (2008) states a study is considered valid when 
individuals’ scores from an instrument make sense and are meaningful. 
Validity is the extent to which a scale or set of measures accurately 
represents the concept of interest. Creswell believes scores are valid 
when the researcher is able to draw good conclusions from the sample 
of the study. This study will demonstrate four validation techniques 
that were considered for the measurement scales of the constructs in 
this study. The validation techniques are Uni-dimensionality, content 
validity, construct validity and nomological validity.  
Uni-dimensionality is a necessary prerequisite for reliability and validity 
analysis (Hair et al., 2006; Recker, 2008). Uni-dimensionality is 
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measured through Cronbach’s alpha, and principal component analysis 
(PCA) (Pallant, 2005). Cronbach’s alpha value must be greater than .60 
to be considered uni-dimensionality (Pallant, 2005). Additionally, uni-
dimensionality can be also met if the items have higher loading in the 
PCA analyses in their own construct than in other constructs (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981).  
Content validity refers to the degree to which the context of an 
instrument covers the extent and depth of the topics it is intended to 
cover (Cavana et al., 2001). As a result, content validity is concerned 
with whether the instrument items truly represent the measurement in 
the intended content area and how well the instrument items sample 
the total content area (Bandara, 2007). Content validity can be ensured 
by experts’ panel judgement and a subjective process (Cavana et al., 
2001). The current study ensured context validity through a 
construction of scale processes using the appropriate methodology to 
ensure content validity and will be discussed in chapter 4.8.   
Construct validity is considered to be the most complicated type of 
validity because it is assessed using statistical and practical procedures 
(Creswell, 2008). Construct validity is established by determining 
whether the scores from an instrument are significant and can be used 
to understand a sample from a population (Creswell, 2008). Construct 
validity must meet the two following conditions: convergent and 
discriminant validity.  
The convergent validity refers to the extent to which the measured 
variables of a specific construct share a high proportion of variance in 
common (Hair et al., 2006). Convergent validity can be tested using 
Fornell, and Larcker’s, (1981) three criteria:   
• All indicator loading should be significant and higher than .5  
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• Construct composite reliability should exceed .6 
• Average variance extracted by each construct exceed the variance 
due to the measurement error for that construct (i. e., AVE 
should exceed .5). 
Discriminant validity however refers to the extent to which a construct 
is truly distinct from other constructs (Hair et al., 2006). Therefore, 
discriminant validity measurement should be uncorrelated with 
measures of unrelated constructs (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). 
Discriminant validity can be measured using Fornell and Larcker’s 
(1981) criteria, where the square root of AVE for each construct should 
exceed the square correlation between that and any other construct in 
the factor correlation matrix.  
Nomological validity reflects the extent to which predictions about 
constructs and measures are accurate from the perspective of 
reasonably well-established theoretical models (Straub, Limayem, & 
Karahanna, 1995). Nomological validity examines whether the 
correlations between the constructs in the measurement theory make 
sense. If the statistical significant construct correlations are all 
consistent with theory, then nomological validity is confirmed. In the 
current study nomological validity of the scale will be assessed using 
SEM with encouraging indices of goodness of fit. 
3.8.11 Reliability 
Creswell (2008) (P.597) states that reliability means “means that 
individual scores from an instrument should be nearly the same or 
stable on repeated administrations of the instrument and that they 
should be free from sources of measurement error and consistent ”. 
Creswell states several ways to examine consistency of responses, for 
example, Cronbach’s “coefficient alpha” (p.171), which is used to test for 
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internal consistency. Creswell adds, “If the items are scored as 
continuous variables (e.g., strongly agree to strongly disagree), the 
alpha provides a coefficient to estimate consistency of scores on an 
instrument” (p.171). Cronbach alpha calculates the average correlation 
between items and the test (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). In this study, 
Cronbach’s alpha was used to assess the consistency of the scales. 
Reliability around 0.90 can be considered “excellent”; a value around 
0.80 as “very good”; and values around 0.70 as “adequate” (Kline, 
2005). The generally agreed-upon lower limit for Cronbach’s alpha is 
0.70 (Neuman, 2003). However, to increase reliability, three methods 
suggested by Neuman (2003) were used in this study: 
• Conceptualize constructs through developing unambiguous, clear 
theoretical definitions. Each measure indicates one, and only one, 
concept; 
• Use a precise level of measurement, since measurement variables 
at higher or more precise levels of measurement are more likely to 
be reliable than less precise measures; and 
• Use pre-tests, pilot studies, and replication. To improve reliability, 
a pre-test or pilot version of a measure must be conducted first. 
The principle of using pilot tests extends to replicating the 
measures other researchers have used. (Neuman, 2003) (p.181).  
3.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents the methodological approach employed by the 
research project. First, it discusses the introduction, research design, 
and the justification for the research design. The research approach 
employed was a mixed method design, using qualitative and 
quantitative data. Qualitative data were incorporated with the literature 
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analysis to develop the information security culture measurement 
model. Quantitative data analysis was used mainly to test and validate 
the model. The qualitative data design analysis approach was discussed 
in detail, including qualitative data sampling and analysis. The 
following section discussed survey rationale, survey content, 
questionnaire development and administration, data collection 
methodology, measurement scales, sampling and sampling methods, 
pre-testing the questionnaires, analysing the questionnaires, and the 
validity and reliability of the questionnaires. The next chapter will 
present the findings of the qualitative interviews and the development of 
the information security culture model. 
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Chapter 4: Formulation of the Security Culture Model 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the development of the 
information security culture model that emerged from the qualitative 
interview findings and the literature review. Section 4.2 provides an 
overview of the qualitative interviews. Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 
discuss the qualitative interview findings which include the 
specification of the factors constituting security culture and of the 
factors influencing security culture. Section 4.5 will be devoted to 
discussion of the development of the information security culture model 
constructs and will be examined in detail. Following this, the 
development of a specification of the model will be discussed. Section 
4.7 focuses on the hypotheses development. Section 4.8 examines the 
construct operationalisation process for each item and discusses the 
process that was followed to develop the research instrument for the 
current study. Section 4.9 concludes the chapter.   
4.2 Overview 
Earlier in the literature review chapter, the conceptual model was 
developed based on an extensive review of security culture literature 
analysis. The purpose of the exploratory qualitative interviews however, 
was to assist in developing the information security measurement 
model. This includes identifying factors that constitute or reflect 
information security culture and factors that influence or drive 
information security culture adoption that are particularly relevant to 
the Saudi context. Additionally, the interviews will confirm the existence 
of the conceptual model candidate factors in the information security 
culture model which will be tested in the subsequent phase of the 
survey questionnaires. The specification process of the information 
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security culture model could be treated as model testing.  Any new 
significant factors will be added to the model. The outcome of the 
qualitative interviews in addition to the synthesized literature review 
(see Chapter 2) assisted in deriving the theoretical model. Therefore, the 
main goals of the qualitative exploratory study phase were: 
1. To develop the information security culture measurement model 
o Are all the eight factors that were found in the conceptual 
model important factors in the Saudi Arabia Environment? 
o Determine what factors that constitutes or reflect security 
culture 
o Determine what factors influence or drive security culture 
o Are there any factors that must be included in the emergent 
theoretical model? 
2. To aid in the design of the subsequent survey 
o Get input to derive the constructs, to be tested in the 
survey. 
o Gather evidence to justify the survey constructs of both 
independent and dependent variables. 
Table 4.1 describes the demographic information for the organisations 
that participated in the qualitative phase. 
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Table 4.1: Demographic Information Profile 
Org Org type 
Size of IT 
Dep*/Org** 
Type of Industry 
Participants’ 
Role 
A 
Semi 
Public 
42/400 
Government Regulation 
Food/Drug/ Medical 
Devices 
Information 
Security and 
Internet 
Managers 
B Private 50/800 
Consulting,  Auditing,  
Assurance,  Consulting 
Security Expert 
C Private 42/3100 
IT, Network,  System,  
Application 
Security 
Manager 
D 
Semi 
Public 
20/100 IT 
IT Security 
Specialist 
E 
Semi 
Public 
40/1150 
Health,  Education,  
Research 
IT Assistant 
Director 
F Public 3000 Healthcare Security Expert 
G Private 1000 
Banking and Financial,  
Retail,  Corporate 
Banking 
Security 
Manager 
H Private 3000 Banking and Financial 
Information 
Security 
Compliance 
Officer 
Org: Organization * Size of IT department within Organization, ** Number of 
Organization Staff  
 
As seen in Table 4.1, this study includes eight employees from eight 
different organisations across public, semi-pubic, and private sectors; 
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different sizes were also included, ranging from small to large 
organisations. Also, this study covers many important elements in the 
Saudi Arabian environment, such as healthcare, financial, IT, 
telecommunication and consulting. Most of the participants’ roles 
however were as information security managers or as experts in their 
respective organisations. In the next sections each of the organisations 
will be abbreviated according to Table 4.1. For example, the first 
organisation in Table 1 will be denoted as Organisation A and the 
second organisation as Organisation B, etc. 
The next sections focus on the exploratory phase findings followed by 
discussion and hypothesis development. Afterwards, construct 
operationalisations will be examined followed by the conclusion to the 
chapter. 
4.3 Qualitative Interviews Findings  
Table 4.2 represents the factors that constitute the security culture of 
the information security culture model. Factors constituting the 
security culture were identified through qualitative interviews. Table 4.3 
identifies factors that influence security culture. Factors influencing the 
security culture were identified through qualitative interviews.  
Explicit and implicit counts were reflected in the qualitative interviews 
during analysis. The analysis of the qualitative interviews was 
conducted by coding the data. In this study, coding the data was an 
iterative process involving consistency revisiting and linking data to the 
research model constructs. The data from the iteration were combined 
and coded into constructs. In the analysis stage, all of the data collected 
from interview was coded and put into one of these constructs. This 
resulted in counts and data points for further analysis. Table 4.2 and 
Table 4.3 summarize the total number of general citations for each 
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constructs within each interview transcript. In addition, redundancy 
check searches were conducted within Excel sheet software. The 
following extract were code into constructs of management involvement 
influence on information security culture.  
“Excellent top management participations and involvement is the most 
important factors for creating information security culture”. 
The following section describes the process for specifying the 
information security culture model. There were a total of eight 
interviews representing eight different organisations. Therefore, each 
organisation has only one interview with their respect information 
security personal.  
 
Table 4.2: Consolidated Summary Results of the Coding Phases for Factors 
Constituted Security Culture 
Factors Org1 Org2 Org3 Org4 Org5 Org6 Org7 Org8 Total 
Security 
Culture 
6 5 6 4 4 5 6 5 40 
Security 
Awareness 
7 5 6 6 5 10 6 6 51 
Security 
Compliance 
4 3 4 5 6 6 5 5 32 
Security 
Ownership 
4 2 3 3 3 4 2 2 22 
Org: Organization  
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Table 4.3: Consolidated Summary Results of the Coding Phases for Factors Influence 
Security Culture 
Factors Org1 Org2 Org3 Org4 Org5 Org6 Org7 Org8 Total 
Top 
Management 
Involvement  
6 5 7 4 5 7 8 6 48 
Policy 
Enforcement** 
4 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 32 
Policy 
Maintenance 
2 1 2 3 2 2 3 3 18 
Security 
Training 
5 3 3 4 3 5 6 6 35 
National 
Culture 
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 4 
Organizational 
Culture 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 4 
Risk 
Assessment 
1 1 3 1 1 0 1 2 10 
Ethical 
Conduct 
Policy 
2 1 2 3 4 3 3 2 20 
Org: organisation, **Includes Monitoring and Auditing the security policy. 
 
4.3.1Specifying Factors Constituting Security Culture   
The qualitative interviews discuss what factors constitute security 
culture. In these interviews, security culture was consistently cited (a 
total of 40 citations). Based on the qualitative interview findings, 
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security culture was deemed to be constituted of security awareness, 
security compliance and another emerging factor, security ownership. 
Therefore, security culture will be taken to be a reflection of security 
awareness, security compliance and security ownership.  
4.3.1 Security Awareness 
This study has found in all of the qualitative interviews that ‘security 
awareness’ was repeatedly mentioned as a major reflection of 
information security culture. ‘Security awareness’ was cited 51 times 
across all of the interviews. More precisely, many organisations consider 
‘security awareness’ a key part of security culture. The following 
question-answer examples are indicative of the importance placed on 
‘security awareness’ by all organisations interviewed: 
 
Q: Could you please talk about security culture in your 
organisation?   
In order to change the security culture, we need to improve our 
security awareness around here (Information Security Manager, 
Organization A).  
In my organisation lack of security culture was because of lack of 
security awareness (Information Security Manager, Organization 
G). 
Q: Please indicate, and give examples of, how information security 
culture can be created in your organisation? 
 You cannot expect some sort of security culture without the 
 existence of security awareness (Security Expert, Organization F).  
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In order to create security culture, employees must be aware of 
the security policy (Information Security Manager, Organization 
C). 
4.3.2 Security Compliance 
Security compliance is another key factor that constitutes security 
culture in Saudi Arabian organisations. The qualitative interviews 
illustrated the challenges in Saudi organisations in dealing with 
security compliance. In these qualitative interviews, security compliance 
was cited 32 times across all of the interviews. As for security 
awareness, security compliance was also cited by many interviewees as 
reflecting an aspect of security culture. The following question-answer 
examples are indicative of the importance placed on ‘security 
compliance’ by all organisations interviewed: 
 
Q: Please indicate, and give examples of, how information security 
culture can be created in your organisation? 
Security culture can be created if we comply with our security 
policy (Security Expert Organization F, and Information Security 
Manager, Organization G).  
It is hard to create security culture in my organisation if we are 
not used to follow the security policy (Information Security 
Manager Organization A). 
Others such as security expert in organisation F indicated the 
importance of improving security compliance in security culture 
creation. 
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 Improving compliance will change the security culture of the 
 organisation.  
4.3.3 Security Ownership 
Security ownership is another key part of security culture which was 
identified based on the qualitative interviews findings. Earlier in the 
conceptual model development, security ownership was not included as 
a factor of security culture. But during the qualitative interviews, 
‘security ownership’ was consistently cited by many of the interviewees 
(a total of 20 citations). The following question-answer examples are 
indicative of the importance placed on ‘security ownership’ by all 
organisations interviewed: 
Q: Please indicate, and give examples of, how information security 
culture can be created in your organisation? 
 We do not expect to create security culture in my organisation 
 since  our staffs do not understand the importance of protecting 
 information security (Security Expert, Organization F).  
Our staffs do not understand their roles and responsibilities. It is 
very  hard to get them to feel the ownership of protecting 
information security. Therefore, it is very hard to create security 
mind culture in my organisation (Information Security Manager 
Organization A).    
Obviously security ownership plays a critical role in creating an 
environment that promotes the creation of security culture. The 
ownership of information security will substantially influence staff 
behaviour in the creation of a security culture mind-set in the Saudi 
Arabian organisations.  
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Figure 4.1 depicts factors that constitute security culture. 
 
Security Culture
Security Awareness
Security Compliance
Security Ownership
 
Figure4.1: Factors Constituting Security Culture 
 
4.4 Specifying the Factors Influencing Security Culture 
The qualitative interviews also discuss what factors influence security 
culture. In these interviews, the current study discusses the findings 
that influence security culture in the context of Saudi Arabia. Based on 
the qualitative interviews findings, factors influencing Saudi security 
culture were: top management involvement in information security; 
information security policy enforcement; information security training; 
ethical conduct policies; and new emerging factors (policy maintenance). 
The next sections will discuss how these factors were found important 
in driving or influencing information security culture in the Saudi 
context.  
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 4.4.1 Top Management Involvement in Information Security  
There has been an agreement by information security management 
experts in the Saudi context that top management commitment and 
involvement in information security is considered one of the most 
important factors for improving or creating security culture in the Saudi 
context. The current study agrees with this and will include 
considerations of this factor in its model. ‘Top management support and 
involvement’ was consistently cited across each of the qualitative 
interviews. It was considered the most cited factor influencing security 
culture across all of the interviews (a total of 48 general citations). Some 
of these citations were directly on the importance of top management 
support and involvement in creating a security culture and creating an 
environment that supports security practices within the Saudi context. 
There was a significant overlap between the top management support 
for information security and top management involvement in 
information security. Therefore, the constructs will be named as ‘top 
management involvement in information security’ which includes ‘top 
management support for information security’. The following question-
answer examples are indicative of the importance placed on ‘top 
management involvement’ by all organisations interviewed: 
Q: What do you consider to be the main contributory factors to 
create an effective information security culture in your organisation? 
To improve our information security culture, more involvement is 
needed from top management (IT Security Specialist, Organization 
D).  
 
Many experts in these interviews are convinced that management 
support is the most effective factors for creating information security 
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culture. Another example of the importance of top management 
involvement was cited during the interviews.  
 
 Q: What are the factors that influence security culture in your 
 organisation? 
 Management support, management support, and management 
 support (Information Security Manager, Organization A). 
 Excellent top management participations and involvement is the 
 most  important factors  for creating information security culture 
 (Information Security Compliance Officer, Organization H).  
 To create or expect some sort of security culture, top management 
 must  be involved (IT Assistant Director, Organization E).  
4.4.2 Information Security Policy Enforcement  
Information security policy enforcement was cited across all of the 
qualitative interviews (a total of 32 general citations). Some of these 
citations specifically discussed the importance of enforcing the security 
policy in creating an information security culture. In addition, some of 
these citations discuss the influence of enforcing the security policy on 
security culture in Saudi Arabian organisations. The following question-
answer examples are indicative of the importance placed on ‘policy 
enforcement’ by all organisations interviewed: 
Q: What do you consider to be the main contributory factors to create 
an effective information security culture in your organisation? 
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One of the key factors for effective information security culture in my 
organisation is being able to enforce the security policy (IT Security 
Specialist, Organization D).  
Policy enforcement will change the attitude and behaviour towards 
security culture (IT Security Specialist, Organization D). 
One of the most common effective techniques were implemented to 
enforce the security policy in the Saudi context were used through 
auditing and monitoring the security policy. Several examples 
illustrated the importance of monitoring and auditing the security 
policy by many organisations such as: 
 Q: What are the factors that influence security culture in your 
 organisation? 
One of key factors for creating information security culture in my 
organisations auditing security practices and procedures 
especially from an external independent auditor (Information 
Security Manager, Organization C).   
 Q: How can you improve security compliance in your 
 organisation? 
 It is important to focus on monitoring security practices because 
 it is the most effective way to ensure compliance with security 
 policy (Information Security Manager, Organization G).   
4.4.3 Information Security Training  
Information security training was consistently cited across all of the 
qualitative interviews (a total of 35 general citations). Some of these 
citations specifically discussed the importance of security training and 
policy communication in creating information security culture. In 
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addition, some of these citations discuss the influence of security 
training on security culture in Saudi Arabian organisations. The 
following question-answer examples are indicative of the importance 
placed on ‘security training’ by all organisations interviewed: 
 
 Q: What are the factors that influence security culture in your 
 organisation? 
 Security training is the one of effective and successful factors for 
 establishing information security culture in my organisation  
 (Security Expert, Organization B).  
 Training employees about information security can influence their 
 behaviour and hopefully create a security mind cultural 
 environment (IT Assistant Director, Organization E).  
The qualitative interviews showed the importance of being able to 
communicate the security policy to staff in Saudi organisations in order 
to influence their behaviour in creating a security culture in the Saudi 
context.  
4.4.4 Information Security Policy Maintenance  
Information security policy maintenance is another key factor which 
has been identified based on the qualitative interviews findings that 
were not originally part of the conceptual model. During the qualitative 
interviews, ‘information security policy maintenance’ was cited across 
all of the qualitative interviews (a total of 18 general citations). Most of 
these citations specifically discussed the importance of maintaining the 
security policy while creating an information security culture in Saudi 
Arabian organisations. The following question-answer examples are 
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indicative of the importance placed on ‘policy maintenance’ by all 
organisations interviewed: 
 Q: What do you consider to be the main contributory factors to 
 create an effective information security culture in your 
 organisation? 
Updating our security policy and procedure will improve the 
security culture in my organisation (IT Security Specialist, 
Organization D). 
‘Maintaining the security policy’ was consistently cited as an important 
step for improving the security policy and the eventually the 
information security culture in Saudi Arabian organisations. Several 
examples illustrated the importance of continuous reviewing and 
updating the security to the overall security programs in the Saudi 
context.  
Improving our security policy can be achieved by continuous 
reviewing and updating the security policy (IT Assistant Director, 
Organization E). 
Continuous updating to the security policy is essential to improve 
our policy development (Information Security Manager, 
Organization G). 
There were some substantial overlaps between policy maintenance 
constructs and other constructs in the information security culture 
model such as risk assessment.  
You cannot expect a security policy to be well maintained if we do 
not have a periodical risk assessment (Information Security 
Compliance Officer, Organization H).   
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‘Maintaining the security policy’ was also found to be critical and 
important for security culture creation. IT assistant director on 
Organization D stated:  
 To change staff security behaviour or culture, maintaining 
 security policy is very important. 
Considering this overlap and the citations that specifically stated the 
importance of policy maintenance, policy maintenance emerged in the 
information security culture model.   
4.4.5 Information Security Risk Assessment 
‘Information security risk assessment’ was mentioned within the 
interview data with only a few citations that specifically cited its 
influence on information security culture. There were ten general 
citations across all interviews. The following question-answer examples 
are indicative of the importance placed on ‘risk assessment’ by few 
organisations interviewed: 
 Understanding the risk involve with information security and 
 more  importantly conducting periodical risk assessment is 
 essential factors for creating a security culture environment 
 (Information Security Compliance Officer, Organization H).   
Risk assessment citations consistently overlapped another construct 
citation, ‘policy maintenance’. Therefore, given this weakness of 
evidence as to its influence on security culture, ‘risk assessment’ was 
reconstructed with the ‘policy maintenance’ construct. 
4.4.6 Ethical Conduct Policies 
Ethical conduct policies were consistently cited by several interviewees 
(a total of 20 general citations). Most of these citations directly 
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discussed the influence of ethical conduct on personal and individual 
behaviour with respect to information security practices and more 
specifically security culture in Saudi Arabian organisations. Ethical 
conduct policies were also found to be critical and important factors 
that influence security culture creation.  The following question-answer 
examples are indicative of the importance placed on ‘ethical conduct 
policies’ by all organisations interviewed: 
 Q: What are the main barriers to address the lack of information 
 security awareness? 
 Lack of ethical conduct policies is major issue in addressing lack 
 of security awareness (Security Expert, Organization F). 
 Q: Please indicate, and give examples of, how information security 
 culture in your organisation is affected cultural factors by: 
 My organisation is affected by personal biased and ethical issues 
 (Security Expert, Organization B).  
The Saudi environment in general lack work ethical conduct 
policies. I have seen it everywhere (IT Assistant Director, 
Organization E).   
 Understanding ethical obligations is a key factor for improving 
 security culture (Information Security Manager, Organization C).  
4.4.7 Organization Culture 
‘Organization culture’ was mentioned in the interview data with only 
four citations. None of the specific citations have clear, direct reference 
to security culture. This suggests its low relevance to information 
security culture in Saudi Arabian organisations. Consequently, it was 
removed from the model.  
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4.4.8 National Culture 
The national culture was mentioned within the interview data with only 
four citations. Some of these citations overlapped with the ethical 
conduct policies constructs. As a result, given this weak evidence of its 
existence, ‘national culture’ was removed from the model.  
Figure 4.2 depicts factors that influence security culture. 
Factors Influencing Security Culture
Top Management Support
Policy Enforcement
Information Security Training
Policy Maintenance
Ethical Conduct Polices
 
Figure4.2: Factors Influencing Security Culture 
4.5 Discussion  
The purpose of the qualitative interviews is to refine the conceptual 
model in order to develop the information security culture model which 
will be tested in the subsequent stages in the survey questionnaires. As 
discussed earlier in Chapter 2, security culture has not had clear 
conceptualizations in terms of what factors constitute security culture. 
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In these qualitative interviews, and based on qualitative analysis, 
‘security culture’ has been found to be constituted as reflection of 
security awareness, security compliance and security ownership. 
Additionally, factors influencing security culture were top management 
involvement in information security; information security policy 
enforcement; information security training; policy maintenance; and 
ethical conduct policies. 
4.5.1 Factors Constituting Security Culture 
The qualitative interviews have shown clearly that Saudi managerial 
experts’ perceptions of security awareness are important elements of 
security culture. In order to create an environment that promotes 
security culture creation, security awareness must be established. The 
lack of security awareness itself has been repeatedly considered as a 
major problem for ensuring the security of organisations by industries 
such as the Computer Security Institute (2008); International 
Standards Organization ISO/IEC 27002 (2005)  and by academics 
(Ceraolo, 1996; Hansche, 2001; Magklaras & Furnell, 2005; Mitchell et 
al., 1999; Neumann, 1999; Schultz, 2004; D. Straub, 1990; D. Straub 
& Welke, 1998; S. von Solms. & von Solms, 2004). Security awareness 
is a fundamental cornerstone for creating security culture. It is nearly 
impossible to expect any sort of security culture without the existence 
of security awareness since employees’ lack of knowledge and 
awareness is considered as a major threat to information security 
(Thomson. & von Sloms, 1998). Siponen (2000) found that employee 
awareness was one of the greatest challenges that organisations must 
face in order to achieve their required level of security which can be 
achieved through the adoption of a security culture. In order to improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of information, a security culture, 
incorporating information security awareness, is required. Therefore, to 
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create an acceptable security mind culture, the existence of security 
awareness within employees is inevitable necessity. Having an 
acceptable level of security awareness could influence human behaviour 
in following or not following the information security policy (R. von 
Solms & S. von Solms, 2004; Vroom & von Solms, 2004). Following and 
adhering to the security policy is considered one of the main objectives 
of security culture (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003).    
Despite the importance of security awareness, several Saudi 
organisations did not develop a formal information security awareness 
program that assists in managing information security effectively nor do 
they understand the importance of security awareness in creating a 
security culture. Increasing security awareness can help organisations 
to minimize some of the damage caused by misused or misinterpreted 
procedures (Senge, 1990). Security awareness can improve employees’ 
behaviour directly by influencing them to  contribute to the 
establishment and maintenance of a security culture (van Niekerk & 
von Solms, 2005).  
The other essential element for creating a security culture in the Saudi 
context is security compliance. Security compliance is another major 
issue in the Saudi environment which needs to be addressed in order to 
protect an organisation’s assets. The literature review chapter has 
illustrated the importance of security compliance to the management of 
information security and more particularly to the creation of a security 
culture (R. von Solms & S. von Solms, 2004; Vroom & von Solms, 
2004). Eloff and Eloff, (2005) stated that complying with information 
security policy will improve the security culture of the organisations. By 
compliance with a security policy, organisations are able to decrease the 
number of security breaches which result from employees’ behaviour 
(Smith. et al., 2007). Employee’s misbehaviour could also influence 
Chapter 4: Formulation of the Security Culture Model 
137 
information security practices which might cause damage and loss to 
the organisation’s assets. Qualitative interviews have revealed 
compliance with the security policy is one the cultural factors that 
contributes strongly to the creation of a security culture.  
The findings from the qualitative interviews illustrated that security 
ownership is an important element for the creation of a security culture. 
It is important for staff in any organisation to understand their security 
roles and responsibilities, in order to enhance their security 
performance and thus the organisation’s security performance. By 
understanding their responsibilities and the importance of protecting 
information security, staffs are able to understand what security risks 
are associated with their actions. This will increase their security 
awareness levels, which will increase compliance with the security 
policy of the organisation. For this reason, employee responsibility and 
ownership of the need to protect information security is an important 
aspect of creating a security culture (Koh et al., 2005; Maynard & 
Ruighaver, 2002; Ramachandran et al., 2004; Tarimo, 2006). By being 
responsible and having a sense of ownership, staff behaviour will 
change with respect to protecting organisational assets, leading to the 
creation of a security culture. Therefore, security ownership is another 
key factor that reflects security culture. 
4.5.2 Factors Influencing Security Culture 
Top management support was considered as an important driver of 
security culture creation (Chia et al., 2003; D’Arcy & Greene, 2009; Da 
Veiga & Eloff, 2007 Dojkovski et al., 2007; Kraemer et al., 2009; 
Schlienger & Teufel, 2002, 2003). The qualitative interviews have also 
supported this claim in the Saudi context. As discussed earlier in the 
literature review chapter, top management support can assist in the 
improvement of security awareness by providing extensive training and 
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enforcing and maintaining adherence to the security policy by the 
organisation’s staff. This will help develop a positive staff attitude to the 
organisation’s security policy. It should be noted that top management 
involvement here is concerned with whether senior management are 
committed to information security, and with ensuring the appropriate 
responsible individual is assigned to specific information security 
activities. Additionally, the involvement of top management can ensure 
every staff member is accountable for their security actions and 
decisions. This will result in top management influence over security 
culture creation. A security culture would not be easily established 
without strong, consistent, support and involvement from the top 
management of the organisation. Top management involvement also 
includes top management support for information security. This 
supports include allocating resources, budgeting and training.   
Information security policy enforcement was also considered one of the 
important factors for creating a security culture according to the 
qualitative interviews. The qualitative interviews also indicated that 
monitoring and auditing the security practices and procedures could 
strongly enforce the security policy that would assist in the creation of a 
security culture in Saudi organisations. Additionally, enforcing the 
security policy can be also accomplished by reporting and taken actions 
against individual whom violates the organisation security policy.  
However, enforcing security policy is not an easy task to accomplish 
and requires challenging effort to achieve because it requires strong 
commitment and support from top management (R. von Solms & S. von 
Solms, 2004). Therefore, policy enforcement should be an 
organisational priority and organisations must enforce their security 
policy in order to create security culture.  
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The maintenance information security policy is an essential element for 
creating a security culture. Information security policy maintenance is 
considered an important element in developing security policy and must 
be consistent with the business objectives of the organisation (Hare, 
2002; Howard, 2003; Knapp, Morris, Marshall, & Byrd, 2009). 
Academic researchers have overlooked the importance of policy 
maintenance and only focus on developing and enforcing the policies. 
Therefore, the literature has revealed a clear gap in terms of the 
importance of security policy maintenance for information security 
culture creation. The qualitative interviews however showed the 
necessity of maintaining the security policy for security culture creation 
in Saudi Arabian organisations. It should be noted risk analysis and 
assessment overlapped with the policy maintenance constructs. The 
maintaining of a security policy in the Saudi context involves a 
periodical update and review of security policy. Additionally, security 
policy maintenance could be achieved by conducting regular risk 
assessments for information security and for every new security policy. 
The current study proposes that policy maintenance could influence 
employees’ behaviour by promoting security-conscious decision-making 
and ultimately influence the security culture of the organisation. 
Therefore, it will be included in the information security culture model.   
Information security training was also considered as an important 
factor that influences and assists in the creation of security culture in 
the Saudi context. The qualitative interviews showed the importance of 
being able to communicate the security policy to staff in Saudi 
organisations in order to influence their behaviour in creating a security 
culture in the Saudi context. These findings support the literature 
arguments that a security culture cannot be achieved without security 
training for all users (Tarimo, 2006). Security training can contribute to 
the security culture creation by improving employees’ behaviour and 
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increasing their security awareness levels. This might be reflected in 
their security behaviour should they then follow the security policy 
which initially gave rise to the necessary creation of the security 
culture. Therefore, security training plays a major role in the 
establishment of a security culture (van Niekerk and von Solms, 2005) 
and will be included in the information security culture model.   
One of the factors that influence security culture is ethical conduct and 
particularly the existence of ethical conduct policies. In fact the 
importance of ethical conduct for security culture creation was well 
supported by several studies (Chaula, 2006; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2009; 
Dojkovski et al., 2007; Martins & Eloff, 2002; OECD, 2005). Ethical 
conduct policies could assist users to understand and be aware of their 
security responsibilities to reduce any risk associated with their 
security behaviour. This would also help users to adhere to the security 
policy. In the Saudi context, lack of ethical conduct policies was clearly 
shown by many organisations in different industries. This lack has 
clearly influenced security culture creation in Saudi Arabian 
organisations. Therefore, their non-existence of ethical conduct policies 
would be a major concern and could influence the creation of security 
culture in the Saudi environment and will be included in the 
information security culture model.   
The literature analysis has provided substantial evidence as to the 
possibility that national culture could influence security culture. 
However, the qualitative interviews have shown a weaker degree of 
national cultural influence on security culture. Several possible 
explanations could lead to this conclusion in the Saudi context. One 
explanation is Saudi national culture has changed drastically in the last 
decade in its adoption of new technology. For example, most of the 
existing national culture literature analysis research in the Saudi 
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environment was conducted in previous decades when the adoption of 
new technology in the Saudi context was not strong. Additionally, there 
is growth in the Saudi young population which adopts new technology 
more easily than the older generation that did not adopt the new 
technology. As a result, Saudi national culture did not appear to have 
significant influence on the security culture creation in the Saudi 
context. 
The literature analyses have discussed and referred to the important 
factors that could influence security culture as organisation security 
culture rather than as organisational cultural values and beliefs (Chang 
& Lin, 2007; Chia et al., 2002; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007, 2009; Schlienger 
& Teufel, 2003; van Niekerk. & von Solms, 2005; Zakaria et al., 2003). 
The qualitative interviews in the current study showed the importance 
of these organisational security culture values and practices for security 
culture but did not find organisational cultural values and beliefs to be 
very influential in creating security culture. These organisational 
security culture factors such as top management involvement, policy 
enforcement, policy maintenance, security training, and other external 
factors such as ethical conduct policies were found to have a stronger 
influence on security culture creation in the Saudi context than did 
national and organisational culture values and beliefs. Therefore, based 
on the qualitative interview findings, national and organisation culture 
will be removed from the information security culture model. Perhaps in 
future studies, the extent of the influence of the national and 
organisational culture on security culture will be examined. 
4.6 Overall Specified Information Security Culture Model 
Figure 4.3 summarizes the specific model factors that were derived from 
the qualitative interviews. This summary includes a clear distinction 
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between factors constituting information security culture and factors 
influencing security culture. Based on the qualitative interviews 
findings, security culture comprises of three reflective factors: security 
awareness, security compliance and security ownership. Additionally, 
factors influencing security culture were: top management involvement 
in information security; information security policy enforcement; 
information security training; policy maintenance; and ethical conduct 
policies. Furthermore, “Organization Culture”, “National Culture”, and 
“Risk Analysis and Assessment” were removed from the model due to an 
overlap with other constructs or to weak influence on security culture 
in Saudi Arabian organisations. However, based on the qualitative 
interview findings, “Policy Maintenance” was added as an important 
factor that influences security culture, and “Security Ownership” was 
added as an important factor that in part constitutes security culture.  
Chapter 4: Formulation of the Security Culture Model 
143 
Factors Influencing Security Culture
Top Management Support
Policy Enforcement
Information Security Training
Policy Maintenance
Ethical Conduct Policies
Security Culture
Security Awareness
Security Ownership
Security Compliance
 
Figure 4.3: Specifying Security Culture Model 
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4.7 Hypotheses Development  
Table 4.4 summarises the main hypothesis to be tested through the 
subsequent survey phase. Table 4.4 was developed based on the 
qualitative interview findings incorporated with the literature review 
analysis. There is strong evidence that factors were derived from the 
qualitative interviews and the literature review analyses have influence 
on security culture. For example, many several researchers have 
indicated the importance of top management commitment and 
involvement in creating security culture (Chia et al., 2002; D’Arcy & 
Greene, 2009; Dojkovski et al., 2007; Knapp et al., 2006; Knapp. et al., 
2007; Kraemer et al., 2009; Schlienger & Teufel, 2002, 2003; Tarimo, 
2006). Others revealed the strong influence of policy enforcement on 
security culture creation (J. Eloff & Eloff, 2005; Knapp et al., 2006; 
Knapp. et al., 2007). Security training can also influence security 
culture creation (Furnell et al., 2001; Knapp. et al., 2007; Schlienger & 
Teufel, 2003). Finally, Tarimo (2006) found ethical conduct policies to 
be an important factor that influences security culture. However, policy 
maintenance arose based on the qualitative interview data although the 
current study had not found evidence to support its importance in 
security culture creation. The next sections and subsequent chapters 
will discuss the design, analysis and interpretation of the survey 
findings in detail.  
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Table 4.4: Research Hypothesis to be Testing in a Subsequent Survey Phase 
Hypothesis Description 
1 Security culture is constituted mainly of three reflective factors: 
(a) Security Awareness, (b) Security Compliance, (c) Security 
Ownership 
2 (a) Top Management Involvement, (b), Information Security Policy 
Enforcement, (c) Information Security Policy Maintenance, (d) 
Information Security Training,(e) Ethical Conduct Policies are 
factors that have positive and significant influence on security 
culture in Saudi Arabian organisations. 
4.8 Construct Operationalisation 
Operationalising, or operationally defining, model constructs is an 
attempt to measure the underlying abstract concepts, especially those 
that involve an understanding of feelings and attitudes (Sekaran, 2003). 
Whilst brief meanings for the model constructs were provided earlier in 
this chapter, they are too broad and do not provide adequate measures 
to accurately capture the meaning of the constructs. This process 
started with identifying the dimensions denoted by the construct, then 
translating them into observable and measurable elements in order to 
form an index of measurement of the construct (Sekaran, 2003). The 
elements derived from this process were subsequently selected as 
measurement variables and were used to develop multivariate 
measurements for the constructs. However, the number of items to 
measure a construct should adequately sample the domain of interest. 
A survey with too many items can induce response pattern bias, while 
those with too few may jeopardize context and construct validity (Sedera 
et al., 2003). In order to derive the survey items for this study, an 
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extensive literature review was conducted in order to operationalise the 
questionnaire constructs.  
One of the major limitations in this study is lack of identification and 
validation constructs in information system security research. Most of 
the studies in information security literature have implemented a 
qualitative methodological approach, at the time of operationalising the 
survey; there were only a few studies that used quantitative 
measurement (D’Arcy & Greene, 2009; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2009; Da 
Veiga. et al., 2007; Knapp et al., 2006; Knapp. et al., 2007). This shows 
a great gap in knowledge in terms of adopting a quantitative approach 
in information security studies. As a result, one of the major 
motivations for the current study is to use quantitative measurement to 
address the security culture measurement instrument on a larger scale 
rather than for a particular group or context. This is in addition to 
validating a model using quantitative measurement in order to 
understand information security culture in Saudi Arabian 
organisations. Perhaps this is because information security addresses 
sensitive issues and it is recommended that one be extremely cautious 
when conducting research in the information security field (Kotulic & 
Clark, 2004). Thus, a qualitative approach fits better for addressing 
information security effectively. However, it was challenging to find 
survey items for each construct, due to the lack of empirical academic 
and professional literature in the information system security field. 
Therefore, a combination of a comprehensive literature review with 
qualitative interview findings, and expert panel inputs was used to 
identify constructs and their respectful survey items that have 
influenced and constituted security culture. The constructs measured 
were tested and validated through the qualitative interview phases. In 
addition, a panel of experts assisted this study to validate the 
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statements that were derived for the current study as discussed earlier 
in the research methodology chapter.  
4.8.1 Adaption of Scale  
Because of a serious scarcity of empirical research into information 
security Koutic and Clark (2004), substantial scales were obtained from 
the qualitative data and panel experts’ feedback to develop the 
measurement scales. The scales were developed through an iterative 
process of extracting candidate questionnaire items directly from the 
interview response questions and the panel experts’ feedback. In 
addition, many items were extracted and adapted from an existing pre-
validated measurement from the literature review. Using these adapted 
scales will enhance the reliability and validity of this current study. 
Therefore, it is advisable to adapt measurement scales of these 
constructs. This consideration of scale items helps to assure content 
validity (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). As a result, a significant number 
of the scales used were adapted from previous reliable and validated 
instruments. However, the qualitative interviews and expert panel 
judgments have suggested the need to add more item scales for each 
construct. These will be discussed in the construction of scale section 
4.8.2. Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 will illustrate all of scales used in the 
current study as well as other constructed scales. Each dimension 
contains relevant measurement variables adapted mostly from the 
questionnaire items published in (A. Chaula, Yngstrm, & Kowalski, 
2006; D’Arcy & Greene, 2009; Da Veiga. et al., 2007; Knapp et al., 
2006). The operational details of the security factors that influence 
security culture constructs in terms of the dimensions and the 
measurement variables and references, are presented in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.6 summarizes the operational details of the factors constituting 
security culture constructs in terms of the developed dimensions, along 
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with their measurement variables and associated references. The 
constructions of scales section 4.7.2 will show the process that was 
followed in order to develop the research instrument.  
Table 4.5: Factors Influence Security Culture Operationalisation Statements 
Dimension Measurement Variables References 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
for  
Information 
Security 
Top management considers information security an 
important organisational priority 
(Knapp et al., 
2006) 
Senior management gives strong and consistent 
support to the security program 
(Knapp et al., 
2006) 
Senior management is always involved in key 
information security activities. 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/inp
ut 
Management ensures that appropriate individuals 
are made responsible for specific aspects of 
information security 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/inp
ut 
Management ensures that everyone who takes 
information security actions, and makes information 
security decisions and is held accountable for their 
decisions and actions 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/inp
ut 
Information 
Security 
Policy 
Information security practices and procedures are 
continually monitored to ensure compliance with 
security policy 
(Da Veiga, 
Martin, and 
Eloff, 2007 
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Enforcements 
Information security practices and procedures are 
externally audited 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/inp
ut 
Information security violations are reported to the 
proper authority 
(Knapp et al., 
2007) 
Actions against violations are always taken 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/inp
ut 
Information 
Security 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Information security policy is clearly defined 
(D’Arcy and 
Greene, 
2009) 
Information security policy is consistently reviewed 
and updated on a periodical basis 
(Knapp et al., 
2006) 
Assessing risks to information security is regular 
(Chalua, 
2006) 
Risk assessments are conducted prior to developing 
new security policies 
(Knapp et al., 
2006) 
Information 
Security 
Training 
I receive adequate information security training 
(D’Arcy and 
Greene, 
2009) 
Information security policy is communicated well 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
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feedback/inp
ut 
I am always educated or trained about new security 
policies 
(Knapp et al., 
2007) 
Ethical 
Conduct 
Policies 
I am familiar with the policy on professional conduct 
(Chalua, 
2006) 
I am familiar with the policy on code of conduct 
I am familiar with the policy on conflict of interest 
 
 
Table 4.6: Factors Constitute Security Culture Operationalisation Statements 
Dimension 
Measurement Variables Adapted 
Originally from 
Information 
Security 
Awareness 
I am aware of my information security roles and 
responsibilities 
(Chalua, 2006) 
I am aware of the risk of not following the 
information security policy 
Qualitative Data 
and experts 
feedback/input 
I am familiar with the information security policy Qualitative Data 
and experts 
feedback/input 
I am aware of the procedures for reporting security 
policy violations 
(D’Arcy and 
Greene, 2009) 
Information I always adhere to the information security policy (D’Arcy and 
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Security 
Compliance 
Greene, 2009) 
Others around adhere to the information security 
policy in a similar manner 
Qualitative Data 
and experts 
feedback/input 
Information 
Security 
Ownerships 
It is my responsibility to protect the information of 
my organisation 
Qualitative Data 
and experts 
feedback/input 
I take ownership of the outcomes of my 
information security decisions and actions    
Protecting information security is an important 
part of my job 
 
The survey items of the current study were derived from the qualitative 
interviews, experts’ panel judgement and the adapted scales from the 
literature review. Using these adapted scales from the literature will 
enhance the reliability and validity of this current study. Therefore, it is 
advisable to adapt measurement scales of these constructs. This 
consideration of scale items helps to assure content validity (Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994). The outcome of the qualitative interviews assists in 
obtaining a list of scale items that were identified for each construct. 
Based on the literature review and the qualitative interview findings, the 
constructs chosen to represent security factors that influence security 
culture and factors constitute security culture are the following: 
4.8.1.1 Top Management Involvement in Information Security  
Top management involvement in information security is measured 
using five items. Two of these items were adopted from Knapp et al. 
(2006). These two items include the consideration of top management 
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consideration of information security as organisation priority and the 
consistent support of an information security program. Additionally, 
three items were constructed as part of the scale construction to 
represent top management involvement. These items include the 
involvement of senior management in information security activities, 
assigning appropriate personnel to specific aspects of information 
security and ensuring every individual is accountable for their 
information security actions and decisions. These three items were 
derived from the qualitative interviews findings, and the construction of 
scales procedures that include experts’ panel judgement which will be 
examined in the construction of scale section 4.8.2.    
4.8.1.2 Information Security Policy Enforcements  
Information security policy enforcement is measured using four items. 
One of these items was adopted from Da Veiga, et al. (2009) and 
includes continuous monitoring of information security practices and 
procedures to ensure compliance with the security policy. The second 
item was adopted from Knapp et al. (2006), and includes reporting 
violation of information security to the proper authority. However, the 
other two scale items were constructed as part of a scale construction 
to represent and measure information security policy enforcement. 
These items include auditing information security practices externally 
and taking actions against violations of information security. These 
items were derived from the qualitative interview findings and the 
construction of scales procedures which will be examined in the 
construction of scale section 4.8.2.    
4.8.1.3 Information Security Policy Maintenance  
Information security policy maintenance is measured using four items. 
The first item was adopted from D’Arcy and Greene (2009) and includes 
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defining information security policy clearly. The second and third items 
were adopted from Knapp et al. (2006), in which information security 
policy is consistently reviewed and updated on a periodical basis and 
also includes conducting a risk assessment prior to developing new 
security policies. The fourth item was adopted from Chalua (2006) in 
which assessing risks to information security is regarded as regular. 
4.8.1.4 Information Security Training  
Information security training is measured using three items. Two of 
these items were adopted from D’Arcy and Greene, (2009) including 
receiving adequate information security training. The second item was 
adopted from Knapp et al. (2006), and includes educating and training 
staff about new security policies. However, the third scale item was 
constructed as part of the scale construction to represent information 
security training. This includes good communication of security policy.  
4.8.1.5 Ethical Conduct Policies  
An ethical conduct policy is measured using three items. All of these 
items were adapted from Chalua (2006): policy of professional conduct, 
code of conduct, and conflict of interest were recognized and familiar to 
staff. 
4.8.1.6 Information Security Awareness  
Information security awareness is measured using four items. Two of 
these items were adopted from Chalua (2006) including awareness of 
information security roles and responsibilities. The second item was 
adopted from D’Arcy and Greene, (2009), including awareness of the 
procedures for reporting security policy violations. However, the other 
two scale items were constructed as part of the scale construction to 
represent information security awareness. These items include 
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awareness of the risk of not following the information security policy 
and familiarity with information security policy. These items were 
derived from the qualitative interview findings and the construction of 
scales procedures which will be examined in the construction of scale 
section 4.8.2.    
4.8.1.7 Information Security Compliance  
Information security compliance is measured using two items. The first 
item was adopted from D’Arcy and Greene (2009), which includes 
adhering to the information security policy. The second item was 
constructed as part of the scale construction to represent information 
security compliance which includes the perception of other staff 
adhering to the information security policy in the same manner.  
4.8.1.8 Information Security Ownership  
Information security ownership is measured using three items. These 
items were constructed by this study because of lack of validated 
instruments in the current literature. The items included to measure 
information security ownership were the responsibility to protect the 
information in the organisation, taking ownership of the outcomes of 
one’s information security decisions and actions and the importance of 
protecting information security as part of everyone job. These items 
were derived from the qualitative interview findings and the 
construction of scales procedures which will be examined in the 
construction of scale section 4.8.2.    
4.8.2 Construction of Scales  
The previous sections described how scales were adapted for the 
determinant variables in the research model. However, the literature 
analyses have illustrated the need to develop a valid and reliable 
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information security culture measurement model. As discussed earlier 
because of the lack of an empirically validated instrument in the 
information system security research area, the current study needed to 
scale items and constructs. This section described the construction of 
scales process during the survey phases of this research.   
4.8.2.1 Overview  
The development of measurement items was carried out in multiple 
stages in order to provide reliable and valid results for empirical 
research. This study adopted Moore and Benbasat’s (1991) testing 
procedure which incorporates five stages. This approach has been 
adopted since a number of information system researchers adopted 
Moore and Benbasat’s (1991) procedures and for whom the resulting 
scales were highly reliable and valid (Recker, 2008). Figure 4.4 depicts 
the overall procedures and information about the research method 
deployed in each stage as well as references to the relevant literature 
that were originally adapted from (Recker, 2008). The Figure 4.4 
approaches include five procedures as described below: 
1. Item Creation: this stage’s concern is with specifying the 
theoretical constructs for the measurement scales to be developed 
and with deriving a pool of candidate items for each construct, 
2. Substrata Identification: this stage sorts the candidate items into 
meaningful separate constructs to ensure convergent and 
discriminant validity,     
3. Item Identification: This stage identifies a pool of candidate items 
in order to revise a set of items to show the potential for high 
content validity,  
4. Item Selection and Revision: this stage re-specifies and condenses 
the set of candidate items and also gives initial indication of 
reliable and valid items to be used later in the empirical studies, 
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5. Preliminary Item Validation: this stage obtains the initial 
statistical evidence for reliability and validity (Recker, 2008).   
The next few sections will describe each of these steps in detail. 
 
Phase Literature Task Method
I
II
III
IV
V
Chaula, 2006; D’Arcy & 
Greene, 2009; A. da 
Veiga et al., 2007; Knapp 
et al., 2006
Sherif and Sherif (1967); 
Davis (1989); Moore and 
Benbasat (1991)
Davis (1989)
Davis (1989); Moore and 
Benbasat (1991)
Tabachnik and Fidell 
(2007); Pallant (2005)
Item Creation
Substrata identification 
Item identification 
Item section and revision 
Preliminary item validation 
Literature review
Own category test
Expert panel study 
Index card sorting test
Exploratory factor analysis 
 
Figure 4.4: Scale Development Procedures (Adapted from Recker, 2008) 
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4.8.2.1 Item Creation 
The purpose of this step is to ensure the content validity of the 
measurement items. This will also ensure that the scale representing 
the theoretical constructs can be generalized. As a result, the 
measurement items were developed to capture the respondents’ 
perceptions of factors that influence security culture and factors 
constituting or reflecting security culture. Additionally as discussed 
previously, some of the construct scales developed were adopted from 
previous empirically validated instruments. But further construction 
scales of some the items were needed to sufficiently represent the 
theoretical constructs. As a result, some of the constructs were further 
investigated to demonstrate the appropriate constructs based on the 
extensive review of the literature, the qualitative interview findings and 
the panel experts’ judgement and feedback. The following theoretical 
constructs were changed accordingly to address the theoretical 
appropriate constructs. Moreover, the security ownership construct was 
constructed since there was a lack of academic representation for the 
security ownership construct.  
1. Top Management Involvement 
2. Information Security Policy Enforcement 
3. Information Security Policy Maintenance  
4. Information Security Training 
5. Ethical Conduct Policies  
6. Information Security Awareness 
7. Information Security Compliance 
8. Information Security Ownership 
For each of these constructs, pools of candidate items were generated 
from the literature (A. Chaula et al., 2006; D’Arcy & Greene, 2009; Da 
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Veiga. et al., 2007; Knapp et al., 2006). Additionally, the qualitative 
interview findings have strongly suggested the need to add more scales 
in order to develop the appropriate theoretical constructs. After creating 
the items needed to develop the theoretical constructs, the items were 
worded in the form of a statement to which the respondent indicated 
his/her perception of the extent of agreement on a 5-point likert scale 
with the end points ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘strongly agree’. Appendix C1 
presents the initial candidate item pools for top management 
involvement, policy enforcement, policy maintenance, training, 
awareness, compliance and ownership.       
 4.8.2.2 Substrata Identification 
After generation of the initial pools of candidate items was the 
establishment if the construct validity of the candidate items to display 
the convergent and discriminant validity (Recker, 2008). Even though 
many of the candidate items were adopted from the current literature, 
this study however still utilized the substrata identification process step 
to ensure constructs represent the appropriate theoretical 
representation. The current study followed the recommendations of 
Moore and Benbasat’s (1991) study which employed ‘Own Category 
Test’ to ensure the construct validity (Davis, 1989; Sherif & Sherif, 
1967). This can be achieved by asking a panel of experts with a strong 
background in information security system records to sort candidate 
items into a number of constructs to ensure the identify domain 
substrata of the primary theatrical constructs (Moore & Benbasat, 
1991; Recker, 2008). Each panel member was asked to place the 
candidate items in the correspondent constructs. This helped to assess 
the convergence and representativeness of the items. It is also 
important to assess whether panel members placed the same candidate 
items in the respective constructs. This ensured cluster reliability 
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demonstration by assessing the items placed in the target constructs 
across all members (Recker, 2008). Appendix C2 presents the substrata 
identification results per item and construct. All of the items were found 
categorized in the correspondent constructs according to the panel 
expert’s categorizations. The results were not surprising since some of 
these items were adopted from previous empirical studies in the 
information security system area with some other items were 
constructed as part of this study.  
4.8.2.3 Item Identification 
As discussed earlier, some of the items in the current study were 
adopted from previous empirically validated studies. However, there is 
still need to establish difference in content validity between the 
candidate items in order to drop items that show low validity (Recker, 
2008). This was achieved using an expert panel of four academic 
experts with a strong background in information security system 
records. See Appendix C3 expert panel results for the item 
identification. The item identification procedures followed Davis’, (1989) 
recommendation. The expert panel assists in achieving and assessing 
correctly the validity of candidate items. Additionally, informal 
qualitative feedback on the development procedure and item wording 
was achieved. The responses from the panel members were ranked to 
obtain an order of candidate items with respect to their content validity 
to identify potential candidates for elimination. Additionally, the expert 
panel outcome resulted in order rankings as shown in Appendix C3 to 
ensure the potential content validity of the candidate items. This 
ranking was used to eliminate items which demonstrated low potential 
for validity. The decision to retain or drop an item was made based on 
the ranking of the items and the feedback from the panel. Additionally, 
items that were redundant were eliminated, reworded and/or merged 
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with other items. Moreover, low ranking items were also eliminated for 
candidate sets of items. Appendix C3 presents the expert panel’s 
ranking for each of the constructs item. Appendix C3 also presents each 
item for each construct in addition to the decision made to include or 
exclude each item and the justification for this associated with each 
candidate item.   
4.8.2.4 Item Selection and Revision 
The purpose of this stage is to revise the reduced set of candidate items 
to the final potential candidate items in order to improve the validity 
and reliability of the final set of items. This was achieved by following 
the index card sorting test which was established by (Davis, 1989; 
Moore & Benbasat, 1991). If any items were found within a particular 
category, then it demonstrated convergent validity with the construct 
associated with the category, and discriminant validity with the others 
(Recker, 2008). This sorting test was conducted by a panel of four 
recognised academics judges with a strong background in information 
system securities that had randomly given items on printing index 
cards and were asked to sort these cards into categories. The panel 
judges hold doctorate degrees in information system discipline. The 
panel of judges were asked to classify items into given categories and 
identify items that were ambiguous. This approach ensured highly 
illustrates the results of the top candidate for each construct which was 
illustrated earlier in Table 4.5 and in Table 4.6 after following the 
construction of scale process.  
4.8.2.5 Preliminary Item Validation  
An exploratory factor analysis was conducted with twenty people from a 
Saudi Arabia sample in order to obtain formal measures for scale 
reliability and validity (Pallant, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The 
Chapter 4: Formulation of the Security Culture Model 
161 
sample included employees from different organisation size, type, 
industries and job title. The initial exploratory factor analysis 
demonstrated highly reliable and valid results which can be further 
tested in the subsequent survey questionnaires with no required 
changes to the actual instruments.  
4.8.3 Background Information 
Background information questions were used to profile the respondents 
and to summarize relevant information about their organisations. Nine 
demographic and organisational measures canvassed: the respondent’s 
position in the organisation; age; education; organisational type; size; 
sectors; numbers of years the organisation had been established; 
existence of an information security management department in the 
organisation; and number of information security staff in the 
organisation. These questions helped ensure that the respondents 
represented diverse organisations. However, testing will not establish a 
causal relationship between demographics and the studied variables. 
The data measured will confirm the eligibility of the employees to 
participate in the study (having significant knowledge about information 
security practices in the organisation) and the diversity of the 
organisations surveyed. 
4.9 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter presents the development of the information security 
culture model. This chapter reported the extent to which the qualitative 
interviews contributed to the specifications of the security culture 
model. The qualitative interviews findings were presented illustrating in 
detail how the information security culture model was specified. 
Afterwards, discussions of results were provided to strengthen the 
qualitative interview findings. The developed model encapsulates two 
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major constructs: (1) factors that influence security culture and (2) 
factors constituting or reflecting security culture. By reviewing past 
research studies and qualitative findings, hypotheses associated with 
the relationships between these model constructs were developed. On 
the other hand, the current findings have some major limitations. One 
of the limitations is not being able test the nonological validity of the 
information security culture model and test the initial relative influence 
of the factors influencing security culture or factors constituting 
security culture. However, the subsequent survey was designed to 
address these limitations. In order to develop the survey questionnaires, 
the constructs were operationally defined and rendered measurable, 
based on the literature review as well as on the qualitative interview 
findings and experts’ feedback input. More importantly, the details of 
the operationalised constructs were presented in terms of measurement 
variables. These operational definitions of the model constructs serve as 
a basis for developing a set of reliable measures to capture the meaning 
of the constructs in the subsequent research stages, described in the 
following chapters. 
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Chapter 5A: Descriptive Statistics  
5A.1 Objectives and Structure of the Chapter 
The objective of this chapter is to present the process of descriptive 
statistics and data preparation for multivariate analysis in order to test 
the information security culture measurement model. Section 5A.2 
describes the analysis of the survey profiles and responses. Section 
5A.3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables of the factors 
influencing security culture and factors constituting or reflecting 
security culture in the theoretical model. Section 5A.4 provides an 
interpretation of the mean values obtained for each construct and each 
measured variable. Section 5A.5 concludes the chapter.  
The gathered data were analysed using SPSS version 18.0. The data 
preparation process ensured that the data set met the following criteria: 
• Limited missing values; 
• Free of extreme outliers;  
• Not distorted significantly by the different opinions of specific 
groups; and 
• Upheld the assumptions of normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity.  
These were the conditions required by subsequent multivariate analyses 
(EFA, CFA and SEM analyses). These conditions were also necessary for 
testing the developed information security culture measurement model. 
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5A.2 Questionnaire Survey and Respondent Profiles 
5A.2.1 Questionnaire Survey  
A questionnaire survey was conducted in Saudi Arabia from March to 
May 2010. The survey packages (a cover letter explaining the purposes 
and benefits of the survey, and a set of questions) were mailed to 200 
Saudi Arabian organisations covering all the country’s regions, types 
and sizes. Respondents came from a variety of organisational levels, 
geographic locations, backgrounds, education levels and ages. In 
addition, a web mail survey was included in case the participants 
desired to complete the survey online. One hundred and fifty 
questionnaires were returned by mail and one hundred and fifty 
surveys were completed online. Forty-six of the returned questionnaires 
were excluded from the analysis, due to significant incompletion. As a 
result, 254 valid responses from 64 organisations remained. A 32 per 
cent response rate is considered satisfactory for research conducted in 
the information security field (Kotulic & Clark, 2004). The following 
section details the profiles of the survey sample respondents. 
5A.2.2 Respondent Profiles  
The purpose of examining the respondent profiles is to determine 
whether the sample could adequately represent the survey population. 
Generally speaking, respondents were classified based on the following 
categories:  
• Type, size, industry and age of organisations in which they were 
employed; 
• Existence of an Information Security Management Department 
and number of security staff; and 
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• Respondent job title, age and education. 
The demographic information about the respondents and the sample 
organisations is summarized in Table 5.A.1.  
Table 5A.1: Frequencies of Demographic Variables 
 Frequency Percentage 
Organisation Type 
Private 124 48.8 
Public 75 29.5 
Non- Profit 3 1.2 
Semi-Public 52 20.5 
Organisation Size * 
1-499 63 24.8 
500-4999 104 40.9 
more than 5000 87 34.3 
Organisation Industry 
Financial 48 18.9 
Education 36 14.2 
Telecommunications 27 10.6 
IT 24 9.4 
Insurance 22 8.7 
Health are 21 8.3 
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 Frequency Percentage 
Construction 18 7.1 
Petrochemical 16 6.3 
Oil & Gas 6 2.4 
Consulting 5 2 
Manufacturing 3 1.2 
Other 28 11 
Organisation Age 
0-3 42 16.5 
4-6 44 17.3 
7-10 8 3.1 
11-20 10 3.9 
More than 20 150 59.1 
Separate ISM 
Yes 172 67.7 
No 74 29.1 
Do not know 8 3.1 
Security Staff Number 
0 14 5.5 
1-5 68 26.8 
6-10 47 18.5 
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 Frequency Percentage 
11-20 48 18.9 
21-50 35 13.8 
More than 50 31 12.2 
Do not know 11 4.3 
Job  Title ** 
Security  Staff 34 13.4 
IT Staff 101 39.8 
Users Staff 119 46.9 
Participants Age 
21-30 119 46.9 
31-40 101 39.8 
41-50 28 11.0 
51-60 6 2.4 
Education Level 
Doctoral 9 3.5 
Master 71 28.0 
Bachelor 148 58.3 
Diploma 22 8.7 
High School 4 1.6 
*Please note that organisation size was regrouped into three types (Small 1-499 staff, 
Medium 500-4,999 staff, and large more than 5,000 staff). 
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** Please note that job title was regrouped into three categories (Security staff for 
anyone dedicated to information security only; IT staff for Chief information officers, IT 
managers and IT staff; and Users for department managers, operation staff and 
technical staff (not IT related). 
 
The majority of the respondents were employed in the private sector 
(48.8%). The reported sizes of the firms appeared to represent a good 
mix of small (1-499 employees, 24.8%), medium (500-4,999 employees, 
40.9 %) and large firms (> 5,000 employees, 34.3%). The largest four 
industries represented in the respondent sample were Financial, 
Education, Telecommunications and IT, with 18.9%, 14.2%, 10.6% and 
9.4% respectively. Concerning organisation age, 59.1% had been 
around for more than 20 years. Few organisations have been 
established in the last six years (16.5% for 0-3 years and 17.3% for 4-6 
years). Concerning the ISM department, 67.7% of the respondents 
indicated that their respective organisations had a separate Information 
Security Management (ISM) department. The job title breakdown for the 
respondents was 46.9% for Users, 39.8% for IT and 13.4% for Security. 
Concerning the respondents’ age, 86.6% of the respondents were 21-40 
years old. Concerning the respondents’ education, 58.3% of the 
respondents had a bachelor’s degree.  
5A.3 Data Screening 
Data screening is critical to prepare data for multiple regression 
analysis (Hair et al., 2006). Data screening through exploratory data 
analysis includes looking for missing data, influential outliers and 
distributional characteristics. Significant missing data result in 
convergent failures, biased parameter estimates and inflated fit indices 
(Shah & Goldstein, 2006). Influential outliers are linked to normality 
and skewness issues with observed variables. Assessing data normality 
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(along with skewness and kurtosis) is important because model 
estimation methods are based on assumptions of normality (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007). Non-normal data may result in inflated goodness of fit 
statistics and underestimated standard errors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). The following section details the survey data screening 
procedures undertaken to ensure the data’s suitability for subsequent 
statistical analyses. 
5A.3.1 Missing Data Analysis 
One of the most pervasive problems in data analysis is missing values, 
since incomplete questionnaires could bias the results. However, it is 
quite common that data sets have missing observations (Kline, 2005). 
Hair et al. (2006) state missing data could also distort the practical 
sample size available for analysis. Statistical tests based on sample size, 
such as significance level, could be distorted. Missing data are the 
result of two main causes: one is attributable to the respondent and the 
other external to the respondent (Hair et al., 2006). In some 
circumstances, a respondent might refuse to answer some of the 
questionnaire items due to company policy or perceptions regarding the 
sensitive nature of the questions (Hair et al., 2006). Causes external to 
the respondent could simply be a data entry error. As a result, before 
removing questionnaires with missing values, the entire data were first 
examined to correct any possible data entry errors by comparing the 
original questionnaires with data entries in the SPSS software. This 
follows a Hair et al. (2006) recommendation that cases with missing 
values on dependent variables are automatically excluded and cases 
with missing values on variables other than dependent variables are 
optionally excluded. In this current study, 46 cases were removed as 
significant data was missing (e.g., an entire section left blank) to keep 
the maximum proportion of missing values substantially less than the 
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5% allowable limit Tabachinick and Fidell (2001) for most of the 
variables (24 out of 28). In doing so, mean substitution of missing data 
was able to be adopted for handling missing values during the 
measurement development and relationship identification process 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The descriptive statistics for the variables 
of each construct are illustrated in Tables 5A.2 to 5A.3. As these tables 
show from among the 28 variables under constructs of the theoretical 
model, only four from the factors that influence security culture 
variables had the missing value proportion within the 5 to 10% range. 
One variable however exceeded the range, up to 11.4%. The missing 
values focused on two variables, namely security training and ethical 
conduct policies. A reason for this outcome could be reluctance to 
reveal the information. The data set was then submitted to a missing 
value analysis in SPSS to determine whether the missing pattern was 
‘Missing Completely at Random (MCAR)’ (Hair et al., 2006; Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007). Little’s MCAR test yielded non-significant Chi-square 
statistics (Chi-Square = 2843.104, d.f. = 2800, Sig. = 0.418), indicating 
that the missing pattern was random and thus justifying the 
substitution of missing data with mean values. As a result, the final 
sample retained for analysis was 254 respondents. 
5A.3.2 Assessment of Normality 
Normality is the most important fundamental assumption in 
multivariate analysis (Hair et al., 2006). Normality refers to the shape of 
the data distribution for a variable and its correspondence to the 
normal distribution (Hair et al., 2006). There are two types of normality, 
univariate and multivariate (Hair et al., 2006). ‘Univariate normality’ 
refers to the degree to which the data distribution of a specific variable 
corresponds to a normal distribution, whilst ‘multivariate normality’ 
refers to a normal joint distribution of more than one variable (Hair et 
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al., 2006). This section presents an examination of univariate normality 
to enable a preliminary assessment and demonstration of the data 
distribution for each variable, in order to justify the use of specific 
statistical analysis procedures.  
Multivariate normality is addressed in the model assessment using the 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) technique. In general, the 
assessment of normality can be carried out visually or statistically (Hair 
et al., 2006). A visual inspection allows researchers to observe and 
judge how well a variable’s data histogram corresponds to a bell-shaped 
curve. However, researchers commonly adhere to ‘skewness’ and 
‘kurtosis’, which are considered to be two important components of 
normality (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Skewness provides an indication 
of the symmetry of the distribution; a skewed variable is a variable 
whose mean is not in the centre of the distribution (Hair et al., 2006). 
Kurtosis however provides information about the ‘peakedness’ or 
‘flatness’ of a distribution compared with the normal distribution (Hair 
et al., 2006). Theoretically, the value of both skewness and kurtosis in a 
perfect distribution is zero (however, this is an uncommon occurrence 
in social research). To have a normal distribution, both skewness and 
kurtosis of the distribution should fall between -2.00 and +2.00 (Hair et 
al., 2006). The results of normal distribution tests indicated that the 
absolute values of skewness and kurtosis of all variables ranged from -
1.082 to 0.147 and from -0.974 to 0.908 respectively, which fall within 
the aforementioned recommended ranges of -2.00 to +2.00 (as shown in 
Tables 5A.2 to 5A.3). These results provide support and justification for 
the normality of the data set. 
5A.3.3 Outliers Screening  
‘Outliers’ are cases with scores that are substantially different from the 
rest (Hair et al., 2006). For this reason, it is very important to screen 
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the data to detect outliers, as they can potentially bias the mean and 
inflate the standard deviation (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Cases with 
scores more than three standard deviations beyond the mean may be 
considered as outliers (Kline, 2005). In order to detect such extreme 
deviations in this study, the entire scores of all 28 variables from all 
cases were converted into standardized z-scores. Any cases with an 
absolute z-score (|z|) value < -3.29 or > 3.29 at p < 0.01 were 
considered potential outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). For any 
variable, the number of such outliers should not be greater than 
approximately one percent (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). In this study, 
there was only one variable with an absolute z-score less than 3.29 (see 
Tables 5A.2 to 5A.3), accounting for 1.18%; this was not excessive 
compared with the acceptable level of one percent. In addition, to 
ensure the outliers did not significantly distort the data, the differences 
between the mean and the 5% trimmed mean of each variable was 
examined. The ‘5% trimmed mean’ refers to a mean calculated from a 
set of cases in which those scoring in the top and the bottom five 
percent are removed (Pallant, 2005). By convention, a large difference (> 
0.20) between the mean and the 5% trimmed mean indicates that the 
outliers may cause a problem to the data set (Pallant, 2005). In this 
study, all the calculated mean differences (Δ mean) were relatively small 
compared with 0.20, ranging from 0.0178 to 0.1016 (see Tables 5A.2 to 
5A.3). These results indicated that the detected outliers did not cause 
any problems to the data set. As a consequence, all 254 cases were 
retained for further statistical analyses. 
5A.3.4 Assessment of Standard Deviations and Standard Errors of 
the Mean 
Standard deviation (SD) is a measure of how well the mean represents 
the observed data, whereas standard errors of the mean (SE) is an 
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indication of how well a particular sample represents the population 
(Field, 2005). A large standard deviation indicates that the scores 
cluster more widely around the mean, showing the mean is not a good 
representation of the data. A small standard deviation, on the other 
hand, indicates fewer dispersed data about the mean, showing the 
mean adequately represents the data. Standard Error (SE) represents 
the variability of the sample mean. A large SE indicates that there is a 
lot of variation between the means of the different samples, which 
suggests that the sample is a poor representation of the population. On 
the other hand, a small SE indicates that most sample means are 
similar to the population mean and therefore the sample is an accurate 
reflection of the population. The values of SD and SE of all variables in 
this study were relatively small when compared to the means (see 
Tables 5A.2 to 5A.3). Therefore, it can be reasonably concluded that the 
mean value can be used as a representative score for each variable in 
the data set. In addition, the small values of the SE suggest that the 
sample used was sufficiently representative of the population. 
Table 5A.2: Descriptive Statistics of Factors Influencing Security Culture Variables 
Variable Description Mean Mean – 
5% 
trimmed 
mean 
Δ 
Mean* 
SD SE Skew Kurt 
TPM1: Top management 
considers information 
security an important 
organisational priority 
4.10 4.17 - 0.07 .94 .059 -1.0 .61 
TPM2:Senior management 
gives strong and 
consistent support to the 
3.88 3.94 - 0.06 .98 
.06
2 
-.73 .02 
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security program 
Variable Description Mean Mean – 
5% 
trimmed 
mean 
Δ 
Mean* 
SD SE Skew Kurt 
TPM3: Senior 
management is always 
involved in key 
information security 
activities 
3.54 3.58 - 0.04 
1.0
5 
.06
7 
-.38 -.51 
TPM4: Management 
ensures that appropriate 
individuals are made 
responsible for specific 
information security 
aspects 
3.58 3.64 - 0.06 
1.1
2 
.07
1 
-.67 -.15 
TPM5: Management 
ensures that everyone who 
takes information security 
actions and makes 
information security 
decisions are held 
accountable for their 
decisions and actions 
3.61 3.67 - 0.05 
1.0
4 
.06
5 
-.56 -.19 
PE1: Information security 
practices and procedures 
are continually monitored 
to ensure compliance with 
security policy 
3.64 3.70 - 0.06 
1.0
8 
.06
8 
-.61 -.24 
PE2: Information security 
practices and procedures 
3.33 3.36 - 0.03 1.1 .07 -.25 -.70 
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are externally audited 3 4 
Variable Description Mean Mean – 
5% 
trimmed 
mean 
Δ 
Mean* 
SD SE Skew Kurt 
PE3: Information security 
violations are reported to 
the proper authority 
3.43 3.48 - 0.04 .94 
.07
1 
-.31 -.55 
PE4: Actions against 
violations are always 
taken 
3.42 3.47 - 0.04 .98 
.06
7 
-.32 -.31 
PM1: Information security 
policy is clearly defined 
3.50 3.55 - 0.05 
1.0
5 
.07
3 
-.57 -.48 
PM2: Information security 
policy is consistently 
reviewed and updated on 
a periodical basis 
3.34 3.38 - 0.03 
1.1
2 
.07
4 
-.27 -.76 
PM3: Assessing risks to 
information security is 
regular 
3.44 3.46 - 0.02 
1.0
4 
.06
7 
-.18 -.71 
PM4: Risk assessments 
are conducted prior to 
developing new security 
policies 
3.41 3.44 - 0.02 
1.0
8 
.06
5 
-.22 -.49 
PC1: I receive adequate 
information security 
training 
2.83 2.81 0.01 
1.1
3 
.08
1 
.10 -.97 
PC2: Information security 
policy is communicated 
3.18 3.20 - 0.02 .94 
.06
8 
-.28 -.55 
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well 
Variable Description Mean Mean – 
5% 
trimmed 
mean 
Δ 
Mean* 
SD SE Skew Kurt 
PC3:I am always educated 
or trained about new 
security policies 
2.83 2.82 0.01 .98 
.07
6 
.14 -.83 
ETH1: I am familiar with 
the policy on professional 
conduct 
3.36 3.40 - 0.04 
1.0
5 
.06
8 
-.47 -.44 
ETH2:I am familiar with 
the policy on code of 
conduct 
3.30 3.33 - 0.03 
1.1
2 
.06
8 
-.31 -.64 
ETH3: I am familiar with 
the policy on conflict of 
interest 
3.19 3.21 - 0.02 
1.0
4 
.07 -.21 -.75 
Δ Mean* = Mean – 5% trimmed mean; Standard deviation (SD); Standard error of 
mean (SE), Skew: Skewness, Kurt: Kurtosis 
TPM: Top Management Involvement, PE: Policy Enforcement, PM: Policy Maintenance, 
PC: Policy Communication, ETH: Ethical Conduct Policies. *Cases with z > 3.29 or z < 
-3.29 
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Table 5A.3: Descriptive Statistics of Security Culture Variables 
Variable Description Mean Mean – 
5% 
trimmed 
mean 
Δ 
Mean* 
SD SE Skew Kurt 
AW1: I am aware of my 
information security roles 
and responsibilities 
3.72 3.79 - 0.07 1.03 
.06
5 
-.81 .27 
AW2: I am aware of the 
risk of not following the 
information security policy 
3.87 3.96 - 0.08 1.01 
.06
4 
-.97 .68 
AW3: I am familiar with 
information security policy 
3.63 3.69 - 0.05 1.03 
.06
6 
-.59 -.10 
AW4: I am aware of the 
procedures for reporting 
security policy violations 
3.28 3.31 - 0.03 1.14 
.07
3 
-.36 -.65 
CMP1: I always adhere to 
the information security 
policy 
3.82 3.88 - 0.06 .95 
.06
0 
-.70 .33 
CMP2: Others around 
adhere to the information 
security policy in a similar 
manner 
3.18 3.20 - 0.02 1.0 
.06
4 
-.35 -.20 
OWN1: It is my 
responsibility to protect 
the information of my 
organisation 
3.99 4.08 - 0.09 1.0 
.06
8 
-1.05 .50 
OWN2: I take ownership of 
the outcomes of my 
information security 
3.98 4.07 - 0.08 .96 
.06
1 
-.96 .86 
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decisions and actions 
Variable Description Mean Mean – 
5% 
trimmed 
mean 
Δ 
Mean* 
SD SE Skew Kurt 
OWN3: Protecting 
information security is an 
important part of my job 
4.04 4.15 - 0.10 1.0 
.06
7 
-1.08 .69 
Δ Mean* = Mean – 5% trimmed mean; Standard deviation (SD); Standard error of 
mean (SE), Skew: Skewness, Kurt: Kurtosis, AW: Awareness, CMP: Compliance, OWN: 
Ownership, *Cases with z > 3.29 or z < -3.29 
5A.4 Preliminary Findings  
As described in the previous sections, the standard deviations of all 28 
variables were not large. As a result, the mean values were determined 
to adequately represent the overall response for each variable. This 
section focuses on evaluating and interpreting the mean values of all 28 
variables, calculated from the entire sample. The mean values are 
presented in Tables 5A.2 to 5A.3. The interpretation of the mean values 
was carried out with reference to the five-point scale response format, 
for all questionnaire items (variables), the value of five (5) representing 
the highest score and one (1) representing the lowest score. 
5A.4.1 Level of Factors Influencing Security Culture 
Table 5A.2 shows the respondents’ perception of factors that influence 
security culture with respect to Saudi organisations. These factors 
include five constructs, namely: top management involvement; policy 
enforcement; policy maintenance; security training; and ethical conduct 
policies. The mean values of these factor variables ranged from 2.83 to 
4.10. Overall, Saudi organisations displayed moderately strong 
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management involvement with information security programs. More 
specifically, the participants perceived that management considered 
information security to be an organisation priority (TPM1) and senior 
management gave strong and consistent support to the security 
program (TPM2), as indicated by the two highest mean values of 4.10 
and 3.88 respectively. However, despite the perceived strong belief of 
management involvement in information security, they showed a lack of 
resourcing in terms of allocating enough of the budget for security 
training, which scored the least, on average 2.95. The support for 
security training was evidently not a major concern of top management 
in Saudi organisations and indicates the need to consider allocating 
more funds to security training. Additionally, ethical conduct policies 
receive the second lowest average of all constructs, with an average 
score of 3.28. Many of the respondents lean towards being unsure of 
the existence of ethical policies in the Saudi environment. Interestingly, 
Saudi organisations typically are concerned that they develop and 
communicate ethical conduct policies to all staff according to the 
qualitative interviews reported in Chapter 4. On the other hand, policy 
enforcement and policy maintenance each have a medium mean, 
scoring an average of 3.44 and 3.41 respectively. Evidently, Saudi 
organisations need to spend more time and effort maintaining and 
enforcing the security policy. 
5A.4.2 Level of Factors Constituting Security Culture  
Table 5A.3 shows respondents’ perception of security culture in Saudi 
organisations. The security culture includes three constructs, namely 
awareness of security policies; adherence to security policy; and 
security ownership. The mean values of the security culture variables 
were above the medium level, ranging from 3.50 to 4.01. Overall, Saudi 
organisations displayed strong security ownership, which had a mean 
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score of 4.01. Most of the respondents felt strongly that protecting 
information security was an important part of their job, and it had a 
score of 4.05. However, compliance and adherence to the security policy 
take a different turn. Most of the respondents felt that they adhered to 
the information security policy, giving it a mean score of 3.82. However, 
many of the respondents were unsure about other members’ ability to 
adhere to the information security policy, with a mean score of 3.18 
resulting for it. As a result, their perception of their personal adherence 
to the security policy differs from their perception of other members’ 
adherence. Interestingly, many respondents perceived their security 
awareness level to be moderate and felt their sense of security 
ownership was higher than their actual awareness level. However, the 
security awareness levels had different mean scores. The highest 
awareness level score was awareness of the risk of not following the 
information security policy, with a mean of 3.87. On the other hand, the 
lowest score was awareness of the procedures for reporting security 
policy violations, with a mean of 3.29. The overall awareness score was 
moderate, with an overall average of 3.63. This shows that Saudi 
respondents, despite the awareness of consequences of risk for not 
following the security policy, seemed in a neutral zone in terms of 
reporting security policy violations.   
5A.5 Chapter Summary  
This chapter presents a descriptive data analysis to provide an 
understanding of the characteristics of the data collected from the 
questionnaire survey of Saudi Arabian organisations. At the start of the 
chapter, an examination of the profiles of the 254 respondents revealed 
that the opinions given by these respondents provided reliable 
information according to their current positions, qualifications and 
characteristics of the organisations in which they were employed. The 
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data screen showed an acceptable normal distribution without extreme 
outliers and upheld the assumptions of normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity. In addition, the standard deviation and standard 
error of the mean indicated that a mean value could be used as a 
representative score for each variable and that the sample used in the 
study sufficiently represented the population. As a result of the above, 
the data is considered suitable input for the subsequent analysis, such 
as multivariate analyses (EFA, CFA and SEM analyses), which are 
presented in the next chapter. 
 
 182 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5B: Measurement Scale Analysis  
183 
CHAPTER 5B: Measurement Scale Analysis 
5B.1 Objectives and Structure of the Chapter 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the process of measurement 
scale development for the two constructs in the theoretical model. Each 
of the two measurement scales, representing the model constructs, was 
assessed to determine its overall reliability. Additionally, factor analyses 
were performed to uncover and confirm factor structures that represent 
the model construct, an essential step prior to assessing the model as 
previously discussed in Chapter 3. Section 5B.2 presents the analysis of 
scale reliability through the assessment of internal consistency and 
item-total correlations. Section 5B.3 presents the Exploratory Factor 
Analysis (EFA) conducted to uncover the appropriate factor structures 
of the model construct. Section 5B.4 presents the Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) employed to confirm and refine the identified structure 
of each model construct to ensure its reliability and validity. Section 
5B.5 summarizes and concludes the chapter. 
5B.2 Scale Reliability 
Pallant (2005) (p.97) defined reliability as “the degree to which an 
instrument measures the same way each time it is used under the same 
conditions with the same subject”. For a scale to be valid and possess 
practical utility, it must be reliable (Pallant, 2005). In this study, the 
survey questionnaire used two scales to measure the constructs 
proposed in the research model in Chapter 4B, namely factors 
influencing security culture, and constituting security culture. To 
ensure that such a set of measurement scales consistently and 
accurately captured the meaning of the constructs, an analysis of scale 
reliability was performed through an assessment of internal consistency 
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and inter-total correlations. The assessment procedures and associated 
results are presented in Sections 5B.2.1 and 5B.2.2. 
5B.2.1 Internal Consistency 
Kline (2005) refers to the degree to which responses are consistent 
across the items as “internal consistency”. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
is the most common measurement for internal consistency, which 
calculates the estimated correlation of a set of items and true scores. A 
low Cronbach’s alpha coefficient indicates that variables may be so 
heterogeneous that they perform poorly in representing the measure 
(i.e. the construct). Cronbach’s Alpha above 0.70 is considered an 
acceptable indicator of internal consistency and the values of 0.60 to 
0.70 are at the lower limit of acceptability, as suggested in the literature 
(Hair et al., 2006; Pallant, 2005). Table 5B.1 presents the Cronbach’s 
alpha for two scales: Factors Influencing Security Culture (19 items), 
and Factors Constituting or Reflecting Security Culture (9 items). 
However, Cronbach’s alpha is not a statistical test, it is a coefficient of 
reliability (or consistency) (Hair et al., 2006). Therefore, it has been 
suggested that analyses of the inter-total correlations for the items 
should be considered (Pallant, 2005). The values of the alpha coefficient 
of all the construct scales ranged from 0.629 to 0.919, suggesting good 
internal consistency and reliability for the scales with this sample. 
Therefore, the measurement scales appear to be composed of a set of 
consistent variables for capturing the meaning of the model constructs. 
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Table 5B.1 Cronbach’s Alphas of Measurement Scales for Each Construct 
Constructs Measurement 
Scale 
Number of Variables Cronbach’s Alpha 
Top Management 
Involvement  
5 .870 
Policy Enforcement  4 .820 
Policy Maintenance  4 .897 
Training  3 .842 
Ethical Conduct Policies  3 .919 
Awareness 4 .906 
Compliance  2 .629 
Ownership 3 .847 
 
5B.2.2 Item-Total Correlations 
Item-total correlation refers to the correlation of a variable, with the 
composite score of all variables forming the measure of the construct 
(Lu, Lai, & Cheng, 2007). If all variables share a common core of the 
same construct, the score of each variable, and that of the entire 
construct, should be highly correlated (Koufteros, 1999). Churchill 
(1979) recommends that this analysis should be performed to purify the 
measure by eliminating “garbage items” prior to determining the factors 
that represent the construct. This approach helps to prevent the 
unnecessary production of many more factors than can be conceptually 
defined. 
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In SPSS, the value of the item-total correlation is corrected. The 
corrected item-total correlation excludes the score of a variable of 
interest when calculating the composite score (Koufteros, 1999). A value 
of the corrected item-total correlation of less than 0.30 indicates that 
the variable is measuring something different from the construct as a 
whole (Pallant, 2005). Thus the results of item-total correlations 
presented in Tables 5B.2-5B.9 show that all of the variables within each 
construct measure the actual construct, as their corrected item-total 
correlations were greater than 0.30.  
 
Table 5B.2: Item-Total Correlations of Top Management Involvement 
Variables: Description 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Top management considers information security an 
important organisational priority 
.740 .833 
Senior management gives strong and consistent support 
to the security program 
.774 .824 
Senior management is always involved in key information 
security activities 
.740 .831 
Management ensures that appropriate individuals are 
made responsible for specific information security aspects 
.637 .859 
Management ensures that everyone who takes 
information security actions and makes information 
security decisions is held accountable for their decisions 
and action 
.602 .865 
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Table 5B.3: Item-Total Correlations of Policy Enforcement 
Variables: Description 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Information security practices and procedures are 
continually monitored to ensure compliance with 
security policy 
.622 .783 
Information security practices and procedures are 
externally audited 
.563 .810 
Information security violations are reported to the 
proper authority 
.685 .754 
Actions against violations are always taken .704 .746 
 
Table 5B.4: Item-Total Correlations of Policy Maintenance 
Variables: Description 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Information security policy is clearly defined .734 .881 
Information security policy is consistently reviewed 
and updated on periodical basis 
.806 .853 
Assessing risks to information security is regular .837 .843 
Risk assessments are conducted prior to developing 
new security policies 
.713 .887 
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Table 5B.5: Item-Total Correlations of Training 
Variables: Description 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I receive adequate information security training .701 .787 
Information security policy is communicated well .671 .814 
I am always educated or trained about new security 
policies 
.751 .737 
 
Table 5B.6: Item-Total Correlations of Ethical Conduct Policies 
Variables: Description 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I am familiar with the policy on professional conduct .840 .881 
I am familiar with the policy on code of conduct .897 .835 
I am familiar with the policy on conflict of interest .776 .934 
 
Table 5B.7: Item-Total Correlations of Awareness 
Variables: Description 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I am aware of my information security roles and 
responsibilities 
.814 .869 
I am aware of the risk of not following the information 
security policy 
.806 .873 
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I am familiar with information security policy .820 .867 
I am aware of the procedures for reporting security 
policy violations 
.722 .905 
  
Table 5B.8: Item-Total Correlations of Compliance 
Variables: Description 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I always adhere to the information security policy .459 .629 
Others around adhere to the information security 
policy in a similar manner 
.459 .629 
 
 
Table 5B.9: Item-Total Correlations of Ownership 
Variables: Description 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
It is my responsibility to protect the information of 
my organisation 
.737 .766 
I take ownership of the outcomes of my information 
security decisions and actions 
.686 .816 
Protecting information security is an important part 
of my job 
.726 .776 
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5B.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis  
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was employed to reduce the large 
number of variables to a smaller, more manageable set (Hair et al., 
2006). EFA is particularly useful as a preliminary analysis in the 
absence of a sufficiently detailed theory about the relations of the 
variables to the underlying constructs (Gerbing & Anderson, 1988). 
Although all measured variables in the constructs were derived from 
previous research (an extensive literature review and qualitative data 
with experts’ feedback input), the EFA was deemed necessary since 
these variables had not been operationalised extensively within the 
Saudi Arabian context. The following sections (5B.3.1 to 5B.3.3) provide 
the details of the analysis. 
5B.3.1 Factorability of Data 
The factorability refers to the suitability of the data to be factorized in 
terms of the inter-correlation between variables (Pallant, 2005; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). As the variables included in the analysis 
were deemed to measure the same underlying construct, a correlation 
matrix that was factorable needed to include sizable values for the 
correlation (Field, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity are generally applied to determine the factorability of such a 
matrix (Pallant, 2005). The strength of the inter-correlations among the 
variables within each construct was supported by the inspection of the 
correlation matrix with evidence of coefficients greater than 0.30. As 
presented in Table 5B.10, the values of Kaiser-Meyer- Olkin (KMO) of 
constructs was 0.932 making them well above the minimum acceptable 
level of 0.60 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). In addition, the 254 cases in 
this study satisfied the minimum acceptable sample size of 100 and 
exceeded the minimum requirement of five times as many cases as the 
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variable to be analysed in each construct (Hair et al., 2006). Finally, 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity for each construct was highly significant at p 
< 0.001 level, indicating that there were adequate relationships between 
the variables included in the analysis (Field, 2005). These results 
confirmed the factorability of the EFA conducted for each construct 
(Field, 2005; Hair et al., 2006; Pallant, 2005). 
Table 5B.10 KMO and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 
Construct KMO 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
Information 
Security Culture 
Model 
.932 4241.558 378 .000 
 
5B.3.2 Factor Extraction and Rotation 
EFA needs to follow two essential steps to produce an appropriate 
solution that explains an adequate number of factors representing a 
construct: (1) factor extraction, and (2) factor rotation and 
interpretation (Pallant, 2005). Factor extraction aims to uncover factors 
based on a particular method and criteria to determine the adequacy of 
the number of factors, whereas factor rotation and interpretation aims 
at improving the interpretation of a given factor solution   (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007).  
In this current study, factor extraction was performed using principal 
components analysis (PCA) to achieve an empirical summary of the data 
set. PCA is an extraction method used widely for defining the factors 
needed to represent the structure of the variables. Several criteria are 
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used to achieve the number of factors that best describe the underlying 
relationship among variables, namely: (1) latent root criterion, (2) 
Catell’s scree test, (3) a priori criterion, and (4) percentage of variance 
criterion (Hair et al., 2006). The Latent root criterion suggests that 
factors having an Eigen value greater than 1 are significant, and that 
those with less than 1 should be disregarded (Pallant, 2005). The 
Catell’s scree test employs a graphical plot of Eigen values against a 
number of factors in their order of extraction. The point where there is a 
sudden change of slope in the curve indicates the maximum number of 
factors to be extracted (Pallant, 2005). The a priori criterion is a simple 
criterion where the number of factors is known prior to undertaking the 
factor analysis. This approach is considered particularly useful when 
testing a theory or hypothesis about the number of factors to be 
extracted (Hair et al., 2006). It is also an appropriate criterion in 
attempting to replicate another researcher’s work and extracting the 
same number of factors that were previously found (Hair et al., 2006). 
The percentage of variance criterion ensures practical significance for 
the derived factors by confirming that they explain at least a specified 
amount of variance (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). According to Hair et al. 
(2006), it is quite common to consider a solution that accounts for 60 
per cent (or less) of the total variance in social science research, since 
the information in this area, by nature, is often less precise. Factor 
loadings will determine the degree to which the variables load onto 
these factors once the factors have been extracted (Field, 2005). In most 
circumstances, the initial factor solution does not provide an adequate 
interpretation, since most variables will have high loadings on the most 
important factor and small loadings on the other factors, regardless of 
the extraction method employed (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). As a 
result, factor rotation was employed to achieve simpler and more 
meaningful solutions. 
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The Varimax orthogonal rotation was the preferred method, since it was 
the simplest and most commonly used rotation (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). A specific criterion was employed to justify the significance of the 
factor loadings after the factor had been rotated. A factor loading of 0.50 
and above was considered significant at the 0.05 level to obtain a power 
level of 80% with a sample of 254 (Hair et al., 2006; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). The variables of a factor loading less than 0.50 were 
eliminated. Considering the above criteria, the detailed procedures of 
the EFA for each individual construct are discussed in the following 
sections. 
5B.3.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis Results  
Based on the above techniques and criteria, the EFA was performed 
separately for each of the two major constructs using the SPSS 18.0 
program. The scree test identified three factors which accounted for 
68.12 per cent of the total variance for the factors influencing security 
culture and factors constituting or reflecting security culture construct, 
as represented in Figure 5B.1. Table 5B.11 indicates that all variables 
were significant (factor loadings greater or very close to 0.50). However, 
all of the four variables represent (PM) Policy Maintenance 1 through 4 
cross loaded between two constructs, namely as policy enforcements 
and training. Therefore, this factor appears to be cross loaded into two 
different constructs. As a result, the elimination of these variables is 
necessary in order to continue analysing the results. In addition, ethical 
conduct policies are loaded into the dimension of security awareness. 
Finally, compliance with the policies appears to be closely related to 
security awareness constructs. Later in this section, the current study 
will discuss several possible explanations for the cross loading 
constructs and the combinations of the constructs. In addition, five 
factors were derived from the 28 variables. These are: 
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• Factors Influencing Security Culture: Top Management 
Involvement (5 variables, component 3); 
• Factors Influencing Security Culture: Policy Enforcement (4 
variables, component 2);  
• Factors Influencing Security Culture: Training (3 variables, 
component 4);  
• Factors Constituting or Reflecting Security Culture: Ethical 
Conduct Policy, Security Awareness Polices and Policy 
Compliance (8 variables, component 1); and 
• Factors Constituting or Reflecting Security Culture: Security 
Ownership (3 variables, component 5).  
Table 5B.11 depicts the results of the analysis, when factors were not 
forced (after suppressing loadings of less than 0.4). 
Table 5B.11: Rotated Factor Loadings of the Research Model Constructs: No Forced 
Factors 
 
 Component 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Top management considers information 
security an important organisational 
priority 
TPM1     .818     
Senior management gives strong and 
consistent support to the security 
program 
TPM2     .815     
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Senior management is always involved 
in key information security activities 
TPM3     .781     
Management ensures that appropriate 
individuals are made responsible for 
specific information security aspects 
TPM4     .678     
Management ensures that everyone who 
takes information security actions and 
makes information security decisions is 
held accountable for their decisions and 
actions 
TPM5     .549     
Information security practices and 
procedures are continually monitored to 
ensure compliance with security policy 
PE1   .507      
Information security practices and 
procedures are externally audited 
PE2   .646       
Information security violations are 
reported to the proper authority 
PE3   .679       
Actions against violations are always 
taken 
PE4   .665       
Information security policy is clearly 
defined 
PM1   .533   .501   
Information security policy is 
consistently reviewed and updated on 
periodical basis 
PM2   .504   .561   
Assessing risks to information security 
is regular 
PM3   .530   .544   
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Risk assessments are conducted prior 
to developing new security policies 
PM4   .468   .471   
I receive adequate information security 
training 
T1       .712   
Information security policy is 
communicated well 
T2       .668   
I am always educated or trained about 
new security policies 
T3       .776   
I am familiar with the policy on 
professional conduct 
ETC1 .787         
I am familiar with the policy on code of 
conduct 
ETC2 .800         
I am familiar with the policy on conflict 
of interest 
ETC3 .803         
I am aware of my information security 
roles and responsibilities 
AW1 .726         
I am aware of the risk of not following 
the information security policy 
AW2 .718         
I am familiar with information security 
policy 
AW3 .745         
I am aware of the procedures for 
reporting security policy violations 
AW4 .691         
I always adhere to the information 
security policy 
CMP1 .566         
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Others around adhere to the 
information security policy in a similar 
manner 
CMP2   .519       
It is my responsibility to protect the 
information of my organisation 
OWN1         .803 
I take ownership of the outcomes of my 
information security decisions and 
actions 
OWN2         .792 
Protecting information security is an 
important part of my job 
OWN3         .781 
Eigen value  12.046 3.149 1.533 1.341 1.017 
% Variance  43.02 11.245 5.474 4.788 3.632 
Cumulative Variance explained  43.03 54.268 59.74 64.53 68.12 
TPM: Top Management Involvement, PE: Policy Enforcement, PM: Policy Maintenance, 
T: Training, ETC: Ethical Conduct Policies, AW: Awareness, CMP: Compliance, OWN: 
Ownership, Cronbach’s alpha = .957. Yellow highlighter indicates factor loadings. 
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Figure 5B.1 Scree Plot for the EFA of Security Governance and Security Culture 
 
5B.3.4 Construct Validity of Factors Influencing Security Culture 
and Factors Constituting or Reflecting Security Culture 
Table 5B.11 illustrates five factor solutions with no enforcement of 
factor solutions. This option is considered the best option because both 
the scree plot and the Eigen value suggested items fell naturally into 
five factor solutions. All of (TPM) top management involvement items 
loaded exactly as predicted. Additionally, (PE) policy enforcement items 
loaded exactly as predicted with an additional item was supposed to 
represent security compliance (CMP 2) “Others around adhere to the 
information security policy in a similar manner” that was supposed to 
represent security compliance but did not loaded as predicted. Perhaps 
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respondents believed if other people around complied with the security 
policy, it would force them to comply with the security policy as well. All 
of the training items (T) loaded exactly as predicted. Additionally, all of 
(OWN) security ownership items loaded exactly as predicted. However, 
(AW) security awareness, (ETH) ethical conduct policies and (CMP) 
security compliance are included in the information security culture 
model as separate constructs. Perhaps information security awareness 
(that included security awareness of roles and responsibilities, risk of 
not following the policy, security policy and procedures for reporting 
policy violations) were not clearly differentiated with ethical conduct 
policies (that included familiarity with policy on professional conduct, 
policy of code of conduct and policy on conflict of interest) and security 
compliance (that included adhering to the security policy), especially in 
the operationalisations of measures.  One possible explanation for this 
loading between constructs is a lack of ethical conduct policies, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, which is a major concern in the Saudi Arabian 
environment and many respondents seemed to be unsure whether such 
polices existed. ‘Ethical policies’ scored a mean average of 3.29 which 
indicated that many respondents are not very sure about the existence 
of such ethical policies. For complying with a security policy, ‘many 
respondents felt that once they had been made aware of the need for 
security awareness, they would follow the security policy ’in the Saudi 
context. However, one could conclude, given that fact that ‘ethical 
conduct policies’, ‘security awareness’ and ‘security compliance’ are 
placed directly following each other in the questionnaire, such 
placement might have influenced the respondents to rate the items in a 
similar manner. On the other hand, policy maintenance (PM) was cross 
loaded with policy enforcement (PE) and training (T). The policy 
maintenance construct was derived from the qualitative interviews 
which showed that maintaining the security policy was an important 
factor that influences security culture creation in the Saudi context. 
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Policy Maintenance (PM) was operationalised as clearly defining the 
security policy; reviewing and updating security policy on a periodical 
basis; assessing the security policy regularly and assessing risks prior 
to developing a new security policy. Despite the effort to distinguish 
‘policy maintenance’ from ‘policy enforcement and training’, the current 
study found ‘policy maintenance’ cross loaded into both of these 
constructs which resulted in the elimination of this construct. Perhaps, 
because of the similarity between these constructs, the cross loading 
occurred. Information security policy constructs are closely related to 
each other and as a consequence all security policy statements are 
related to some extent. However, additional validation techniques such 
as Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) are needed for further validation 
of the information security culture model.   
5B.3.5 Summary of Exploratory Factor Analysis Results  
Based on the Eigen value, the scree test and the a priori criterion, the 
constructs of factors influence security culture and factors constituting 
or reflecting security culture. Table 5B.12 summarizes these factor 
solutions where they were supported by the cumulative percentage of 
the variance extracted, around 68%, and were considered satisfactory 
solutions in the social sciences field (Hair et al., 2006). Four variables 
were removed in the policy maintenance constructs due to cross loading 
with other constructs in the model. Finally, the Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients of all scales were very high and well above the 0.70 
threshold level, ranging from 0.629 to 0.919, thus demonstrating 
internal consistency except for one construct (Compliance) which will 
potentially eliminated since it was  the only construct found to be below 
0.70 (Pallant, 2005). However, since this current study is an exploratory 
research in which a minimum of 0.60 is considered acceptable, the 
current study will precede with analysis of the compliance constructs. 
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These results therefore confirmed that the developed scales comprised 
reliable and valid items, which adequately captured the meaning of the 
model constructs and their related factors. 
Table 5B.12 Summaries of EFA Results 
Construct 
Variable 
Removed 
Factors 
Extract
ed 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Cumulative 
Variance 
Factor: Description 
Factors 
Influenci
ng 
Security 
Culture & 
Factors 
Constitut
ing 
Security 
Culture 
4 5 
0.629-
0.919 
68.16 % 
Top Management 
Involvement (5 
Variables) 
Security Policy 
Enforcements (5 
Variables) 
Security Policy 
Communication  (3 
Variables) 
Ethical Conduct and 
Security Awareness 
and compliance (8 
Variables) 
Security Ownerships 
(3 Variables) 
 
5B.4 Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
Reliability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of validity of the 
measurement scales (Thompson, 2004). It is important to confirm 
whether the collected data are appropriate (fit) for the hypothesized 
model (proposed measurement) before conducting statistical analysis 
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techniques such as multiple regression analysis and correlation matrix 
analysis. The assessment of construct validity is a critical element in 
measurement theory (Gerbing & Anderson, 1988; Hair et al., 2006). 
Construct validity is “the extent to which the constructs or a set of 
measured items actually reflects the theoretical latent construct those 
items are designed to measure” (Hair et al., 2006)(P.776). To assess 
‘construct validity’ adequately, a contemporary analytical method, 
namely the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), which is a subset of the 
structural equation modelling technique, was employed. CFA provides a 
stricter interpretation than those methods employed in the exploratory 
analysis (i.e., item-total correlation, EFA) (Gerbing & Anderson, 1988). 
CFA in general is a way of testing how well the a priori factor structure 
and its respective pattern of loadings match the actual data (Hair et al., 
2006). CFA can also be used to refine an existing theoretical 
perspective, support an existing structure and test a known 
dimensional structure in an additional population (DiStefano & Hess, 
2005). EFA however provided a preliminary factor structure for each 
construct, based on the factors extracted and the pattern of loadings. 
To strengthen the EFA results, CFA was employed to further refine and 
support the identified factor structures. This process involved assessing 
how well the factor structure of each construct fitted the data and 
examining the model parameters to assess construct validity. These 
factors were treated as a CFA model so that they could portray a set of 
relationships showing how the measured variables represented a latent 
factor (Hair et al., 2006). The main difference between CFA and EFA is 
that in CFA the number of factors, and the relations between the 
variables and factors, had to be known and specified prior to the 
analysis (Hair et al., 2006). The next sections will provide details of the 
analysis. 
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5B.4.1 Assessment of Model Fit and Estimation Methods 
The most important feature of CFA is its ability to determine how well 
the specified factor model represents the data, which can be done by 
examining the model fit indices. If the fit indices prove to be good, the 
model is invariably accepted. Rather than being rejected, a model with 
unsatisfactory fit indices is re-specified to improve the model fit. Fit 
indices are also commonly classified as either absolute or incremental, 
as described below: 
1. Absolute fit indices are a direct measure of how well the specified 
model reproduces the observed data (Hair et al., 2006). Absolute 
fit indices provide the most basic assessment of how well the 
theory fits the sample data (Shah & Goldstein, 2006). The most 
fundamental absolute fit index is a Chi-square (X²) statistic, 
which generally includes the value of X², degree of the freedom 
(df) and significance level (p-value). By convention, the non-
significant X² indicates that the model fits the data, thus the 
model is accepted. On the other hand, a significant X² (p < 0.05) 
suggests that the model does not fit the data and should be 
rejected. However, absolute indices may be adversely affected by 
sample size (Kline, 2005). As a result, numerous alternative 
indices have been developed to quantify the degree of model fit 
(Shah and Goldstein, (2006), including goodness-of-fit index 
(GFI), adjusted-goodness-of-fit index (AGFI), standardized root 
mean square residual (SRMR), root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) and the root mean square residual 
(RMR). 
2. Incremental fit indices are concerned with the degree to which the 
model of interest is superior to the following alternative baseline 
models (Hair et al., 2006). The most common baseline model is 
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referred to as a null model, which assumes all observed variables 
are uncorrelated. Some of the most popular incremental fit 
indices are: normed-fit-index (NFI), comparative-fit-index (CFI), 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) and incremental-fit-index (IFI). 
3. Estimation Method requires accurately calculating the model 
parameters and fitting indices, and an appropriate estimation 
method. There are a variety of estimation methods available, 
including maximum likelihood (ML), generalized least square 
(GLS), weighted least square (WLS), asymptotically distribution 
free (ADF) and ordinary least square (OLS). The choice of the 
estimation method generally depends upon the distributional 
property of the data, model complexity and sample size (Shah & 
Goldstein, 2006). Each estimation method has computational 
advantages and disadvantages. ML assumes data are univariate 
and multivariate normal, but it is relatively unbiased under 
moderate violation of normality (Bollen, 1989). WLS and ADF do 
not require an assumption of normal distribution, but they 
demand a very large sample size for accurate estimates. OLS is 
considered the most robust method and requires no distributional 
assumption, but it is scale invariant and does not provide fit 
indices or standard errors for estimates (Shah & Goldstein, 2006).  
Since this study sample is 254, which is relatively good for CFA, ML 
was considered as the most appropriate method. Although ML requiring 
data distribution is multivariate normal, it was still found robust under 
the condition of moderate non-normality. In addition, these data 
characteristics also justified the use of the following model fit indices: 
X²/df, GFI, AGFI, TLI, NFI, CFI, IFI, CFI and RMSEA. According to Shah 
and Goldstein (2006), these fit indices were not found to be 
substantially biased under the condition of non-normality when using 
the ML estimation method. For the model to be considered as having an 
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acceptable fit, all eight indices were measured against the following 
criteria: 
• X²/df < 3.0 (Hair et al., 2006; Kline, 2005); 
• GFI, TLI, NFI, CFI and IFI > 0.90 and (Hair et al., 2006);  
• AGFI > 0.80 (Bhattacherjee, 2001; Chin & Todd, 2001); and  
• RMSEA < 0.08  (Hair et al., 2006).  
5B.4.2 Assessment of Construct Validity  
Assessing construct validity using the CFA involved an examination of 
convergent validity and discriminant validity. The convergent validity 
refers to the extent to which the measured variables of a specific 
construct share a high proportion of variance in common; the 
discriminant validity refers to the extent to which a construct is truly 
distinct from other constructs (Hair et al., 2006). The assessment of 
convergent validity focuses on the magnitude of the standardized factor 
loadings and their significance level.  
The larger the factor loadings with the corresponding significant critical 
value, the stronger the evidence that the measured variables represent 
the underlying constructs (Bollen, 1989). As a guideline, Hair et al. 
(2006) suggest that factor loadings should be greater than 0.50. 
Koufteros (1999), however, argues that only significant t-values or 
critical value should suffice to demonstrate convergent validity. In 
addition, variables should also have adequate reliability, which can be 
determined by inspecting the R² (or squared multiple correlation, SMC) 
values. As recommended by Bollen (1989), a variable should have an R² 
value greater than 0.50 in order to demonstrate an acceptable 
reliability. However, discriminant validity provides evidence that a 
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construct is unique and captures some phenomena other measures do 
not (Kline, 2005).  According to Kline (2005), discriminant validity can 
be assessed by an inspection of the correlation coefficient between each 
pair of variables. If the value of the correlation coefficient is very high 
(i.e. greater than 0.850), then the variables of interest might represent 
the same concept and should be combined as a single variable 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
5B.4.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results  
The CFA was performed on each construct using the AMOS (version 
18.0) program, which is an extension program to SPSS. The covariance 
matrix was automatically used as an input data set as a default in 
AMOS (Shah & Goldstein, 2006). The results of each construct are 
presented in Tables 5B.13 to 5B.16. The factor loading, critical value 
and significance level of each variable shown in the tables provided a 
measure for the convergent validity; the value of R² provided a measure 
with which to assess the reliability of the variables; and the value of the 
correlation between the factors provided an indication of the 
discriminant validity. 
5B.4.3.1 Factors Influencing Security Culture 
The CFA results of the factors that influence the security culture 
construct are presented in Table 5B.13. The model (Figure 5B.3) 
appears to have an adequate fit: X² = 156.705; df = 62; X²/df = 2.528; 
GFI = 0.913; AGFI= 0.872, NFI = 0.913, TLI = 0.931, CFI = 0.945; IFI = 
0.945; and RMSEA = 0.078. All the factor loadings, ranging from 0.578 
to 0.852, were greater than the threshold level of 0.50 and were all 
significant at p < 0.001 level, suggesting convergent validity. With the 
exception of only four variables, all the R² values were either greater 
than, or close to, 0.50, indicating the reliability of the variables. The 
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variables “Others around adhere to the information security policy in a 
similar manner” and “Information security practices and procedures are 
externally audited” have low R² scores of 0.33 and 0.39 respectively. In 
addition, the variable “Management ensures that everyone who takes 
information security actions, and makes information security decisions 
and is held accountable for their decisions and actions” and 
“Management ensures that appropriate individuals are made 
responsible for specific information security aspects” have higher R² 
scores of 0.43 and 0.46 respectively. Although having a relatively low 
reliability, these statements were retained since they loaded 
substantially and highly significantly on their respective factors. All the 
correlation coefficients between each pair of factors, ranging from 0.56 
to 0.79, were less than 0.850, thus supporting the discriminant validity 
of the construct (Kline, 2005). However, apparently further testing is 
needed to remove items with low R² values in order to improve the fit 
indices and a reasonable fit values. Further statements needed to be 
removed to improve the fit indices. After removing the two statements 
“Others around adhere to the information security policy in a similar 
manner” and “Management ensures that everyone who takes 
information security actions and makes information security decisions 
is held accountable for their decisions and actions” which have lower R² 
values, the fit indices of the model were improved significantly which 
justifies the removal of these statements. Table 5B.14 presented ‘The 
Results of Factors Influencing Security Culture’ after removing two 
statements. The model (Figure 5B.4) appears to have a better adequate 
fit: X² = 94.5; df = 41; X²/df = 2.305; GFI = 0.939; AGFI= 0.901, NFI = 
0.913, TLI = 0.951, CFI = 0.964; IFI = 0.964 and RMSEA = 0.072. All 
the factor loadings, ranging from 0.578 to 0.852, were greater than the 
threshold level of 0.50 and were all significant at p < 0.001 level, 
suggesting convergent validity. This illustrated the significant 
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improvement of adequate fit after removing the two statements. AGFI 
has improved to > 0.90 as opposed to the previous value of 0.872. 
Table 5B.13: CFA Results of Factors Influencing Security Culture 
Factor/Variable 
Factor 
Loading 
CR**** R2 Correlations 
TPM1: Top management considers 
information security an important 
organisational priority 
.825 f. p. .68 
TPM-Policy 
Enforcement 
:0.79 
 
Policy 
Enforcement 
–Training: 
0.70 
 
TPM- 
Training: 
0.56 
TPM2: Senior management gives 
strong and consistent support to the 
security program 
.852 15.713 .73 
TPM3: Senior management is always 
involved in key information security 
activities 
.812 14.717 .66 
TPM4: Management ensures that 
appropriate individuals are made 
responsible for specific information 
security aspects 
.678 11.589 .46 
TPM5: Management ensures that 
everyone who takes information 
security actions and makes 
information security decisions is held 
accountable for their decisions and 
actions 
.657 11.143 .43 
PE1: Information security practices 
and procedures are continually 
monitored to ensure compliance with 
security policy 
.754 f. p. .57 
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PE2: Information security practices 
and procedures are externally audited 
.621 9.561 .39 
PE3: Information security violations 
are reported to the proper authority 
.763 11.888 .58 
PE4:Actions against violations are 
always taken 
.782 12.184 .61 
CMP2:Others around adhere to the 
information security policy in a similar 
manner  
.578 8.859 .33 
T1: I receive adequate information 
security training 
.782 f. p. .61 
T2:Information security policy is 
communicated well 
.790 12.389 .62 
T3: I am always educated or trained 
about new security policies 
.835 12.930 .70 
Model fit indices: X²= 156.705, df = 62, X²/df = 2.528, GFI = .913, AGFI=0.872, NFI= 
.913, TLI = .931, CFI = 0.945, IFI = .945, RMSEA = .078, f.p., fixed parameter for 
estimation, ****: CR: Critical ratio (CR > 1.96: significant at 0.001 level), TPM: Top 
Management Involvement, PE: Policy Enforcement, T: Training.  
Table 5B.14: CFA Results of Factors Influence Security Culture after Removing Two 
Statements 
Factor/Variable 
Factor 
Loading 
CR**** R2 Correlations 
TPM1: Top management considers 
information security an important 
organisational priority 
.837 f. p. .701 
TPM-Policy 
Enforcement 
:0.75 
 TPM2: Senior management gives 
strong and consistent support to the 
.867 15.713 .751 
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security program Policy 
Enforcement 
–Training: 
0.69 
 
TPM- 
Training: 
0.54 
TPM3: Senior management is always 
involved in key information security 
activities 
.818 14.717 .669 
TPM4: Management ensures that 
appropriate individuals are made 
responsible for specific information 
security aspects 
.657 11.589 .431 
PE1: Information security practices 
and procedures are continually  
monitored to ensure compliance with 
security policy 
.737 f. p. .544 
PE2: Information security practices 
and procedures are externally 
audited 
.619 9.561 .383 
PE3: Information security violations 
are reported to the proper authority 
.776 11.888 .603 
PE4:Actions against violations are 
always taken 
.799 12.184 .638 
T1: I receive adequate information 
security training 
.783 f. p. .613 
T2:Information security policy is 
communicated well 
.787 12.389 .619 
T3: I am always educated or trained 
about new security policies 
.837 12.930 .700 
Model fit indices: X²= 94.5, df = 41, X²/df = 2.305, GFI = .939, AGFI=0.901, NFI= .913, 
TLI = .951, CFI = 0.964, IFI = .964, RMSEA = .072, f.p., fixed parameter for estimation, 
****: Critical ratio (CR > 1.96: significant at 0.001 level), TPM: Top Management 
Involvement, PE: Policy Enforcement, T: Training.  
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Figure 5B.2: CFA Model for Factors Influencing Security Culture 
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Figure 5B.3: CFA Model for Factors Influencing Security Culture after Removing Two 
Statements 
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5B.4.3.2 Factors Constituting or Reflecting Security Culture 
The CFA results for the factor ‘constituting or reflecting security culture’ 
construct are presented in Table 5B.15. The model (Figure 5B.4) 
appears to not have an adequate fit: X² = 395.046; df = 43; X²/df = 
9.187; GFI = 0.763; AGFI= 0.636, NFI = 0.813, TLI = 0.781, CFI = 
0.829; IFI = 0.830; and RMSEA = 0.180. All the factor loadings, ranging 
from 0.697 to 0.839, were greater than the threshold level of 0.50, and 
were all significant at p < 0.001 level, suggesting convergent validity. 
However, the high values of all the previous absolute and incremental 
fit indices indicated the model did not fit with these variables. As a 
result, further investigation was needed to establish a model with better 
absolute and incremental fit indices. 
Table 5B.15: CFA Results of Factors Constituting or Reflecting Security Culture 
Factor/Variable 
Factor 
Loading 
CR**** R2 Correlations 
AW1: I am aware of my information 
security roles and responsibilities 
.843 f. p. .711 
AWR*-
OWN: 0.66 
AW2: I am aware of the risk of not 
following the information security 
policy 
.815 15.869 .665 
AW3: I am familiar with information 
security policy 
.839 16.604 .703 
AW4: I am aware of the procedures for 
reporting security policy violations 
.793 15.199 .629 
CMP1:I always adhere to the 
information security policy 
.697 12.592 .486 
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ETH1: I am familiar with the policy on 
professional conduct 
.761 14.268 .579 
ETH2:I am familiar with the policy on 
code of conduct 
.756 14.139 .572 
ETH3: I am familiar with the policy on 
conflict of interest 
.754 14.092 .569 
OWN1: It is my responsibility to protect 
the information of my organisation 
.836 f. p. .698 
OWN2: I take ownership of the 
outcomes of my information security 
decisions and actions 
.754 12.579 .568 
OWN3: Protecting information security 
is an important part of my job 
.829 13.783 .687 
Model fit indices: X²= 395.046, df = 43, X²/df = 9.187, GFI = .763, AGFI=0.636, NFI= 
.813, TLI = .781 CFI = 0.829, IFI = .830, RMSEA = .180, fixed parameter for 
estimation, ****: Critical ratio (CR > 1.96: significant at 0.001 level). 
AW: Awareness, CMP: Compliance, ETH: Ethical Conduct Policies, OWN: Ownership.  
*: Awareness, Compliance and Ethical Conduct Policies were combined into one 
construct after conducting Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). 
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Figure 5B.4: CFA Model for Security Culture 
After further examination of the model, this study found ethical conduct 
policies and compliance statements did not fit within the model 
variables. As a result, ethical conduct policies and compliance 
statements were removed to fit the absolute and incremental fit indices. 
Table 5B.16 shows CFA results of the factors constituting or reflecting 
Security Culture after removing the ethical conduct policies and 
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compliance. The model (Figure 5B.5) appears to have an adequate fit: X² 
= 31.16; df = 13; X²/df = 2.397; GFI = 0.966; AGFI= 0.926, NFI = 0.973, 
TLI = 0.971, CFI = 0.984; IFI = 0.984 and RMSEA = 0.074. All the factor 
loadings, ranging from 0.705 to 0.884, were greater than the threshold 
level of 0.50 and were all significant at p < 0.001 level, suggesting 
convergent validity. The correlation coefficients between factors, at 0.66, 
were less than 0.850, thus supporting the discriminant validity of the 
construct.  
Table 5B.16: CFA Results of Factors Constituting or Reflecting Security Culture 
Factor/Variable 
Factor 
Loading 
CR**** R2 Correlations 
AW1:I am aware of my information 
security roles and responsibilities 
.886 f. p. .785 
AWR-OWN: 
0.66 
AW2: I am aware of the risk of not 
following the information security 
policy 
.879 19.040 .772 
AW3: I am familiar with 
information security policy 
.854 18.235 .730 
AW4: I am aware of the procedures 
for reporting security policy 
violations 
.755 15.046 .570 
OWN1: It is my responsibility to 
protect the information of my 
organisation 
.837 f. p. .700 
OWN2: I take ownership of the 
outcomes of my information 
security decisions and actions 
.756 12.631 .572 
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OWN3: Protecting information 
security is an important part of my 
job 
.826 13.797 .682 
Model fit indices: X²= 31.16, df = 13, X²/df = 2.397, GFI = .966, AGFI= .926, NFI= 
.973, TLI = .974, CFI = 0.984, IFI = .984, RMSEA = .074, fixed parameter for 
estimation, ****: Critical ratio (CR > 1.96: significant at 0.001 level). AW: Awareness, 
OWN: Ownership.  
 
Figure 5B.5: CFA Model of Security Culture 
5B.4.4 Summary of Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results  
The summary of the CFA results confirmed the factor structures derived 
from the EFA of the factors that influence security culture and CFA 
CHAPTER 5B: Measurement Scale Analysis  
218 
results of factors constituting or reflecting security culture constructs. 
However, the CFA restructured the research model constructs. As 
presented in Table 5B.17, the CFA refined the structures of the security 
culture constructs by removing the ethical conduct policies and 
compliance statement to improve the absolute and incremental fit 
indices. Construct validity was obtained within each construct because 
all variables significantly and substantially loaded onto their respective 
factors with an acceptable level of reliability. In summary, the results 
from the rigorous CFA procedures yielded the final factor structures 
with adequate reliability and validity for each of the model constructs. 
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Table 5B.17: Summaries of CFA Results 
Con 
EF
A 
CFA 
Re
m 
Model Fit Indices 
X² df 
X²/
df 
G
FI 
AG
FI 
NF
I 
TLI CFI IFI 
RM
SEA 
FIS
C: 
TP
M 
PE 
T 
3 3 2 
94.
5 
4
1 
2.3 
.9
3
9 
.90
1 
.91
3 
.95
1 
.964 .964 
.07
2 
FCS
C: 
AW 
OW
N 
2 2 
4 
ET
C 1, 
2 
and 
CM
P1 
31.
16 
1
3 
2.3
97 
.9
6
6 
.92
6 
.97
3 
.97
4 
.984 .984 
.07
4 
Con: Construct,  Rem: Remove, EFA: Number of Variables after EFA, CFA: Number of 
Variables after CFA, FISC: factors Influencing Security Culture, FCSC: Factors 
Constituting Security Culture, TPM: Top Management Involvement, PE: Policy 
Enforcement, T: Training, ETH: Ethical Conduct policies, AW: Awareness, CMP: 
Compliance, OWN: Ownership 
 
5B.5 Information Security Model Refinement  
After refining the information security model using EFA and CFA 
sequentially, the refined model was represented in figure 5B.6. Factors 
influencing security culture are: top management involvement in 
information security; security policy enforcement; and security training. 
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Factors constituting or reflecting security culture are: security 
awareness and security ownership.      
Security Culture
Security Awareness
Security Ownership
Factors Influence Security Culture
Top Management Support
Policy Enforcement
Information Security Training
 
Figure 5B.6: Refined Information Security Culture Model 
 
5B.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the details and results of the measurement scale 
analysis, with regard to the assessment of scale reliability, EFA and 
CFA of the survey data. In the first phase, Section 5B.2 analysed the 
scale reliability through an assessment of internal consistency and 
inter-total correlations. The assessment of the scale reliability showed 
that the measurement scales, which were used to capture the meaning 
of the model constructs, were reliable, as indicated by the high values of 
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Cronbach’s alpha for each individual construct. The item-total 
correlations of all the variables were also substantial, indicating that 
each variable adequately measured its underlying construct. However, 
reliability is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for validity. As 
a result, factor analyses, including EFA and CFA, were performed to 
inform an evaluation of scale validity. EFA was conducted for each 
individual construct to uncover the appropriate number of latent factors 
(factor structures). The extracted factors from EFA were examined by 
the stricter CFA technique to confirm validity. For each construct, the 
results of the CFA provided the final factor structures that 
demonstrated adequate reliability and validity. In conclusion, the EFA 
and CFA developed and confirmed good measurement scales for the two 
constructs (factors influencing security culture, and CFA results of 
factors constituting or reflecting security culture), with very good 
reliability, validity and conceptual definitions (as shown in Table 5B.17). 
These results form the basis for creating the factors that will be used in 
the subsequent model assessment, which is presented in the structure 
equation modelling Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6: Model Testing 
This chapter presents the detailed procedures undertaken to assess the 
information security culture model developed in Chapter 4. The 
assessment of the model was conducted following the confirmed validity 
and reliability of the model constructs described in the preceding 
Chapter 5B. This chapter began with an overview of the Structural 
Equation Modelling (SEM) employed as the technique for evaluating the 
relationships between the model constructs which presented SEM 
components of a measurement model. The measurement model will be 
addressed in section 6.2 and 6.3 elaborates on the specification of the 
measurement model and the relevant assessment criteria, as well as 
presenting the assessment results. Section 6.4 will present the 
nomological validity of the information security culture model with the 
assessment criteria, as well as present the results of the final empirical 
model. Section 6.5 provides a summary of the chapter. 
6.1 SEM Overview 
SEM is considered as an extension of multivariate techniques such as 
regression analysis which allows the use of multiple indicators to 
measure unobserved variables (i.e. constructs), whilst taking into 
account measurement errors when statistically analysing data (Hair et 
al., 2006). Generally speaking SEM is employed primarily to determine 
whether a theoretical (a priori) model is valid, by specifying, estimating 
and evaluating the linear relationships among a set of observed and 
unobserved variables (Shah & Goldstein, 2006). Any linear relationships 
imply causal links, whose estimated path coefficients can be used as 
the basis for hypothesis testing (Shah & Goldstein, 2006). The model 
used in the SEM analysis can be viewed as the combination of a 
measurement model and a structural model (Shah & Goldstein, 2006). 
The measurement model depicted the relationships between the 
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variables and the constructs, which can be used to determine whether 
the constructs are accurately measured. The structure model 
represented the relationship between the constructs only, and is used 
to test the hypothesised relationships (Shah & Goldstein, 2006). In 
general, the SEM analysis followed the ‘two-step approach’: (1) 
specifying and assessing the entire ‘measurement model’ to establish 
validity; and then (2) testing the ‘structural model’ to examine and 
assess the relationships between the constructs (Anderson & Gerbing, 
1988). Both steps required an assessment of the model fit indices and 
parameter estimates, which were based on similar procedures and 
criteria employed in the CFA conducted in Chapter 5B. However in the 
present study, there was no need to test the structure model since the 
main purpose was to establish the nomological validity of the research 
model. Additionally, the two hypotheses in this study can be 
represented using the SEM measurement model. 
6.2 Measurement Model Assessment 
6.2.1 Measurement Model Specification and Assessment Criteria 
The approach began with the specifications of the measurement model, 
followed by an assessment of its validity. The measurement model (a 
CFA model) depicts a series of relationships that suggest how measured 
variables represent a construct that is not measured directly (Hair et 
al., 2006). In this study, the measurement model was developed by 
integrating the individual CFA models of all the constructs (described in 
Chapter 5B) into a single model (Figure 6.1). The model consisted of 
three layers: (1) indicators, signifying the measured factors; (2) first-
order factors, signifying the underlying constructs; and (3) second-order 
factors, signifying the underlying constructs.  
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The measurement model was assessed using the CFA technique 
conducted similarly to that utilised in the previous chapter. The 
assessment of the model fit, the convergent and discriminant validity, 
were based on the following criteria: 
• Model fit indices: X²/df < 3.0; GFI, TLI, NFI, CFI, and IFI > 0.90; AGFI 
> 0.80, and RMSEA < 0.08 (Bhattacherjee, 2001; Chin & Todd, 2001; 
Hair et al., 2006; Kline, 2005); 
• Convergent validity: factor loadings > 0.50; t-values > 1.96 (significant 
at p < 0.05 level); and R² > 0.50 (Hair et al., 2006); 
• Discriminant validity: correlation coefficients for each pair of 
constructs less than 0.850 (Kline, 2005). 
In addition, the reliability of the model was assessed using a more 
accurate measure such as ‘composite reliability’ and ‘average variance 
extracted’, rather than the traditional Cronbach’s alpha. ‘Composite 
reliability’ refers to the degree to which a set of two or more variables 
share in their measurement of a construct (Koufteros, 1999; Lu et al., 
2007). A high composite reliability, therefore, indicates that all the 
variables measure the same construct.  
Moreover, composite reliability can be calculated from the following 
formula (Hair et al., 2006): 
 
 
CR = Composite Reliability; i = number of items; n = total number of 
items; iλ  = standardised factor loadings; iδ  = error variance term = 1- iλ
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Additional measures to determine the composite reliability can be found 
by calculating the average variance extracted measures in which the 
amount of variance in the measured variables is accounted for by the 
latent construct (Koufteros, 1999). The higher values of the variance 
extracted indicate that the variables were truly representative of the 
latent construct. The average variances extracted were calculated from 
the following formula (Hair et al., 2006): 
 
 
Where AVE = Average Variance Explain; 2iλ =the sum of the squared 
loadings; i = number of items; n = total number of items. 
Composite reliability values of greater than .60 are desirable and the 
values for average variance extracted, greater than .50, are considered 
adequate (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). Convergent validity can be obtained with 
having .5 values or higher for average variance extracted. In addition if 
average extracted estimates greater than the square root of the 
correlation between that factor and other factor, then it is considered an 
evidence of discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The average 
extracted estimates should be computed for each latent construct in a 
measurement model. It is important to note that the AMOS program 
used in this study did not provide the values for both measures. As a 
result, these values were calculated separately using the above 
formulae.  
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FISC: Factors Influencing Security Culture, FCSC: Factors Constituting Security 
Culture, TPM: Top Management Involvement, PE: Policy Enforcement, T: Training, AW: 
Awareness, OWN: Ownership 
Figure 6.1: Initial Measurement Model Specification 
FISC 
TPM 
PE 
OWN 
Indicators 
(Variables) 
 First Order factors -  
s 
Second Order Factors -  
FCSC 
 
 
T 
AW 
 
 
 
 
 Note: Details of variables were omitted for clarity 
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6.3 Measurement Model Results  
Table 6.1 indicated the correlation between the research model 
constructs. The results are presented in Table 6.2 and indicate that in 
no case was any correlation between the constructs greater than the 
average square root of AVE (the principal diagonal element) and all the 
AVEs were above the 0.5 threshold as discussed earlier. The AVEs 
ranged from 0.654 to 0.784. The largest squared correlation between 
policy enforcement and top management involvement was 0.6648 while 
the smallest square root of AVE obtained is for policy enforcement with 
AVE of 0.8087. Thus, the discriminant validity of the scales used was 
adequate for the information security culture measurement model. The 
results of the measurement model assessment, presented in Figure 6.2 
and Table 6-3, were based on the criteria discussed above. The model 
exhibited an acceptable level of fit (X²= 252.939, df = 129, X²/df = 
1.961, GFI = .903, AGFI=.871, NFI= .912, TLI = .946, CFI = .955, IFI = 
.955, RMSEA = .062). All the indicators (factors) had significant 
loadings greater than 0.50 (p < 0.001) on their respective constructs. 
These results indicated the measurement model maintained convergent 
validity. All of the composite reliability constructs have values above 
0.60. In fact the lowest composite reliability value was .883 according to 
Table 6.3 which indicates excellent reliability for the construct research 
model. Additionally, the principal component analysis showed that all 
the items have higher factor loadings on their construct than the other 
constructs which indicated a requirement for the Uni-dimensionality 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981) Furthermore, the average variance extracted 
for all constructs was greater than 0.50 with a lowest construct value of 
.654 according to Table 6.3. These results indicate that the information 
security culture measurement model possessed substantial convergent 
validity. On the other hand, the correlation coefficients between each 
pair of the constructs were less than 0.850, suggesting adequate 
Chapter 6: Model Testing 
229 
discriminant validity (Kline, 2005). Additionally, discriminant validity 
was also examined using Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) recommended 
conditions for discriminant validity, such as the square root of average 
variance explained (AVE) for all constructs should be larger than all 
other cross-correlations and all AVEs should have values above 0.5. In 
this study, all of the AVEs should have values above 0.5.  
Table 6.1: Factor Correlation between Research Model Constructs 
 TPM PE T AW OWN 
TPM 1     
PE . 6648 1    
T .4894 .5805 1   
AW .3757 .4668 .4641 1  
OWN .3197 .3658 .4196 .583  
TPM: Top Management Involvement in Information Security, PE: Policy Enforcement, 
T: Training, AWR: Awareness, OWN: Ownership. 
Table 6.2: Discriminant Validity for Factors Influencing Security Culture and Factors 
Constituting Security Culture 
Constructs 
Inter-Construct Correlations 
TPM PE T AWR OWN 
TPM  .8514     
PE . 6648 .8087    
T .4894 .5805 .8683   
AWR .3757 .4668 .4641 .8854  
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OWN .3197 .3658 .4196 .583 .8712 
TPM: Top Management Involvement in Information Security, PE: Policy Enforcement, 
T: Training, AWR: Awareness, OWN: Ownership. 
Table 6.3: Measurement Model Results 
Construct/ 
Factor 
Loading CR***
* 
R2 Composite 
Reliability  
Average 
Variance 
Extracted 
Correlations 
Factors 
Influencing 
Security 
Culture 
  
 
 
 
 
Factors 
Influencing 
Security 
Culture- 
Security 
Culture: 
0.652 
 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
.777 
f.p. 
 
.604 .915 .725 
Policy 
Enforcements 
.930 8.774 
.865 .883 .654 
Training .748 8.386 .559 .902 .754 
Factors 
Constituting 
Security 
Culture 
 
Security 
Awareness 
.863 f.p. 
.744 .9355 .784 
Security 
Ownership 
.767 7.281 
.588 .9045 .759 
Model fit indices: X²= 252.939, df = 129, X²/df = 1.961, GFI = .903, AGFI=0.871, NFI= 
.912, TLI = .946, CFI = 0.954, IFI = .954, RMSEA = .062, f.p., fixed parameter for 
estimation; ****: Critical ratio (CR > 1.96: significant at 0.001 level). 
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Figure 6.2: Information Security Culture Measurement Model 
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6.3.1 Alternative Measurement Model Results 
As discussed earlier in section 2.10, there is not a clear distinction in 
terms of what factors constitute security culture and what factors 
influence security culture. The conceptual model that was developed 
from the literature analysis did not make a clear distinction. However, 
our information security culture model that was developed from 
incorporating the qualitative interviews with the literature analysis has 
made a clear distinction in terms of factors that constitute security 
culture and factors that influence security culture. In the conceptual 
model, security culture was composed of several factors such as top 
management involvement, policy enforcement, training, awareness and 
ownership. In our information security culture measurement model, 
there was a clear distinction between factors constituting or reflecting 
security culture (security awareness and security ownership) and 
factors influencing security culture (top management involvement, 
policy enforcement, and training). As a result, this section compares our 
information security culture measurement model labelled as ‘Model A’ 
(Figure 6.3) with the alterative information security culture conceptual 
model labelled as ‘Model B’ (Figure 6.4) in order to examine which 
model might best explain the data. Model B exhibited an acceptable 
level of fit (X²= 301.453, df = 130, X²/df = 2.391, GFI = .883, AGFI=.846, 
NFI= .895, TLI = .926, CFI = .937, IFI = .937, RMSEA= .072). The 
results of the conceptual model measurement assessment (Model B) are 
presented in Figure 6.4 and Table 6-4.  
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Table 6.4: Conceptual Measurement Model Results 
Construct/ Factor Factor Loading CR**** R2 
Security Culture    
Top Management 
Involvement 
.752 
f.p. .566 
Policy Enforcements .876 8.525 .767 
Training .771 8.327 .594 
Security Awareness .642 7.914 .412 
Security 
Ownership 
.598 7.125 
.358 
Model fit indices: X²= 301.453, df = 130, X²/df = 2.319, GFI = .883, AGFI=0.846, NFI= 
.895, TLI = .926, CFI = 0.937, IFI = .937, RMSEA = .072, f.p., fixed parameter for 
estimation; ****: Critical ratio (CR > 1.96: significant at 0.001 level). 
Table 6.5 compares the goodness of fit statistics for the information 
security culture measurement model (Model A) and the conceptual 
model (Model B). As can be seen, ‘Model A’ has better variable indices 
than ‘Model B’. Additionally, the Chi-square (X²) values of these models 
were compared with those of the original measurement model. 
Theoretically, if the Chi-square difference between the two models is 
significant, the model exhibiting the better fit indices becomes the 
preferred model. On the other hand, if the Chi-square difference is not 
significant, the two models are said to have a comparable fit (i.e. both 
models explain the data equally well). In this case, the Chi-square 
difference between the two models (Model A) and (Model B) is significant 
(48.513) at p < 0.01, suggesting that all the model parameters did differ 
significantly. Additionally, to provide a complementary measure for the 
analysis, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was provided. 
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According to Kline (2005), the model with the smallest AIC is the 
preferred choice. In this case, Model A has lower (AIC) values of 336.939 
compared to 383.452 in Model B. The results indicated that Model A is 
a more parsimonious representation. Consequently, Model A was 
chosen as the final model that best represented the survey data. 
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Figure 6.3: Information Security Culture Measurement Model (Model A) 
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Figure 6.4: Conceptual Model Measurement (Model B) 
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Table 6.5: Comparison of Models Fit Indices 
Fit Indices Recommendation 
value 
Model A Model B 
X² N/A 252.939 301.453 
df N/A 129 130 
Δ X² N/A - 48.513* 
X²/df < 3:1 1.961 2.319 
GFI > .90 .903 .883 
AGFI > .80 .871 .846 
NFI > .90 .912 .895 
TLI > .90 .946 .926 
CFI > .90 .955 .937 
IFI > .90 .954 .937 
RMSEA < .08 .062 .072 
AIC N/A 336.939 383.452 
*: Significant at p < 0.01 
 
6.4 Testing the Nomological Validity of Information Security 
Culture Measurement Model  
One of the most powerful ways of examining the validity of the research 
model constructs and measures, is through nomological validation 
analysis (Bagozzi., 1980; Cronbach, 1971). According to Churchill 
(1995), p.538) an instrument or model has nomological validity if it 
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‘‘behaves as expected with respect to some other constructs to which it 
is theoretically related”. In other words, nomological validity refers to 
the degree that the summated scales are correlated with a similar but 
conceptually distinct measure (Hair et al.,  (2006), through assessment 
of the selected best-fitting model. Nomological validity reflects the extent 
to which predictions about constructs and measures are accurate from 
the perspective of reasonably well-established theoretical models 
(Straub et al., 1995). In this study, the nomological validity of the scale 
was assessed by constructing a structural equation modelling (SEM) of 
information security culture measurement model with encouraging 
indices of goodness of fit. The SEM approach is adopted because this 
study is intended to vigorously test the convergent, discriminant, and 
nomological validity of the factors influencing security culture and 
factors constituting or reflecting constructs. In this current research, 
there is certainly a lack of empirically validated theories that could 
establish substantial relationships between model constructs. More 
importantly, there is certainly a lack of any empirically validated 
measurement model for information security culture. As a result, the 
nomological validity of our information security measurement model is 
important and essential to the existing body of knowledge in the 
information security culture area.  
This study was designed to develop and test the nomological (predictive) 
validity of a measure capturing an information security culture 
measurement model that includes the identification of the relationship 
between factors influencing security culture and factors constituting or 
reflecting security culture. The current study expected factors 
influencing security culture to display stronger relationships with 
factors constituting or reflecting security culture. To test the 
nomological (predictive) validity of this part of the measure, the current 
study proposed the following two hypotheses. H1: (a) Security 
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Awareness, (b) Security Compliance, (c) Security Ownership are as a 
reflection of security culture. The second hypothesis include factors 
that have positive and significant influence on security culture in Saudi 
Arabian organisations such as  management involvement, information 
security policy enforcement, information security policy maintenance, 
information security training, ethical conduct policies. These are as 
discussed earlier in Chapter 5B; some of these factors were excluded 
due to low validity (security compliance, policy maintenance, and 
ethical conduct policies).  
After validating the measurement model as optimal through exploratory 
and confirmatory factor analysis, the current study will test model 
constructs to ensure nomological validity. Nomological validity was 
assessed through the examination of relationships between factors 
influencing security culture and factors constituting or reflecting 
security culture. Earlier in Chapter 5B and section 6.3, the current 
study has demonstrated convergent validity with all associations 
between indicators and the latent variable being significant at .001. In 
addition, Table 6.1 showed consistently high loadings for the 
information security culture in the nomological net models. Moreover, 
as shown in Table 6.1, composite reliability and average variance 
explained were well above the minimum level. The model testing 
nomological validity fitted the data well with (CMIN = 356.373, df = 234, 
P=.000, CMIN/df = 1.5229, GFI = .903, AGFI=.871, NFI= .912, TLI = 
.946, CFI = .955, IFI = .955, RMSEA = .062). The nomological model 
posits that security awareness and security ownership are 
nomologically related to security culture as shown in figure 6.5. 
Therefore, the current study believes that security culture is 
theoretically linked to security awareness and security ownership. 
There are strong correlations between security culture and security 
culture reflection (Awareness and Ownership) with values of .744 and 
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.588 respectively. This indicates a strong existing relationship between 
these constructs. Additionally, there is also a strong relationship 
between factors influencing security culture and top management 
involvement, policy enforcement and training with values of .604, .865 
and .559 respectively. Our nomological network was found to have 
statistical significance. Furthermore, the relationship between latent 
factors in the model and factors influencing security culture and factors 
constituting or reflecting security culture, were positive and significant 
(β = .652, p < .001), with 43 % variance explained in the factors 
constituting or reflecting security culture. Hypotheses H1 and H2 are 
significantly supported at P < .001, thus supporting the nomological 
validity of the proposed security culture research model measures. All of 
the factors in the model were deemed to possess nomological validity.  
The information security culture model as presented in Figure 6.5 was 
presented as a relevant nomological network for determining the validity 
of constructs that reflect security culture and constructs that influence 
security culture. To further examine the relationship between the 
components of factors influencing security culture and factors 
constituting or reflecting security culture, a correlation analysis was 
performed—see Table 6.6. The results indicate that all correlations 
between factors influencing security culture and factors constituting or 
reflecting security culture are statistically significant. Based on the 
results of these analyses, the current study concluded that the 
information security culture measurement model has nomological 
validity. 
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Table 6.6: Correlations among the Components of Security Culture with the Factors 
Influencing Security Culture 
 Top Management 
Involvement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Training  Factors 
Influencing 
Security 
Culture 
Awareness .376 .467 .463 .511 
Ownership .320 .369 .418 .431 
Factors 
Constituting 
Security 
Culture 
.395 .477 .498 .535 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
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Figure 6.5: Nomological Validity of the Information Security Culture Measurement 
Model 
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6.5 Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter detailed the analysis procedures and the assessment 
results for the information security culture model developed in Chapter 
4. The chapter began by providing an overview of the analytical 
technique, namely, structure equation modelling (SEM). SEM was 
utilized to assess and refine the theoretically developed model. The 
analysis procedures comprised an assessment of SEM measurement 
model components. The assessment results indicated that the specified 
measurement model possessed acceptable levels of fit, convergent 
validity, and discriminant validity. Additionally, this chapter compared 
the assessment results of the information security culture 
measurement model to the alternative measurement model results 
which also shows that our information security culture measurement 
has more parsimonious representation and better indices fit than the 
alternative measurement model. Afterwards, the hypothesis relationship 
was tested using a SEM measurement model and the nomological 
validity of the information security culture measurement model in 
which both hypotheses were supported.  
 244 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion  
245 
Chapter 7: Conclusion  
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the research project, restates the research 
problem and lists the research questions. Contributions of the current 
study to existing knowledge are examined. Implications for academia 
and for practice are provided, followed by limitations of the research 
and recommendations for future research.  
7.2 Overview 
Information security and its management are concerned with people, 
processes and technology. Whilst the technology itself is relatively 
objective by nature, the people and processes are influenced by the 
environment in which they operate. People and processes are influenced 
by human behaviour which might in turn substantially influence the 
management of information security. Numerous academics have argued 
that the human dimension in information security forms its weakest 
link (Chia et al., 2002, 2002b; Chia et al., 2003; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007, 
2009; Da Veiga. et al., 2007; Martins & Eloff, 2002; Maynard & 
Ruighaver, 2002; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003, 2005; van Niekerk & von 
Solms, 2003; van Niekerk & von Solms, 2005, 2006). Thus, the creation 
of a security culture is essential and inevitable for organisations to 
enhance the effectiveness of managing information security (M. Eloff & 
von Solms, 2000; S. von Solms, 2000).  
The challenges and significance of the current study surpass identifying 
security culture as a major information security management issue in 
Saudi Arabian organisations. The significance of the current study lies 
in conceptualizing and exploring critical factors that constitute a 
security culture. An examination of information security culture is not 
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an easy task because great complexity surrounds the creation of such a 
culture. Another challenging task is to understand the factors that 
influence or create security culture. Therefore, the importance of the 
current study is to be able understand what constitutes an information 
security culture. Factors that could influence security culture were 
investigated including the initial understanding of the relationship 
between these factors and factors constituting or reflecting security 
culture. The current study was one of the earliest in the information 
security culture area to develop a reliable and valid information security 
culture measurement model as a major contribution to this area of 
research. The data was conducted using a highly reliable approach. The 
current study did not offer any financial compensation to any 
participants. In fact, many participants have written notes indicating a 
great interest in the findings of the current study because of the 
importance of creating a security culture environment to improve 
security practices. The approach adopted ensured that the data 
collected from the participants were honest since there was no reason, 
other than altruistic, for any respondent to participate in this study.  
7.3 The Research Problem 
The research problem addressed in the current study is: 
What are the characteristics that conceptualize an information 
security culture measurement model for Saudi Arabian 
organisations? 
To address the research problem, an exploratory qualitative interview 
phase was conducted in order to identify security culture factors in 
addition to factors that influence the creation of a security culture. The 
outcome of the qualitative interviews revealed that lack of a security 
culture is a major concern in Saudi Arabian organisations. Additionally, 
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the qualitative interviews also revealed interesting elements that could 
constitute a security culture. Moreover, many interesting factors were 
found to have influence on a security culture. The outcomes of the 
qualitative interviews were synthesized with a literature review analysis 
to develop the information security culture measurement model. Then, 
quantitative instruments were used to test and validate the security 
culture measurement model. To address the research problem, three 
research questions were formed, which were: 
RQ1: What are the factors that constitute or reflect security 
culture in the Saudi context? 
To address this question, a literature review of various perspectives and 
theories in information security management, and more particularly on 
information security culture, was conducted in order to identify factors 
that constitute or reflect security culture. Lack of agreement as to what 
constitutes a security culture creates potential confusion for academic 
and professional researchers. The current study aimed at easing this 
confusion by taking a further step in the literature analysis by 
attempting to identify elements that reflect security culture. However, 
before developing the research model, the key issues first needed to be 
identified. The identification process began with open ended, 
exploratory, qualitative interviews with various information security 
management experts in different Saudi Arabian organisations, covering 
a wide range of industries, sizes and types. Based on the qualitative 
interview findings, a security culture can be said to be constituted by 
reflecting on three major factors: security awareness, security 
compliance and security ownership. These factors were found to be 
critical, essential and important in the exploratory qualitative 
interviews. The qualitative interview findings were confirmed with 
various information security culture literature analyses which 
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illustrated the existence of these information security cultural factors in 
similar contexts.   
RQ2: What are the factors that have direct influence on 
information security culture in the Saudi context? 
A comprehensive review was conducted of information security culture 
current literature. The purpose was to identify a set of candidates for 
building a conceptual model. However, the literature review analyses 
have so far not clearly identified what factors could influence or drive 
the creation of a security culture. As a result, exploratory qualitative 
interviews with various information security management experts in 
different Saudi Arabian organisations, covering a wide range of 
industries, sizes and types was launched in order to achieve this goal. 
Based on the qualitative interview findings, factors influencing security 
culture were found to be: top management involvement in information 
security, information security policy enforcement, information security 
policy maintenance, security training and ethical conduct policies. The 
importance of these factors on security culture creation was discussed 
in various literatures. For example, top management involvement in 
creating a security aware culture is  considered an essential element for 
creating a security culture (Chia et al., 2002; Schlienger & Teufel, 2002, 
2003). Enforcing the security policy was an essential factor for the 
creation of a security culture (R. von Solms & S. von Solms, 2004; 
Vroom & von Solms, 2004). Training and communicating the security 
policy was also a key element for creating a security culture (Furnell et 
al., 2001; Lichtenstein & Swatman, 2001; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003; 
Tarimo, 2006). Additionally, familiarity with and understanding of 
ethical commitment through existing ethical policies will assist the 
creation of a security culture (Institute of Internal Auditors, 2001; 
Mears & von Solms, 2004). The qualitative interviews revealed a wide 
Chapter 7: Conclusion  
249 
range of factors that are essential for the creation of a security culture. 
For more detail, refer to Chapters 2 and 4. However, the outcome of the 
qualitative interviews also led to a refinement of the conceptual model 
constructs when ‘maintaining the security policy’ was found to be an 
essential factor for the creation of a security culture. Furthermore, the 
outcome of the interviews undermined the importance of ‘direct 
influence of national and organisational culture’ on Saudi Arabian 
organisations and this consideration will be excluded later in the survey 
design questionnaires.  
RQ3: How can a reliable and valid information security culture 
measurement model be developed?  
This study sought, primarily, to develop and validate a reliable 
information security culture measure, and secondly to gain an initial 
understanding of the relationship between factors influence security 
culture on factors constitute or reflect security culture. The information 
security culture proposed model was developed based on the outcome of 
the qualitative interviews and the synthesized literature review analysis. 
The outcome was security culture can be said to be constituted by 
reflecting on three major factors: security awareness, security 
compliance and security ownership. Additionally, factors influencing 
security culture were found to be: top management involvement in 
information security, information security policy enforcement, 
information security policy maintenance, security training and ethical 
conduct policies. Afterwards, the proposed model was tested using the 
quantitative assessment throughout chapter 5B and chapter 6. Then, 
the information security culture measurement proposed model was 
refined with an information security culture measurement model. The 
research data in this study offered a nomological validity to the 
conceptualization of an information security culture measurement 
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model. The findings in this study support the assertion that a security 
culture consists of security awareness and security ownership. 
Information security culture was measured as a reflection of security 
awareness and security ownership. The findings also support our 
assertion that factors influencing security culture consist of three 
factors: top management involvement; policy enforcement; and training. 
The information security culture measurement model instruments that 
were demonstrated produced excellent reliability estimates, and 
evidence also supported their content validity, discriminant validity, 
convergent validity, and nomological validity. Factors influencing 
security culture were found to be significantly and positively predictive 
of factors constituting or reflecting security culture. (β = .652, p < .01). 
These findings supported the nomological validity of the security culture 
model. With respect to the security culture, the findings indicate that 
security culture is positively associated with security awareness and 
security ownership. With respect to the factors that influence security 
culture, the findings indicate that factors that influence security culture 
are positively associated with top management involvement, policy 
enforcement and training. In addition, positive correlations, consistent 
with theoretical predictions, were obtained between factors influencing 
security and factors constituting or reflecting security culture. These 
correlations provide further support to the nomological validity of the 
security culture measurement model. The outcome of the current study 
consolidates security culture literature and could serve as a basis for 
future inquiries in this area. However, certainly the current study 
cannot claim that the model is the final word on security culture. 
Therefore, more work in the future is expected.   
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7.4 Contributions 
The majority of past research on information security culture has 
provided a great deal of knowledge concerning the current state of the 
study area and important critical aspects affecting the creation of 
information security culture. However, the distinction between what 
factors constitute security culture and what factors influence or drive 
security culture have not been substantially examined and particularly 
not from an empirical standpoint. In an attempt to fill the research gap 
and to contribute to the existing body of knowledge, this research 
developed an information security culture measurement model that also 
provides an initial understanding of the relationship between factors 
influencing security culture and factors constituting or reflecting 
security culture. The study model is strongly supported by empirical 
evidence using quantitative assessment.  
The study’s contributions include: 
• The current study underpinned or identified what constitute a 
security culture through an extensive review of the literature and 
exploratory qualitative interviews. Researchers have not defined 
what aspects are necessary to create or constitute a security 
culture. No prior academic and professional research was found 
dedicated to addressing what constitutes security culture. Being 
able to understand critical factors that constitute or reflect 
security culture is a major challenge that required a synthesis of 
the literature incorporated with the qualitative interviews 
findings. This will serve as a foundation for an early 
understanding of information security culture creation. This 
constitution of information security culture reflective behaviour is 
considered a very important contribution to the information 
security culture research area since there is otherwise a lack of 
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clear definition and conceptualization. This work substantiates 
the claim that security culture is a reflection of security 
awareness, compliance and ownership. So if individuals within an 
organisational setting demonstrate high awareness of information 
security practices and procedures, follow the security policy, and 
feel the responsibility and ownership for protecting information 
security, a security culture is most likely to be created.  
• The current study identified and conceptualized factors that 
influence security culture based on evidence from the literature 
review and qualitative interview findings. This resulted in the 
operationalising of these constructs where prior academic 
instruments have failed to do so. This substantiated the claim 
that factors influencing security culture are: top management 
involvement, policy enforcement, policy maintenance, training 
and ethical conduct policies. 
• The current study operationalised information security culture 
measurement model constructs through a literature review, 
qualitative interviews and an appropriate ‘construction of scales’ 
methodological approach. An operationalised information security 
culture measurement model process required careful effort from 
the researcher in order to represent the security culture reflection 
constructs in addition to factors that influence security culture 
accurately. The item operationalisation process included a 
rigorous review of the literature and conceptualization of items 
representing security culture, factors that influence security 
culture as the current study proposed to conceptualize it. Use of 
panel experts had ensured the content validity of constructs 
through the constructions of scale process and that statements 
reflected the measurement for each construct.  
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• The current study added substantively to the literature 
concerning the factors influencing security culture and factors 
constituting or reflecting security culture in Saudi organisations. 
This includes providing an initial understanding of the 
relationship between factors influencing security culture and 
factors constituting or reflecting security culture- areas in which 
no prior academic literature had addressed the relationship 
specifically in the Saudi context. In order to fill an existing gap in 
the literature, the current study developed an information 
security culture measurement model which was designed to 
assist in better understanding the relationship between factors 
influencing security culture and factors constituting or reflecting 
security culture. A better understanding of such relationships can 
provide a better picture of how to more successfully develop an 
information security culture in Saudi Arabian organisations. This 
understanding will improve the understanding of information 
security culture amongst information security practitioners.  
• The outcome of the current study was an information security 
culture measurement model that was found to be reliable through 
Cronbach’s alpha and item total correlation. The information 
security culture measurement model was the first study, as far as 
the researcher is aware of, to empirically validate the 
conceptualization of factors pertaining to security culture. 
Additionally, the current study is one of the earliest studies to 
validate information security culture measurement with various 
validation techniques such as exploratory factor analysis to 
indicate the relationship between constructs and confirmatory 
factor analysis. The final outcomes provided robust structures 
that serve as a basis for subsequent model assessment. The 
information security culture measurement model was refined and 
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then the first study in the information security culture area 
assessed using advanced statistical instruments such as SEM 
techniques to ensure the nomological validity of the research 
model. This is a thorough approach to assessing the information 
security culture model. 
 
7.5 Implications 
There are two implications (Research and practice) for the current 
study.  
7.5.1 Implications for Research 
It is essential to assess and understand the existence of important 
factors that influence information security culture in order to create a 
security culture. To achieve this goal, the current study developed an 
information security culture measurement model in order to 
understand security culture creation in Saudi Arabian organisations. 
The current study’s major beneficial contribution lies in providing a 
reliable and valid information security culture measurement model. 
Secondly, the information security culture model will also initially assist 
in assessing the relationship between factors influence security culture 
on factors constitute or reflect security culture. The following headings 
summarize the research implications for the current study.  
• The current study assists academic researchers to identify 
research gaps in the information security culture field, including 
identifying further empirical research needed in this area. This 
includes examining information security culture in different 
environment such as Western society. Therefore, the current 
study assists in filling a major gap in the area of information 
Chapter 7: Conclusion  
255 
security culture. This includes developing a reliable and valid 
information security culture measurement model that could be 
replicated in other environment. Furthermore,  
• The current study’s research model provides a reference point for 
a wide range of empirical studies that could be conducted in 
order to further test the model. For instance, the research model 
for the current study can be conducted in several other contexts 
or environments. The research model in the current study can be 
treated as a cornerstone to guide future empirical researchers in 
information security culture areas. The security culture 
constructs in this study can be used as dependent variable in 
other studies. This will assist in gaining insight into factors that 
influence information security culture and hence managerial 
insights into how to manage and enhance information security 
culture. 
• The data analysis of the current study shows a demand for 
deeper research at the organisational level. Further research is 
needed to examine the differences between organisational staff 
roles with respect to information security experience. The 
outcome would provide further understanding of the various 
perceptions of security culture.  
• From a methodological standpoint, the current study has two 
major contributions to information system security research. It 
illustrates that a mixed method research design using a mix of 
qualitative and quantitative methods can be conducted in 
information security. The current study provides exploratory 
qualitative interviews that assist in developing an information 
security culture measurement model in developing countries such 
as Saudi Arabia. The current study demonstrates that qualitative 
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interviews are valuable in exploring new insights and developing 
relationships between constructs. The second methodological 
contribution is provided through an operationalisation of 
information security culture measurement model constructs. The 
current study demonstrates that quantitative assessment was 
valuable validating the nomological net of information security 
culture developed model. Additionally, the quantitative 
assessment assists in exploring the initial understanding of the 
relationship between model constructs such as factors that 
influence security culture and factors that constitute or reflect 
security culture. These two methodologies provide a useful tool to 
assist researchers in carrying out empirical studies associated 
with security culture. Thus, the current study’s contributions 
encourage the utilization of a mixed method approach in 
investigating the phenomenon of security culture and support the 
replication of the study in similar contexts.  
7.5.2 Implications for Practice 
The current study presents a quantitative assessment that can be used 
by information security managers and practitioners to measure security 
culture and the usefulness for creating a security culture. The 
instruments presented were designed with academic rigour and tested 
across multiple phases with empirical data. The research model was 
statistically tested for validity and reliability with 254 Saudi Arabian 
participants representing different industries, types, sizes and roles in 
Saudi Arabian organisations. The research model offers a number of 
observations that can guide managers in organisations to enhance the 
creation of a security culture. The observations are: 
• The current study assists information security managers in 
developing important aspects of information security that will 
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lead to the creation of a security culture. The research model 
provides management with the means to implement effective 
information security management approaches. These approaches 
will provide a single point of reference for managing information 
security to inculcate an acceptable level of security culture. These 
approaches include providing guides to managers in 
understanding the importance of top management involvement 
for the creation of security culture, in particular by enforcing and 
communicating the security policy. The presence of these factors 
substantially positively influences the creation of a security 
culture.   
• This research helped in minimizing the threats that the behaviour 
of employees pose to the protection of an organisation’s 
information assets. The information security measurement model 
facilitates the understanding of information security culture and 
of elements that could reinforce the security culture. By 
understanding security culture reflection factors such as security 
awareness, security compliance and security ownership, 
management can assist in directing the interaction of humans 
with information security in order to contribute to the protection 
of information assets. 
7.6 Limitations 
The following points summarize several possible limitations of the 
current study: 
• Since there was a lack of prior instruments that could be used for 
the current study, most of the survey items were derived from the 
qualitative interviews and literature review in addition to the 
feedback from the panel experts. As a result, the process for 
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deriving items was relatively subjective. However, the current 
study implemented an iterative process in which multiple sources 
of evidence were integrated. This evidence included a literature 
review, qualitative interviews and expert panel feedback. The 
survey instrument was piloted to enhance the construct validity. 
The lack of prior instruments has demonstrated the difficulties 
and challenges to operationalise the constructs that illustrated 
and addressed this gap and significant contributions for the 
current study. 
• This study was unable to adequately develop a valid scale for the 
“ethical conduct policies”, “policy maintenance”, and “security 
compliance” constructs. Hence, the relationships related to these 
concepts could not be empirically analysed. Nevertheless, the 
literature analysis has suggested the importance of these three 
factors which implies that policy maintenance and ethical 
conduct policy factors would influence security culture creation. 
In addition, “security compliance” construct was not validated as 
expected. Perhaps, further research is needed in this area in 
order to operationalise these constructs.  
• The model testing results had not taken into considerations for 
the following control variables (which may produce different 
statistic results): industry type, organization size, age, education 
level and number of security staff in a company.  
• The research findings may not be generalised to other developing 
countries since national culture is likely to affect the information 
security culture as discuss in the literature review section 2.9.1 
even though national culture is not a significant factor in the 
finalised model.  
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• Another limitation is the survey respondent. According to the 
survey respondent, over 53% of the respondents are security staff 
and IT staff, who are information-security sensitive and develop 
higher knowledge than other staff outside the IT department. 
7.7 Future Research 
Future research may include the following: 
• Understanding information security culture from different 
perspective such as what factors could constitute or reflect 
information security culture in other environment.  
• Expansion of our information security measurement model to 
other countries in the region, such as other Middle Eastern 
countries.  
• Gathering measures of variables from different data sources to 
minimize the effect of response bias.   
• Expanding the information security measurement model to 
statistically confirm the measurement scale for the “ethical 
conduct policies” “policy maintenance”, and “security compliance” 
constructs. 
• Including organisational and national culture in the security 
culture model and investigating the influence of these factors on 
security culture.  
• Conducting a comparative analysis between Saudi organisations 
and other developed countries such as Australia or the USA.  
• Conducting case studies or focus groups to gather rich contextual 
data on different means of achieving the creation of a security 
culture in developing countries such as Saudi Arabia. 
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• Replicating the study in different environments (Europe, North 
America and Australia) with different demographic groups. 
• Identifying the challenges for the creation of a security culture 
specifically in small and medium enterprises.  
7.8 Conclusion  
This research study was conducted in response to the need for more 
empirical studies that focus on the development of information security 
culture measurement. To achieve the aim of the study, an information 
security culture model comprising factors influencing security culture 
and factors constituting or reflecting security culture was developed 
based on qualitative interview findings and a literature review. Then the 
information security culture model was assessed and refined using a 
series of quantitative techniques, specifically Exploratory Factor 
Analysis (EFA), Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), Structural 
Equation Modelling (SEM), and nomological validity. These techniques 
were conducted based on the data obtained from a questionnaire survey 
of Saudi Arabian organisations. The current study contributed to 
existing knowledge by providing a valid and reliable information 
security measurement model in addition to providing an initial 
understanding of the relationship between factors influencing security 
culture and factors constituting or reflecting security culture. The 
current study provided practical implications to Saudi organisations by 
offering a model that could explain and provide information about a 
security culture measurement model. The model could serve as a 
framework for Saudi organisations to improve security culture creation. 
Finally, the current study closed with future work recommendations 
that may assist researchers to enhance and extend the findings of this 
study. 
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Appendix A  
0 Tell me about your department structure 
This information gives a baseline indication of the purpose and structure 
of your department. This is necessary since information security culture 
needs to actively support the business function of your organisation. 
0.1 Government, semi-government, private. 
0.2 Size of department/organisation? (Number of Employees) 
0.3 Type of Industry? 
0.4 Accountable to? 
0.5 Extent of ICT centralization or decentralization? 
0.6 Please list briefly the most important main/core services of your 
organisations/department? 
 
1. Could you please talk about security culture in your 
organisation? 
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2. Please indicate, and give examples of, how information security 
culture can be created in your organisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. What do you consider to be the main contributory factors to 
create an effective information security culture in your 
organisation? 
 
 
 
 
 
4. What are the factors that influence security culture in your 
organisation? 
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5. What are the main barriers to address the lack of information 
security awareness? Please explain. 
 
 
 
6. How can you improve security compliance in your organisation? 
Please explain. 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Please indicate, and give examples of, how information security 
culture in your organisation are affected by: cultural factors at 
three levels: 
National: 
 
 
 
 
Organizational: 
 
 
 
 
Individual
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Appendix B: Survey  
Consent Form 
Dear Prospective Participant, 
I am Mohammed Abdullah Alnatheer, a PhD candidate at Queensland University of 
Technology, working toward a doctorate degree in Information Technology. You are 
invited to take part in a research study which focuses on investigating information 
security culture in Saudi Arabia. To participate, please read the following: 
Title: Investigate the Information Security Culture in Saudi Arabia. 
Purpose: is to provide: 1) insights into the influence of information security practices 
factors on security behavior. 
Procedure: your participation will involve completing the enclosed questionnaire, 
which comprises some background questions, and statements about your perception 
of information security practices. This study will take approximately 10-15 minutes. 
Potential benefits: your participation will help to understand the influence of 
information security practices factors on information security behavior in your 
particular organisation. 
Confidentiality: confidentiality of the information you provide is assured. The 
questionnaire forms do not require you to identify yourself, and only grouped data will 
be used in the research. The information collected will be only used for the purpose of 
this study. If you would like to receive a feedback on this study, please provide your e-
mail address below: 
Mechanism for questionnaire distribution and return: a pre-paid envelope is 
enclosed for the return of the questionnaire by 31 May 2010. Follow-up 
communications will be sent to all potential respondents after a period of two weeks. 
As the questionnaires are completed anonymously, the entire research sample will 
receive a follow-up communication. Therefore, please ignore future communications if 
you have already completed and returned the questionnaire.  
The ethical conduct of this research: This research has been reviewed and approved 
by Chair, the University Human Research Ethics Committee, Queensland University of 
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Technology in accordance with the national statement on ethical conduct in research 
involving humans. If potential participants have any concerns or complaints about the 
ethical conduct of the research, please feel free to contact the Research Ethics Support 
Officer on (+61 7) 3138 5123 or email ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. Any complaint you 
make will be treated in confidence and investigated, and you will be informed of the 
outcome. 
Consent of Research Participant: Your consent to participate in this research will be 
indicated by completing and returning the questionnaire. Please detach this 
sheet/cover letter and retain it for your later reference. 
 
Your cooperation in participating in this research is deeply appreciated. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Mohammed Abdullah Alnatheer 
Queensland University of Technology  
School of Science and Technology 
Phone: (+966) 504 408 459 or  (+61) 421 662 928 
Email:  mohammed.alnatheer@student.qut.edu.au     or     ma.alnatheer@gmail.com 
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Background Information 
1. Type of organisation:  
 Private   Public  Non-profit   
Semi-public 
 Other _______________ 
2. The number of people working in my organisation: 
20 and less  21–99  100–499  
500–999  
 1000–2999  3000-4999  5000-9999 
More than 10000 
3. Organization industry: 
Financial  Insurance  Healthcare 
Telecommunication 
 Construction  Consulting  Manufacturing 
Petrochemical 
 Transportation  Agriculture  Education  
Merchandising 
 Oil & Gas  Retail  IT  
Energy 
 Information & communication technology  Wholesale merchandising  
Other _______________ 
4. Organization age: 
 0–3 4–6  7–10 
 11–20  More than 20  Do not know 
5. Does your organisation have a separate information security management 
(ISM) department? 
 Yes  No  Do not know 
6. Number of information security staff in your organisation: 
 0   1–5  6–10  11–
20 
 21–50  More than 50  Do not know 
7. Job title: 
 Department/Operational Manager   Chief Information Officer  IT 
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Manager  
 Security Manager    Security Officer  IT 
Staff 
Security Staff    Operation Staff (e.g., 
Administrator, Clerical, Sales)  
 Technical Staff    Other _______________ 
8. Your age: 
 20 and less  21 – 30   31 – 40 
 41 – 50  51 – 60  More than 60 
9. Your education level is: 
 Doctoral    Master  Bachelor  
Diploma  High School  Other _______________ 
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Section I:  Information Security Practices and Behavior Statements 
Each statement in this section starts with “in my organisation, I think” 
Statements Strongl
y Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Not 
Applicabl
e 
Top management 
considers information 
security an important 
organisational 
priority. 
      
Senior management gives 
strong and consistent 
support to the 
security program. 
      
Senior management is 
always involved in 
key information 
security activities. 
      
Management ensures that 
appropriate 
individuals are made 
responsible for 
specific information 
security aspects. 
      
Management ensures that 
everyone who takes 
information security 
actions, and makes 
information security 
decisions and is held 
accountable for their 
decisions and actions 
      
Information security 
practices and 
procedures are 
continually 
monitored to ensure 
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compliance with 
security policy. 
Information security 
practices and 
procedures are 
externally audited. 
      
Information security 
violations are 
reported to the 
proper authority. 
      
Actions against violations 
are always taken. 
      
Information security 
policy is clearly 
defined. 
      
Information security 
policy is consistently 
reviewed and updated 
on periodical basis.  
      
Assessing risks to 
information security 
is regular. 
      
Risk assessments are 
conducted prior to 
developing new security 
policies. 
 
 
     
I receive adequate 
information security 
training. 
      
Information security 
policy is 
communicated well. 
      
I am always educated or 
trained about new security 
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policies. 
I am familiar with the 
policy on professional 
conduct.  
      
I am familiar with the 
policy on code of 
conduct.  
      
I am familiar with the 
policy on conflict of 
interest. 
      
I am aware of my 
information security 
roles and 
responsibilities. 
      
I am aware of the risk of 
not following the 
information security 
policy. 
      
I am familiar with 
information security 
policy. 
      
I am aware of the 
procedures for reporting 
security policy violations. 
      
I always adhere to the 
information security 
policy. 
      
Others around adhere to 
the information 
security policy in a 
similar manner. 
      
It is my responsibility to 
protect the 
information of my 
organisation. 
      
I take ownership of the 
outcomes of my 
information security 
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decisions and 
actions.    
Protecting information 
security is an 
important part of my 
job. 
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 نموذج موافقة
 أعزائي المشاركين 
 بعد التحية، 
، مرشح للحصول على درجة الدكتوراه من جامعة كوينزلاند للتكنولوجيا، وأعمل من اجل الحصول على درجة محمد عبد الله النذيرأنا/ 
تحري ثقافة أمن المعلومات في المملكة الدكتوراه في تكنولوجيا المعلومات. سيادتكم مدعوين للمشاركة في دراسة بحثية تركز على 
  قراءة التالي: . للمشاركة في الدراسة، يرجى العربية السعودية
 العنوان: تحري ثقافة أمن المعلومات في المملكة العربية السعودية.  
 الغرض: توفير التالي: 1( نظرة على تأثير عوامل ممارسات أمن المعلومات على السلوك الأمني 
الإجراء: تنضوي مشاركتكم على إكمال الاستبيان المرفق، والذي يتكون من بعض الأسئلة الأساسية وبيانات بشأن تصوركم لممارسات 
  دقيقة.  51-أمن المعلومات وتوجه الثقافة السلوكية والتنظيمية. تستغرق هذه الدراسة ما يقارب 
الفوائد المتوقعة: تساعد مشاركتكم في فهم تأثير عوامل ممارسات تكنولوجيا المعلومات على سلوك أمن المعلومات على مستوى 
 المؤسسة التي تعملون بها . 
السرية: نضمن لكم سرية المعلومات المقدمة من قبلكم في هذا الاستبيان. لا تتطلب نماذج الاستبيان منكم التعريف بأنفسكم، وسيتم 
سيتم استخدام المعلومات التي تم تحصيلها في أغراض الدراسة فقط. إذا كنتم استخدام البيانات التي تم تجميعها في أغراض البحث فقط. 
 ترغبون في استلام تعليق بشأن هذه الدراسة، يرجى كتابة عنوان بريدكم الإلكتروني أدناه: 
  ــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ
آلية توزيع وإعادة الاستبيان: تم إرفاق مظروف مسبق الدفع لإعادة الاستبيان بحلول 13 مايو 0102م. سيتم إرسال مراسلات 
ترة أسبوعين. ومع اكتمال الاستبيانات على نحو مبهم، ستتسلم كامل عينة البحث مراسلات المتابعة لجميع المستجيبين المحتملين بعد ف
 المتابعة. لذلك، نرجو منكم تجاهل الاتصالات في المستقبل إذا قمتم بالفعل بإكمال وإعادة الاستبيان.
أخلاقيات الأبحاث البشرية بالجامعة وجامعة : تمت مراجعة هذا البحث واعتماده من قبل الرئيس ولجنة الانضباط الأخلاقي لهذا البحث
كوينزلاند للتكنولوجيا طبقا للبيان الوطني للانضباط الأخلاقي في الأبحاث التي تشمل البشر. وإذا كنت هنالك أية مخاوف أو شكاوى من 
على الرقم التالي  قبل المشاركين المحتملين بشان الانضباط الأخلاقي للبحث، يرجى الاتصال بمكتب دعم أخلاقيات البحث
. سيتم التعامل مع أي شكوى من قبلكم Uua.ude.tuq@tcatnocscihteU أو على البريد الإلكتروني  3215831371600
 بسرية تامة والتحري بشأنها ومن ثم إبلاغكم بالنتيجة.   
الموافقة على المشاركة في البحث: يتم تحديد موافقتكم على المشاركة في هذا البحث عن طريق إكمال وإعادة الاستبيان. يرجى عدم 
 إرفاق هذا الغلاف والاحتفاظ به كمرجعية لكم فيما بعد. 
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 شاكرين مقدرين تعاونكم من خلال المشاركة بهذا البحث. 
 ولكم التحية،،، 
 محمد عبد الله النذير 
  يا جامعة كوينزلاند للتكنولوج
 كلية العلوم والتكنولوجيا 
  8292661241600أو  95480440566900: هاتف
 Umoc.liamg@reehtanla.amU أو   Uua.ude.tuq.tneduts@reehtanla.demmahomU : البريد الإلكتروني
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 معلومات أساسية
  نوع المؤسسة  .4
شبه   غير ربحية   عامة   خاصة     
 عامة 
  أخرى ــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ     
 عدد الأشخاص العاملين في المؤسسة:  .5
-005   994-001   99-12  فيما أقل  02 
  999
أكثر من   999-0005  9994-0003  9992-0001 
   00001
 صناعة المؤسسة   .6
  رعاية صحية   تأمين   مالية  
 اتصالات 
  تصنيع   استشارات   معمار  
 بتروكيماويات 
 تجارة   تعليم   زراعة   نقل  
 طاقة   تكنولوجيا معلومات   تجارة تجزئة   غاز ونفط  
 أخرى ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ  تجارة جملة   تكنولوجيا معلومات واتصالات 
 عمر المؤسسة  .7
  01-7  6-4   3-0 
 لا أعلم   02أكثر من   02-11 
 (؟ MSIهل يوجد لدى مؤسستك إدارة مستقلة لإدارة أمن المعلومات ) .8
  لا أعلم     لا     نعم    
 عدد موظفين أمن المعلومات في المؤسسة  .9
-11  01-6  5-1  0 
 02
 لا اعلم    05أكثر من   05-12 
 المسمى الوظيفي:  .01
 مدير تكنولوجيا المعلومات  الرئيس التنفيذي لإدارة المعلومات  مدير القسم/التشغيل  
 موظف تكنولوجيا المعلومات   مسئول أمني   مدير أمني  
 موظف تشغيل )مثل إداري أو عمل كتابي أو مبيعات(   موظف أمني  
 أخرى ــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ   موظف فني  
 عمرك  .11
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 04-13  03-12  سنة فيما أقل  02 
 عام  06أكثر من   06-15  05-14 
 المستوى التعليمي:  .21
 بكالوريوس   ماجستير   دكتوراه  
 
 أخرى ـــــــــــــــــــــ  مدرسة ثانوية   دبلوم  
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 (: بيانات ممارسات وسلوكيات أمن المعلومات 1القسم الأول )
 "في مؤسستي، أعتقد بأن"يبدأ كل بيان في هذا القسم بجملة 
لا 
 ينطبق
لا أوافق 
 بشدة
 البيان أوافق بشدة أوافق محايد لا أوافق
ترى الإدارة العليا أن أمن المعلومات من بين أهم أولويات       
 المؤسسة 
 تقدم الإدارة العليا دعما قويا ومستمرا للبرنامج الأمني       
تنخرط الإدارة العليا بشكل دائم في الأنشطة الأمنية       
 الأساسية 
تتأكد الإدارة من تولي الأشخاص المناسبين المسئولية عن       
 جوانب محددة في تكنولوجيا المعلومات 
تؤكد الإدارة بخضوع أي شخص يقوم بالتصرف بشأن أمن       
المعلومات ويتخذ قرارات تتعلق بأمن المعلومات 
للمسائلة عن القرارات أو التصرفات التي قام بها   
  
تتم مراقبة ممارسات وإجراءات أمن المعلومات بشكل       
 مستمر لضمان الالتزام بالسياسة الأمنية 
تخضع ممارسات وإجراءات أمن المعلومات للمراجعة       
 الخارجية  
 يتم إبلاغ السلطات المعنية بأي انتهاكات لأمن المعلومات       
 الانتهاكاتيتم اتخاذ إجراءات في الغالب ضد       
 سياسة أمن المعلومات محددة بوضوح        
تتم مراجعة سياسة أمن المعلومات باتساق ويتم تحديثها       
 بشكل دوري 
 يتم تقييم المخاطر بشان أمن المعلومات بشكل منتظم       
يتم إجراء تقييمات المخاطرة قبل تطوير سياسات أمنية       
 جديدة 
 أحصل على تدريب مناسب بشأن أمن المعلومات       
 يتم إبلاغ سياسة تكنولوجيا المعلومات بشكل جيد       
أحصل في الغالب على تعليم وتدريب بشأن السياسات       
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 الأمنية الجديدة 
 أنا مطلع على سياسة الانضباط المهني       
 أنا مطلع على سياسة قانون الانضباط       
 أنا مطلع على سياسة تعارض المصالح       
 أنا على دراية بمهامي ومسئولياتي حيال أمن المعلومات       
 أنا على دراية بخطر عدم التقيد بسياسة أمن المعلومات       
 أنا مطلع على سياسة أمن المعلومات       
أنا على دراية بإجراءات الإبلاغ عن انتهاكات أمن       
 المعلومات 
 أنا ملتزم دائما بسياسة أمن المعلومات       
يلتزم بقية الموظفين المتواجدين بسياسة أمن المعلومات       
 بطريقة مماثلة 
 أنا مسئول عن حماية معلومات مؤسستي       
أتحمل نتائج قراراتي وتصرفاتي فيما يتعلق بأمن       
 المعلومات 
 حماية أمن المعلومات جزء هام من عملي.       
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Appendix B2: Screenshots of online Survey in English and 
Arabic 
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Appendix C: Scale Development Material 
Appendix C1.1: Initial Candidate Items for Top Management Involvement  
Number Item Originally Adopted 
Top Management Involvement 
TPM1 My organisation has annual budget for information 
security 
(Chaula, 2006) 
TPM2 In this organisation, the management perceives 
information security as important 
(Da Viega, Eloff, 
2007) 
TPM3 Top management considers information security an 
important organisational priority. 
(Knapp, 2006) 
TPM4 Top executives are interested in security issues. (Knapp, 2006) 
TPM5 Top management takes security issues into account 
when planning corporate strategies. 
(Knapp, 2006) 
TPM6 Senior leadership’s words and actions demonstrate 
that security is a priority. 
(Knapp, 2006) 
TPM7 Visible support for security goals by senior 
management is obvious. 
(Knapp, 2006) 
TPM8 Senior management gives strong and consistent 
support to the security program. 
(Knapp, 2006) 
TPM9 Senior management is always involved in key 
information security activities 
Qualitative Data 
and experts 
feedback/input 
TPM10 Management ensures that appropriate individuals are 
made responsible for specific aspects of information 
security 
Qualitative Data 
and experts 
feedback/input 
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TPM11 Management ensures that everyone who takes 
information security actions, and makes information 
security decisions and is held accountable for their 
decisions and actions 
Qualitative Data 
and experts 
feedback/input 
 
Appendix C1.2: Initial Candidate Items for Policy Enforcement 
Number Item Originally Adopted 
Information Security Policy Enforcement 
PE1 Information security policy are consistently 
enforced across the organisation 
(Knapp, 2006) 
PE2 Information security policies are selectively enforced (Knapp, 2006) 
PE3 I understand the ramifications for violating security 
policies 
(Knapp, 2006) 
PE4 Security practices are properly monitored for policy 
violations 
(Knapp, 2006) 
PE5 Information security policy violations are reported 
to the proper authority 
(Knapp, 2006) 
PE6 Employees whom caught violating important 
security policies are appropriately corrected 
(Knapp, 2006) 
PE7 Information security policy is properly enforced (Knapp, 2006) 
PE8 Information security rules are enforced by 
sanctioning the employees who break them 
(Knapp, 2006) 
PE9 Repeat security offenders are appropriately 
disciplined 
(Knapp, 2006) 
PE10 Termination is a consideration for employees who 
repeatedly break security rules 
(Knapp, 2006) 
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PE11 Information security practices and procedures are 
externally audited 
Qualitative Data 
and experts 
feedback/input 
PE12 Actions against violations are always taken Qualitative Data 
and experts 
feedback/input 
PE13 Information security practices and procedures are 
continually monitored to ensure compliance with 
security policy 
(Da Veiga, Martin, 
and Eloff, 2007 
 
Appendix C1.3: Initial Candidate Items for Policy Maintenance 
Number Item Originally 
Adopted 
Information Security Policy Maintenance 
PM1 Information security policy is consistently reviewed 
and updated on a periodical basis 
(Knapp, 2006) 
PM2 Information security policy is updated when 
technology changes require it. 
(Knapp, 2006) 
PM3 Policy is updated when legal & regulatory changes 
require it. 
(Knapp, 2006) 
PM4 An established information security policy review and 
update process exists. 
(Knapp, 2006) 
PM5 Security policy is properly updated on a regular 
basis. 
(Knapp, 2006) 
PM6 Risk assessments are conducted prior to developing 
new security policies 
(Knapp, 2006) 
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PM7 Information security policy is clearly defined (D’Arcy and 
Greene, 2009) 
PM8 Assessing risks to information security is regular (Chalua, et 
al., 2006) 
PM9 Formal security policy reviews are conducted at least 
annually. 
(Knapp, 2006) 
PM10 Information security policies are written in a manner 
that is clear and understandable. 
(Knapp, 2006) 
 
Appendix C1.4: Initial Candidate Items for Security Training 
Number Item Originally 
Adopted 
Information Security Training 
T1 Necessary efforts are made to educate employees 
about new security polices 
(Knapp, 2006) 
T2 Users receive adequate security refresher training 
appropriate for their job function 
(Knapp, 2006) 
T3 I received a formal training in information 
security. 
(D’Arcy and 
Greene, 2009) 
T4 My organisation provides good information 
security training and education to employees. 
(Knapp et al., 
2007) 
T5 
Information security policy is communicated well 
Qualitative Data 
and experts 
feedback/input 
T6 I am always educated or trained about new 
security policies 
(Knapp et al., 
2007) 
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Appendix C1.5: Initial Candidate Items for Ethical Conduct Policies 
Number Item Originally 
Adopted 
Ethical Conduct Policies 
ET1 I am familiar with the policy on Conflict of 
Interest. 
(Chaula, 2006) 
ET2 I am familiar with the policy on Professional 
Conduct. 
(Chaula, 2006) 
ET3 I am familiar with the policy on Code of Conduct 
for Officers and Administrators. 
(Chaula, 2006) 
ET4 I am familiar with the policy on reporting known 
and suspected fraud 
(Chaula, 2006) 
ET5 I am familiar with the policy on Confidential 
Information. 
(Chaula, 2006) 
 
Appendix C1.6: Initial Candidate Items for Security Awareness 
Number Item Originally 
Adopted 
Information Security Awareness 
AW1 I am aware of information security responsibilities (Chaula, 
2006) 
AW2 I am aware of any information security policy in my 
organisations 
(Knapp, 2006) 
AW3 Information security awareness is communicated 
well. 
(Knapp, 2006) 
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AW4 A variety of business communications (notices, 
posters, newsletters, etc.) are used to promote 
security awareness. 
(Knapp, 2006) 
AW5 An effective security awareness program exists. (Knapp, 2006) 
AW6 A continuous, ongoing security awareness program 
exists. 
(Knapp, 2006) 
AW7 I am familiar with the information security policy Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/inpu
t 
AW8 I am aware of the risk of not following the 
information security policy 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/inpu
t 
 
Appendix C1.7: Initial Candidate Items for Security Compliance 
Number Item Originally 
Adopted 
Information Security Compliance 
CP1 I always adhere to the information security policy (D’Arcy and 
Greene, 2009) 
CP2 Others around adhere to the information security 
policy in a similar manner 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/input 
CP3 I comply with information security with (Chaula, 2006) 
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international standards 
 
 
Appendix C1.8: Initial Candidate Items for Security Ownership 
Number Item Originally 
Adopted 
Information Security Ownership 
OW1 It is my responsibility to protect the information of 
my organisation 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/input 
OW2 I take ownership of the outcomes of my 
information security decisions and actions 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/input 
OW3 Protecting information security is an important 
part of my job 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/input 
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Appendix C2.1: Substrata Identification Results for Top Management Involvement 
Number Panel1 Panel2 Panel3 Panel4 
TPM1 Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
TPM2 Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
TPM3 Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
TPM4 Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
TPM5 Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
TPM6 Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
TPM7 Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
TPM8 Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
TPM9 Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
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Involvement 
TPM10 Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
TPM11 Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
Top 
Management 
Involvement 
 
Appendix C2.2: Substrata Identification Results for Policy Enforcement 
Number Panel1 Panel2 Panel3 Panel4 
PE1 Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
PE2 Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
PE3 Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
PE4 Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
PE5 Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
PE6 Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
PE7 Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
PE8 Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
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PE9 Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
PE10 Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
PE11 Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
PE12 Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
PE13 Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
 
Appendix C2.3: Substrata Identification Results for Policy Maintenance 
Number Panel1 Panel2 Panel3 Panel4 
PM1 Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
PM2 Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
PM3 Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
PM4 Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
PM5 Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
PM6 Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
PM7 Policy Policy Policy Policy 
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Maintenance Maintenance Maintenance Maintenance 
PM8 Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
PM9 Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
PM10 Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
Policy 
Maintenance 
 
Appendix C2.4: Substrata Identification Results for Security Training 
Number Panel1 Panel2 Panel3 Panel4 
T1 Training Training Training Training 
T2 Training Training Training Training 
T3 Training Training Training Training 
T4 Training Training Training Training 
T5 Training Training Training Training 
T6 Training Training Training Training 
 
Appendix C2.5: Substrata Identification Results for Ethical Conduct Policies 
Number Panel1 Panel2 Panel3 Panel4 
ET1 Ethical Policies Ethical Policies Ethical Policies Ethical 
Policies 
ET2 Ethical Policies Ethical Policies Ethical Policies Ethical 
Policies 
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ET3 Ethical Policies Ethical Policies Ethical Policies Ethical 
Policies 
ET4 Ethical Policies Ethical Policies Ethical Policies Ethical 
Policies 
ET5 Ethical Policies Ethical Policies Ethical Policies Ethical 
Policies 
 
Appendix C2.6: Substrata Identification Results for Security Awareness 
Number Panel1 Panel2 Panel3 Panel4 
AW1 Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
AW2 Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
AW3 Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
AW4 Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
AW5 Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
AW6 Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
AW7 Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
AW8 Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
Security 
Awareness 
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Appendix C2.7: Substrata Identification Results for Security Compliance 
Number Panel1 Panel2 Panel3 Panel4 
CP1 Security 
Compliance 
Security 
Compliance 
Security 
Compliance 
Security 
Compliance 
CP2 Security 
Compliance 
Security 
Compliance 
Security 
Compliance 
Security 
Compliance 
CP3 Security 
Compliance 
Security 
Compliance 
Security 
Compliance 
Security 
Compliance 
 
 
Appendix C2.8: Substrata Identification Results for Security Ownership 
Number Panel1 Panel2 Panel3 Panel4 
OW1 Security 
Ownership 
Security 
Ownership 
Security 
Ownership 
Security 
Ownership 
OW2 Security 
Ownership 
Security 
Ownership 
Security 
Ownership 
Security 
Ownership 
OW3 Security 
Ownership 
Security 
Ownership 
Security 
Ownership 
Security 
Ownership 
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Appendix C3.1: Expert Panel Result for Item Identification for Each Constructs: Top 
Management Involvement 
Numbe
r 
Item Originally 
Adopted 
Average 
Rank 
Decision/ 
Reword 
Justifica
tion 
Top Management Involvement 
TPM1 My 
organisation 
has annual 
budget for 
information 
security 
(Chaula, 2006) 10 Dropped Low 
Ranking 
TPM2 Management 
perceives 
information 
security as 
important 
(Da Viega, 
Eloff, 2007) 
11 Dropped Low 
Ranking 
TPM3 Top 
management 
considers 
information 
security an 
important 
organisational 
priority. 
(Knapp, 2006) 1 Retained N/A 
TPM4 Top executives 
are interested 
in security 
issues. 
(Knapp, 2006) 9 Dropped Low 
Ranking 
TPM5 Top 
management 
takes security 
(Knapp, 2006) 8 Dropped Redunda
nt 
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issues into 
account when 
planning 
corporate 
strategies. 
TPM6 Senior 
leadership’s 
words and 
actions 
demonstrate 
that security is 
a priority. 
(Knapp, 2006) 6 Dropped Redunda
nt 
TPM7 Visible support 
for security 
goals by senior 
management is 
obvious. 
(Knapp, 2006) 7 Dropped Redunda
nt 
TPM8 Senior 
management 
gives strong 
and 
consistent 
support to 
the security 
program. 
(Knapp, 2006) 2 Retained N/A 
TPM9 Senior 
management 
is always 
involved in 
key 
information 
security 
activities 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/input 
3 Retained N/A 
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TPM10 Management 
ensures that 
appropriate 
individuals 
are made 
responsible 
for specific 
aspects of 
information 
security 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/input 
4 Retained N/A 
TPM11 Management 
ensures that 
everyone who 
takes 
information 
security 
actions, and 
makes 
information 
security 
decisions and 
is held 
accountable 
for their 
decisions and 
actions 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/input 
5 Retained N/A 
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Appendix C3.2: Expert Panel Result for Item Identification for Each Constructs: Policy 
Enforcement 
Number Item Originally 
Adopted 
Average 
Rank 
Decision/ 
Reword 
Justificati
on 
Information Security Policy Enforcement 
PE1 Information 
security 
policy are 
consistently 
enforced 
across the 
organisation 
(Knapp, 2006) 12 Dropped Low 
Ranking 
PE2 Information 
security 
policies are 
selectively 
enforced 
(Knapp, 2006) 13 Dropped Low 
Ranking 
PE3 I understand 
the 
ramifications 
for violating 
security 
policies 
(Knapp, 2006) 11 Dropped Low 
Ranking 
PE4 Security 
practices are 
properly 
monitored for 
policy 
violations 
(Knapp, 2006) 6 Dropped Redunda
nt 
PE5 Information 
security 
(Knapp, 2006) 1 Retained  N/A 
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policy 
violations 
are reported 
to the proper 
authority 
PE6 Employees 
whom caught 
violating 
important 
security 
policies are 
appropriately 
corrected 
(Knapp, 2006) 5 Dropped Redunda
nt 
PE7 Information 
security 
policy is 
properly 
enforced 
(Knapp, 2006) 7 Dropped Redunda
nt 
PE8 Information 
security rules 
are enforced 
by 
sanctioning 
the employees 
who break 
them 
(Knapp, 2006) 8 Dropped Redunda
nt 
PE9 Repeat 
security 
offenders are 
appropriately 
disciplined 
(Knapp, 2006) 9 Dropped Redunda
nt 
PE10 Termination 
is a 
(Knapp, 2006) 10 Dropped Redunda
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consideration 
for employees 
who 
repeatedly 
break security 
rules 
nt 
PE11 Information 
security 
practices and 
procedures 
are 
externally 
audited 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/input 
2 Retained N/A 
PE12 Actions 
against 
violations 
are always 
taken 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/input 
3 Retained N/A 
PE13 Information 
security 
practices and 
procedures 
are 
continually 
monitored to 
ensure 
compliance 
with security 
policy 
(Da Veiga, 
Martin, and 
Eloff, 2007 
4 Retained N/A 
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Appendix C3.3: Expert Panel Result for Item Identification for Each Constructs: Policy 
Maintenance 
Number Item Originally 
Adopted 
Average 
Rank 
Decision/ 
Reword 
Justificati
on 
Information Security Policy Maintenance 
PM1 Information 
security policy is 
consistently 
reviewed and 
updated on a 
periodical basis 
(Knapp, 
2006) 
1 Retained N/A 
PM2 Information 
security policy is 
updated when 
technology 
changes require 
it. 
(Knapp, 
2006) 
10 Dropped Low 
Ranking 
PM3 Policy is updated 
when legal & 
regulatory 
changes require 
it. 
(Knapp, 
2006) 
9 Dropped Low 
Ranking 
PM4 An established 
information 
security policy 
review and update 
process exists. 
(Knapp, 
2006) 
8 Dropped Redunda
nt 
PM5 Security policy is 
properly updated 
on a regular 
basis. 
(Knapp, 
2006) 
7 Dropped Redunda
nt 
Appendix C: Scale Development Material 
306 
PM6 Risk 
assessments are 
conducted prior 
to developing 
new security 
policies 
(Knapp, 
2006) 
2 Retained N/A 
PM7 Information 
security policy is 
clearly defined 
(D’Arcy 
and 
Greene, 
2009) 
3 Retained N/A 
PM8 Assessing risks 
to information 
security is 
regular 
(Chalua, 
et al., 
2006) 
4 Retained N/A 
PM9 Formal security 
policy reviews are 
conducted at least 
annually. 
(Knapp, 
2006) 
5 Dropped Redunda
nt 
PM10 Information 
security policies 
are written in a 
manner that is 
clear and 
understandable. 
(Knapp, 
2006) 
6 Dropped Redunda
nt 
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Appendix C3.4: Expert Panel Result for Item Identification for Each Constructs: 
Security Training 
Numbe
r 
Item Originally 
Adopted 
Averag
e Rank 
Decision
/ Reword 
Justificat
ion 
Information Security Training 
T1 Necessary 
efforts are 
made to 
educate 
employees 
about new 
security polices 
(Knapp, 2006) 5 Dropped Redunda
nt 
T2 Users receive 
adequate 
security 
refresher 
training 
appropriate for 
their job 
function 
(Knapp, 2006) 6 Dropped Low 
Ranking 
T3 I received a 
formal 
training in 
information 
security 
(D’Arcy and 
Greene, 2009) 
1 Retained N/A 
T4 My 
organisation 
provides good 
information 
security 
training and 
education to 
(Knapp et al., 
2007) 
4 Dropped Redunda
nt 
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employees. 
T5 Information 
security 
policy is 
communicate
d well 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/inpu
t 
3 Retained N/A 
T6 I am always 
educated or 
trained about 
new security 
policies 
(Knapp et al., 
2007) 
2 Retained N/A 
 
Appendix C3.5: Expert Panel Result for Item Identification for Each Constructs: 
Ethical Conduct Policies 
Number Item Originally 
Adopted 
Average 
Rank 
Decision/ 
Reword 
Justification 
Ethical Conduct Policies 
ET1 I am familiar 
with the policy 
on Conflict of 
Interest 
(Chaula, 
2006) 
1 Retained N/A 
ET2 I am familiar 
with the policy 
on Professional 
Conduct 
(Chaula, 
2006) 
2 Retained N/A 
ET3 I am familiar 
with the policy 
on Code of 
Conduct for 
Officers and 
(Chaula, 
2006) 
3 Retained 
with 
rewording  
N/A 
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Administrators. 
ET4 I am familiar 
with the policy 
on reporting 
known and 
suspected fraud 
(Chaula, 
2006) 
5 Dropped Redundant 
ET5 I am familiar 
with the policy 
on Confidential 
Information. 
(Chaula, 
2006) 
4 Dropped Redundant 
 
 
 
Appendix C3.6: Expert Panel Result for Item Identification for Each Constructs: 
Security Awareness 
Number Item Originally 
Adopted 
Averag
e Rank 
Decision
/ Reword 
Justific
ation 
Information Security Awareness 
AW1 I am aware of 
information 
security 
responsibilities 
(Chaula, 2006) 2 Retained N/A 
AW2 I am aware of 
any information 
security policy 
in my 
organisations 
(Knapp, 2006) 7 Dropped Redund
ant 
AW3 Information 
security 
awareness is 
(Knapp, 2006) 8 Dropped Low 
Rankin
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communicated 
well. 
g 
AW4 A variety of 
business 
communication
s (notices, 
posters, 
newsletters, 
etc.) are used to 
promote 
security 
awareness. 
(Knapp, 2006) 9 Dropped Low 
Rankin
g  
AW5 An effective 
security 
awareness 
program exists. 
(Knapp, 2006) 5 Dropped Redund
ant 
AW6 A continuous, 
ongoing 
security 
awareness 
program exists. 
(Knapp, 2006) 7 Dropped Redund
ant 
AW7 I am familiar 
with the 
information 
security policy 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/inpu
t 
1 Retained N/A 
AW8 I am aware of 
the risk of not 
following the 
information 
security policy 
(D’Arcy and 
Greene, 2009) 
4 Retained N/A 
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AW9 I am aware of 
the risk of not 
following the 
information 
security policy 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/inpu
t 
3 Retained N/A 
 
Appendix C3.7: Expert Panel Result for Item Identification for Each Constructs: 
Security Compliance 
Number Item Originally 
Adopted 
Average 
Rank 
Decision/ 
Reword 
Justifi
cation 
Information Security Compliance 
CP1 I always 
adhere to the 
information 
security 
policy 
(D’Arcy and 
Greene, 2009) 
1 Retained N/A 
CP2 Others 
around 
adhere to the 
information 
security 
policy in a 
similar 
manner 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/input 
2 Retained N/A 
CP3 I comply with 
information 
security 
international 
standards 
(Chaula, 2006) 3 Dropped Redun
dant 
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Appendix C3.8: Expert Panel Result for Item Identification for Each Constructs: 
Security Ownership 
Number Item Originally 
Adopted 
Average 
Rank 
Decision/ 
Reword 
Justification 
Information Security Ownership 
OW1 It is my 
responsibility 
to protect the 
information of 
my 
organisation 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/input 
1 Retained N/A 
OW2 I take 
ownership of 
the outcomes 
of my 
information 
security 
decisions and 
actions 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/input 
3 Retained N/A 
OW3 Protecting 
information 
security is an 
important part 
of my job 
Qualitative 
Data and 
experts 
feedback/input 
2 Retained N/A 
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